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In the autumn of 1975, the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, aware of an accelerating and expanding assault on school
desegregation, undertook a major effort to counter this assault. The
"new thrust," as it became known, is aimed at building support for
school desegregation, stemming the tide of opposition to it, and retain-
ing victories already won.
The increased opposition to school desegregation focuses on busing
or, as its opponents call it, "forced busing." The President has spoken
against busing; the Congress has debated legislation and constitutional
amendments to end or lessen busing; only the Federal courts continue
to hew to the constitutional mandate of Brown v. Board of Education.
The mass media—television, radio, the daily press, and the news
magazines—covered antibusing developments in Boston and Louisville
and, in doing so, began to look at busing in a new light. Some have
raised the rhetorical question: "Is busing worth all this trouble?"
Others have flatly opposed busing "for racial balance," and some have
continued to support the courts in ordering busing as a remedy for a
constitutional wrong.
The Commission on Civil Rights, as part of its "new thrust," spon-
sored a consultation on "School Desegregation: The Courts and Subur-
ban Migration." Held on December 8, 1975, the meeting addressed
the major issues in the countroversy.
Four papers were presented and discussed at the consultation. The
first, "The Suburbanization of America," was presented by Robert C.
Weaver, former Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. It traced the movement of population from cities to sub-
urbs and placed it in historical perspective. Dr. Weaver was assisted
in the preparation of his paper by Ernest Erber, director of research
and program planning of the National Committee Against Discrimina-
tion in Housing.
The second paper, "Court, Congress, and School Desegregation,"
was presented by Robert B. McKay, former dean of the School of Law
of New York University. It examined the role of the Federal courts as
instruments of social change and the constitutional issues involved in
any congressional attempt to limit their power to order remedies, in-
cluding busing.
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The third paper, "School Desegregation and Loss of Whites from
Large CentralaCity School Districts," was presented by James S.
Coleman, professor of sociology at the University of Chicago. It ex-
amined trends in school desegregation between 1968 and 1973 and set
forth findings and an analysis of the data on which they were based.
The analysis was based upon a study done by Dr. Coleman, Sara D.
Kelly, and James A. Moore for the Urban Institute, Washington, D.C.
The fourth paper, "Public School Desegregation and White Flight:
A Reply to Professor Coleman," was presented by Robert L. Green,
dean of the College of Urban Development at Michigan State Universi-
ty. Its analysis of school desegregation and white flight differed from
Dr. Coleman's and sharply disagreed with his conclusions and
opinions. The paper was developed by Dr. Green and Thomas F. Pet-
tigrew, professor of social psychology and sociology at Harvard
University. Robert Griffore, doctoral student, College of Education,
Michigan State University; John Schweitzer, associate professor, and
Joseph Wisenbaker, instructor, both of the College of Urban Develop-
ment, Michigan State University, assisted in development of the oral
presentation.
Following the Coleman-Green exchange, Edgar Epps, professor of
urban education at the University of Chicago, and Robert L. Wolf,
director of the Indiana Center of Evaluation at Indiana University,
commented on the discussion.
Francis Keppel, former U.S. Commissioner of Education, closed the
meeting offering his observations on the day's deliberations.
The views expressed by the participants in their papers and the
discussion are their own and do not necessarily represent those of the
United States Commission on Civil Rights.
These proceedings were prepared by Frederick B. Routh, director,
and Everett A. Waldo, assistant director, Special Projects Division, Of-
fice of National Civil Rights Issues; and Carol-Lee Hurley, editorial su-
pervisor, Office of Management, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Mr.
Routh served as coordinator of the consultation.V
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The United States Commission on Civil Rights sponsored a consulta-
tion on December 8, 1975, in Washington to review the relationship
between desegregation, court orders, and suburbanization, as well as
to assess what further role the Commission might play in discharging
its responsibility to advance the constitutional rights of all children to
a desegregated education. Papers and statements were solicited from
a variety of experts in the field. This introduction summarizes the
presentations made by participants in the consultation and analyzes the
points raised.
The Suburbanization of America
Dr. Robert Weaver, former Secretary of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, began the presentation with a discussion of
the process of suburbanization. His paper points out that suburbaniza-
tion is a very old process dating back to five centuries before the birth
of Christ. He noted that there always have been places to which the
well-to-do have moved to escape the less desirable aspects of urban
life. These earliest suburban areas almost always were areas for the
highest income group, which could afford the transportation cost or
could afford to maintain more than one residence.
The origin of suburbs in this country, Dr. Weaver explains, goes
back at least to the turn of the century. As larger cities, especially
those on the East Coast, began to grow, as transportation facilities
were developed, and as industry showed the first sign of decentralizing
(and using horizontal assembly processes), suburbs began to emerge.
These were not all high-income suburbs but included many industrial
and satellite suburbs as well. Close-in suburbs became a "zone of
emergence" for upwardly-mobile sons and daughters of immigrants.
This out-movement continued until the Depression, when it declined
to a relatively low level until the end of the Second World War.
Over the years, Dr. Weaver states, the form and the function of sub-
urbs changed. Until the end of the war, suburbs were largely depen-
dent on the city for jobs, vital amenities, and for many services. Subur-
* This introduction is based upon a paper summarizing the consultation, prepared for
the Commission by Dr. Philip L. Clay, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology.
1ban development clustered on established transportation links to the
city. Over the last 30 years, however, the suburbs have developed a
cultural and political independence and an economic interdependence.
Dr. Weaver notes George Sternlieb's suggestion that suburbs have
reached a critical mass. Not only do they have a large population, they
now have more political power than the central cities—along with cul-
tural and civic amenities.
Turning to the individual household factors in suburbanization, Dr.
Weaver asks why households have moved in such large numbers to the
suburbs. Clearly, it would be logically improper to infer individual ac-
tion entirely from aggregate trends, especially when the changes have
been so profound and yet so selective among suburbs by racial and
other status characteristics. Dr. Weaver suggests that both "push" and
"pull" factors are at work. On the "pull" side, he points to data that
suggest that the strongest attraction to the suburb is the availability of
a wider range of job opportunities. Other "pull" factors include the
desire for a rustic ambience, for space, and for the opportunity to own
a home. The cumulative effect of these attractions made politicians
responsive and accommodating to suburban growth and development.
As a result, the "pull" was further helped by highway development,
very favorable tax policies, and Federal mortgage insurance pro-
grams—features that the central city could not match.
According to Dr. Weaver, there were also some "push" factors at
work. Support for city services and maintaining productive jobs were
on the decline, and taxes and crime had increased. The number and
percentage of blacks increased, but that has been a much more varied
phenomenon than is generally believed. In many cities, the number of
blacks did not become significant until the early or mid-sixties, while
the suburban growth began in the late forties and early fifties. In many
other cities, blacks have yet to become a significant percentage of the
population. Suburbanization is not tied, either in time or geographi-
cally, to the existence of blacks, to say nothing of specific court-im-
posed desegregation orders. It may be inferred that (1) school
desegregation could not be responsible for the general growth of sub-
urbs and (2) that the reason individuals move is not only a function
of what the city offers or fails to offer, but what the suburbs offer as
well.
Dr. Weaver concludes that the injection of race into discussion of
suburban development obfuscates rather than clarifies. Suburbs emerge
to meet some legitimate and nonracial (and only partly class) goals of
individual households, as well as to respond to aggregate demographic
and economic trends. It is unfortunate that many commentators both
in the social science community and in the political community have
2seized upon race or racial dominance as a causal element in trends
which have many, and still tangled, origins.
The Courts, Congress, and School Desegregation
Having traced the demographic issues, consultation participants
turned their attention to the legal issues, specifically the development
of case law related to school desegregation and the relationship among
the branches of government in school desegregation matters.
Mr. Robert B. McKay, former dean of the New York University Law
School, began by pointing out that over the years the three branches
of the Federal Government have played a key role in developing civil
rights policy and extending the scope of enforcement activity. The
greatest gains in civil rights occurred when the three branches of
government were generally working together toward the expansion and
enforcement of civil rights. Indeed, as a general statement, when the
branches of government move single-mindedly in this way progress is
possible; when the branches move in different directions, or with dif-
fering levels of enthusiasm, then the separation of powers and the
checks and balances among the branches inevitably lead to slowdowns,
and even to retrenchment and paralysis in the Federal effort. The
chronology of Federal activity in school desegregation illustrates this
phenomenon.
Chronology of Significant Federal School Desegregation Activities,
1954-75
1954
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
Found that "separate but equal" schools deprived black children
of "equal protection of the law."
1955
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955)
Ordered that blacks be admitted to public schools on a nondis-
criminatory basis "with all deliberate speed."
1964
Civil Rights Act of 1964
While Congress gave blacks access to public accommodations and
publicly-supported facilities, it included a proviso that Federal of-
ficials and courts could not issue any order requiring transporta-
tion of students to achieve racial balance beyond constitutional
requirements.
31966
U.S. v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th
cir. 1966)
Found that "the only school desegregation plan that meets con-
stitutional standards is one that works."
1966
Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-750, 80 Stat. 1191, § 181.
Congress specifically refused to authorize HEW to require pupil
transportation in order to overcome racial imbalance.
1968
Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968)
The Supreme Court rejected "freedom of choice" because it
failed to produce any significant desegregation and because it
failed to remove the racial identification of schools.
1969
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969)
Schools were told by the Supreme Court that they could delay
desegregation no longer and that they had to develop a unitary
system of education.
1971
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
The lower court order to bus children to achieve school
desegregation was upheld as an appropriate means of dismantling
the dual system of education and removing the vestiges of dis-
crimination in the schools.
North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971)
The court ruled in a related case that a State law prohibiting bus-
ing "would deprive school authorities of the one too! absolutely
essential to fulfillment of their consitutional obligation to eliminate
existing dual school systems." 402 U.S. at 46 (1971).
1972
Amendments were passed that restricted the use of Federal funds for
pupil transportation to achieve desegregation, extended to all regions
of the country the proviso against Federal officials issuing orders
designed to achieve racial balance in public schools, and allowed
parents of transported students to seek to reopen cases where travel
time or distance was excessive. Act of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-318, §§ 801-806, 86 Stat. 371-72.
41973
Keyes v. School District No. 7,413 U.S. 189 (1973)
Busing was ordered in Denver. This represented the first case in
which a busing order was upheld by the Supreme Court outside
of the South. The Court said that when a segregative intent exists
in a substantial portion of the school system, then a system-wide
remedy to assure nondiscrimination is permissible.
Bradley v. State Bd. of Education, 412 U.S. 92 (1973) There was no
Supreme Court majority in a case involving a metropolitan solution
for Richmond schools. The Congress was considering and the Pre-
sident was proposing drastic antibusing legislation to curb court-or-
dered busing.
1974
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)
In an appeal of a lower court order for metropolitan busing in
Detroit to end de jure segregation, the Supreme Court did not ap-
prove metropolitan busing, noting a failure to demonstrate con-
stitutional violations on the part of the suburban jurisdictions.
The Congress backed down on harsh antibusing legislation aimed
at reducing Federal court jurisdiction, but passed restrictions on
the use of pupil transportation for desegregation beyond the next
nearest school of each pupil and establishing priorities for
remedies in school desegregation cases. Congress also prohibited
the issuance of administrative or judicial orders requiring student
reassignment for desegregation at times other than the beginning
of an academic year. Pub. L. No. 93-380, §§ 201-259, 88 Stat.
484.
[Editor's Note: After this consultation was over but before these
proceedings went to press, the Supreme Court decided Hills v. Gautreaux, 44
U.S.L.W. 4480 (US April 20, 1976), establishing the policy that metropolitan
relief—in this case involving housing discrimination—is permissible under
certain circumstances. The Court distinguished between this case and
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717.
The Hills v. Gautreaux ruling enables HUD to finance construction
of lower- and middle-income housing beyond the political and geo-
graphical boundaries of a city (in this case, Chicago) which has been
found to have discriminated in its public housing policy, "but within
the housing market relevant to the respondents housing options***."
The potential effect of this decision on school desegregation might
appear obvious, yet it is too early to make any specific prognoses. If
the suburbs are opened, in fact, to lower- and middle-income fami-
lies—including minority families—minority children will attend subur-
5ban schools in increasing numbers and, in some communities, for the
first time.
White flight—an alleged movement of middle-class white parents to
the suburbs supposedly to avoid inner-city school desegregation—if at
all significant, could well be slowed if suburban schools also are in-
tegrated.]
As a result of these events, one point has emerged that Mr. McKay
notes is of particular importance: The Federal court system is the only
branch of the Federal Government still committed to the use of bus-
ing. Both the Congress and the President are retreating on the issue
of desegregation, especially as it involves the forms of segregation most
common in the North.
With this analysis, Mr. McKay outlines the implications of the
present situation. He sees almost no possiblity of congressional antibus-
ing legislation that would avert a constitutional confrontation with the
Supreme Court. Prospects for a constitutional amendment that
prohibits busing are minimal; such an amendment poses certain con-
ceptual problems that trouble even busing opponents (President Ford,
for example, while opposed to busing, also opposes a constitutional
amendment to ban it). Enforcement by the executive branch has been
less than vigorous, according to Mr. McKay. For example, HEW
recently returned to the Treasury more than $2 million in civil rights
enforcement money.
The conclusion that evolved from the legal analysis by Mr. McKay
is that busing is firmly in place (from a legal perspective) as the best
tool and, in many cases, the only tool for desegregation. Congress and
the President are limited in what they can do about it, although their
ability to frustrate the effectiveness of busing is, nevertheless, real and
increasingly problematic.
The two papers thus far presented bring us to the challenge of the
consultation: If, as Dr. Weaver argues, suburbanization has been inde-
pendent of desegregation, and if, as Mr. McKay argues, busing is the
best and legally most acceptable way to desegregate, how do we deal
with Dr. James Coleman's argument that busing is counterproductive
to the desegregative intent of the courts?
Desegregation and the Loss of Whites from the
Schools
Dr. Coleman became prominent in social science and public policy
with a major HEW report in 1966 that noted the importance of the
family background of schoolmates in the achievement of lower-class
6children.
1 This report was widely used to support desegregation efforts
although it was not initially intended for that purpose.
Recently, as part of a large project for the Urban Institute in
Washington, Dr. Coleman turned his attention to the effect of school
desegregation on loss of white children from certain city school dis-
tricts. Pointing out some variation among regions of the country and
between small and large districts, he notes that there was some decline
in the amount of segregation within school districts and that segrega-
tion between districts increased. This suggests that whites leave the in-
creasingly black central districts for white suburban districts.
Coleman suggests that the causal element in the process is
"substantial desegregation." In the Urban Institute study, he examined
Federal date from 1968 to 1973 for 21 of the 23 largest school dis-
tricts and a second category of 46 of the 47 next largest districts. (The
inclusions and cutoffs in these categories were the subject of substan-
tial controversy.) Dr. Coleman did a number of statistical tests and
concluded that, depending on the percentage of blacks in the system
and the amount of desegregation that occurs, the average loss of
whites may range from 3 to 40 percent. (It should be noted that none
of the large central-city districts considered by Coleman had court-or-
dered busing during the study period. His conclusion about the impact
of court-ordered busing is not, strictly speaking, a finding from his
data.) Coleman's major arguments are quoted in the findings below:
1. In the large cities (among the largest 23 central-city school dis-
tricts) there is a sizeable loss of whites when desegregation takes
place.
2. There is a loss, but less than half as large, from small cities.
These differences due to city size continue to hold when the
reduced opportunity of white flight into surrounding school dis-
tricts in the smaller cities is taken into account.
3. The estimated loss is less in northern cities which have un-
dergone desegregation than in southern ones.
4. In addition to effects of desegregation on white loss, both the
absolute proportion of blacks in the central city and their propor-
tion relative to blacks in the surrounding metropolitan area have
strong effects on loss of whites from the central city district.
5. Apart from the general effect on white loss, a high absolute
proportion of blacks in the central city and a high difference in
racial composition between the central city district and the
remaining metropolitan area both intensify the effects of
desegregation on rates of white loss.
1 James S. Coleman et al., Equality of Educational Opportunity (1966).
76. When general rates of white loss for individual cities are taken
into account, the desegregation effects still hold to about the same
degree as estimated from comparisons among cities.
7. No conclusive results have been obtained concerning the direct
effect of desegregation in subsequent years to the first. The in-
direct effect, however, through increasing the proportion black in
the city and the segregation between the city district and suburban
ones, is to accelerate the loss of whites.
8. The effect of desegregation on white loss has been widely dif-
ferent among different cities where desegregation has taken place.
9. Because, insofar as we can estimate, the loss of whites upon
desegregation is a one-time loss, the long-term impact of
desegregation is considerably less than that of other continuing
factors. The continuing white losses produce an extensive erosion
of the interracial contact that desegregation of city schools brings
about.
Coleman concludes from his analysis that the courts' aim of reduc-
ing segregation in public schools is being defeated by the individual
preference of whites for an all-white (or much less black) suburban
system. What is emerging is a black central-core district with white dis-
tricts surrounding it. He implies that: (1) Some way should be found
to accommodate "the will of the community" (presumably the white
community, since that is where opposition to busing is manifest), and
(2) that attempts to undo de facto segregation (which is not caused by
state action but individual action) reduce individual rights.
In the discussion which follows Dr. Green's presentation, Dr.
Coleman advocates intermarriage as a means of creating "a large set
of interested parties whose orientation to this issue is not so fragile as
that of a set of white liberals who happen to live in the suburbs."
The Green-Pettigrew Rebuttal
Professor Robert Green and Professor Thomas Pettigrew are both
distinguished social scientists who have studied school desegregation
extensively. Their paper (presented by Professor Green) is based not
only on their own findings, but also on findings from related studies
on the subject by independent researchers. The paper also contains an
analysis of the context in which the Coleman-generated controversy
arises.
Dr. Green began by pointing out how Dr. Coleman's research had
been initially presented. He traced the development of at least three
versions of Coleman's paper, each with a different research design and
8somewhat different findings, but all with the same conclusion about
the role of court orders in hastening white loss. None of the cities in-
cluded by Coleman were under court order during the period
1968-73. Dr. Green notes that Dr. Coleman, nevertheless, consistently
presented his views to the press as based on his data.
Dr. Green next turns to a review of findings from other researchers
on this topic. Dr. W. Reynolds Farley, a University of Michigan
sociologist, using the same data (1967-72) but for a larger group of
cities, found no relationship between desegregation and loss of whites
from the system. Dr. Christine Rossell, a Boston University political
scientist, found that desegregation (especially in high-income commu-
nities) may have a social integrating function. With respect to "white
flight" and school desegregation, she found no significant trend in
white flight accounted for by desegregation, although she used the
same national data as Dr. Coleman and, in addition, she collected
more detailed data from local school districts. Her findings even held
true in the limited numbers of cities that implemented court-ordered
desegregation during the period.
Additional analysis by Dr. Gregg Jackson, then on the staff of the
Commission on Civil Rights, and by Dr. Pettigrew himself showed that
school desegregation was not independently or substantially responsi-
ble for white loss from the schools.
The Green-Pettigrew paper goes into great detail about the dif-
ferences in various versions of the Coleman paper, the methodology
of Dr. Coleman's critics, and the sharp differences in the definitions,
methods, and assumptions they employed. These critics generally sug-
gested that Dr. Coleman chose the most restrictive definitions and as-
sumptions to include in his analyses. For example, in his general
model, intended to reflect an average effect, Dr. Coleman chose to as-
sume that blacks were 50 percent of the model school system (when
the real average is 28 percent) and a reduction in segregation of .2
2
or more (only 6 percent of the systems had that much), thereby creat-
ing conditions that pertained to only 1 percent of his total observa-
tions. Such a weighting of the data led to a prediction of the worst
result on average.
Drs. Green and Pettigrew then looked at the studies, including Dr.
Coleman's, to attempt to identify what could be reliably said from the
data about the relationship between school desegregation and loss of
whites from school systems. Their findings are quoted below:
2 The .2 figure is related to a segregation index used by Dr. Coleman. If all schools
have the same percentage of blacks as there are in the school district as a whole, the
index would be 0.00. Typical values of the segregation index in large cities before
desegregation were in the range of 0.6 to 0.8.
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1. There has been an enormous, long-term trend of whites leaving
the central cities for the suburbs and blacks coming into the lar-
gest central cities.
2. There is agreement among the studies that there is little or no
effect of desegregation on the "white flight" of students in medi-
um- and smaller-sized cities.
3. There is agreement that there is little or no effect of desegrega-
tion on the "white flight" of students in metropolitanwide districts.
4. Desegregation required by Federal court orders has not had dif-
ferent effects on "white flight" from other desegregation of equal
magnitude.
5. The loss of white and black students from large urban school
systems is significantly related to the proportion of black students
in the system.
6. Extensive school desegregation in the largest nonmetropolitan
school districts, particularly in the South, may hasten "white
flight" in the first year of the process for families already planning
to move; but at least part of this effect may be compensated for
in later years.
A panelist, Dr. Robert Wolf, director of the Indiana University
Center for Evaluation, points out that "white flight" does not neces-
sarily reduce interracial contact in the schools, as Dr. Coleman has ar-
gued. Many of the whites who left the system had not been in
desegregated situations before, and the overall result, despite some
flight, may be to increase interracial contact among those who remain.
Over and above the issues raised in the individual papers, a number
of more general issues were raised during the consultation.
The first such issue is the "ecological fallacy,"
3 first raised in the
Green paper. Dr. Coleman, Dr. Green stated, made an argument about
individual action, yet presented nothing that addressed individual
motivations behind mobility. Dr. Weaver touched on this issue by
pointing out the "push" and "pull" factors involved in the subur-
banization process. To the extent that individual actions and their
motivations were not addressed with the same depth as the aggregate
trends, the consultation—and current research—are incomplete.
The "ecological fallacy" issue gains in significance when examining
individual situations. The local context and the interaction among local
events, local demography, specific desegregation tools, and trends in
3 By "ecological fallacy," social scientists mean drawing unwarranted conclusions re-
garding individual motivations or actions based upon aggregate data.11
suburbanization are often pivotal. The Washington, D.C., area, for ex-
ample, suffers from great interdistrict segregation. However, the same
events that in other cities led to increased interdistrict segregation led
in Washington to a very substantial increase in black suburbanization
as well. This phenomenon illustrates a far more complicated picture of
mobility.
Similarly, substantial black suburbanization occurred in the Los An-
geles area and modest increases occurred in a half dozen other cities.
In these areas, the important motivations seem to have been housing
and job opportunities and, in the case of blacks particularly, rising in-
come for a select minority. Education or desegregation was a late fac-
tor and hardly the most significant one.
Another issue raised by the consultation is the relevance of concern
for "white flight." The courts have taken note of the hardships that
busing may cause and have articulated instances where busing may be
inappropriate. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
[402 U.S. 1 (1971)] the Supreme Court stated that "an objection to
transportation of students may have some validity when the time or
distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health of the children
or significantly impinge on the educational process."
4 Aside from this
restriction, however, busing has been deemed essential to assuring the
rights of black and other minority children.
The Supreme Court's critics charge that Swann violates the rights of
white children to education at a "neighborhood school." But whites do
not have the right to exclude blacks or to preserve a school district
in a manner that appeals to their prejudices or economic interest. (The
amenities enjoyed by the suburbs, as Dr. Weaver pointed out, were
granted largely with the help of Federal legislation.) White flight from
an unsatisfactory situation poses no constitutional problem, although
from a larger, urban development perspective, most would agree it is
desirable to provide a high quality of life in all sections of a
metropolitan area for all citizens and for some stability to obtain.
(There was little discussion of the latter premise.)
Policymakers are daily faced with the necessity to act on dated, im-
perfect, and seriously conflicting data. Both public policy and social
science are dialectical. (Both contain a thesis, an antithesis, and a
synthesis.) New situations, new data, and new experiences will point
out errors or shortcomings that have to be resolved. The issues sur-
rounding school desegregation have become more controversial
because they have been debated in the media and because social
scientists are divided.
4 402 U.S. at 30-31.12
Another issue raised in the consultation centers on what remedies
are appropriate for school segregation. Dr. Coleman advocated
"voluntary integrating transfers." Under this system, blacks would be
able to attend any school where their presence would promote
desegregation (intra and interdistrict). Movement would be voluntary
for students, but a school would have to accept blacks until minority
enrollment reached a target level. No white children would be forced
to move under this plan.
Dr. Green and several others question whether this plan meets the
constitutional mandate of Swann. They see it as a variation on the
"freedom of choice" theme which the courts have discarded for
several reasons: It doesn't work; the burden of desegregation falls too
heavily on black children; and racial identification of schools remains.
The constitutionality of the voluntary transfer plan remains in serious
doubt.
Drs. Green and Pettigrew argue for a metropolitan approach that
would allow the courts more stability and flexibility in developing a
remedy that they admit currently is too dependent on forcing blacks
and poor whites to fight for declining and seriously inadequate
resources for schools. In addition, a metropolitan approach would as-
sure more demographic stability. Such plans need not involve
metropolitan government, which is opposed by a large and powerful
constituency, including most black political leaders.
In the discussion of remedies, little was said about quality education,
perhaps because legally desegregation is not tied to the quality of edu-
cation. Brown said that separate is inherently unequal. However, the
ultimate support for desegregation will rest on whether blacks and
whites are satisfied that their children will gain a better education at
the end of the bus ride. While this issue did not significantly surface
at the consultation, it will ultimately have to be addressed.
The Commissioners and staff were pleased with the results of this
consultation, for they believe that it provided a public forum for an
orderly, rational, and scholarly discussion of a highly emotional issue.
Each of the major papers and the discussions that followed them con-
tributed to a further understanding of the various positions held by
scholars of differing or opposing viewpoints.
The Commission will not issue findings and recommendations at this
time. Those will come later in the report to the Nation and will be
based upon the several projects undertaken as part of the Commis-
sion's "new thrust" program, which is aimed at examining the current
status of school desegregation throughout the Nation.
There are, however, some general conclusions that the Commission
believes may be drawn from the papers presented and the deliberations
held at the consultation.13
First, the suburbanization process—the movement of middle-class
whites and, to a lesser extent, middle-class blacks from the inner city
to the suburbs—predates school desegregation. The evidence presented
at the consultation suggests that school desegregation and the busing
of school children may accelerate this movement in some communi-
ties, particularly during the first year of school desegregation. With few
exceptions, the degree of acceleration was not of great significance.
Second, the United States Supreme Court and the other Federal
courts have held that school segregation is unconstitutional and to ef-
fectuate this holding have ordered the dismantling of "dual" school
systems. Further, the courts have held that, in certain situations, busing
is a necessary and reasonable means for the implementation of con-
stitutionally-mandated school desegregation.
Third, congressional and executive attempts to limit or restrict the
authority of the Federal courts to provide remedies, including busing,
for constitutionally prohibited school segregation can lead to a direct
confrontation between them and the courts and to a constitutional cri-
sis. Fourth, congressional and other attempts to seek a constitutional
amendment to prohibit busing as a means for constitutionally-mandated
school desegregation are ill conceived.
Fifth, school desegregation, including busing, has a better chance for
public approval or acceptance when it is supported as the law of the
land by educational, civic, religious, business, labor, and elected
leadership.
Sixth, school desegregation, including busing, has a better chance of
succeeding when the three branches of the Federal Government are
mutually supportive of its implementation.
Seventh, from many points of view, a more effective remedy for
school segregation in many parts of the Nation is to be found in
metropolitan desegregation than in desegregating the central city
alone.14
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: THE
COURTS AND SUBURBAN
MIGRATION
A Consultation Sponsored by the United States
Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C.,
December 8, 1975.
The U.S. Commissior on Civil Rights convened pursuant to notice
at 9 a.m., Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman, presiding. Present: Arthur
S. Flemming, Chairman; Stephen Horn, Vice Chairman; Manuel Ruiz,
Jr., Commissioner; Murray Saltzman, Commissioner; Robert S. Rankin,
Commissioner; Frankie M. Freeman, Commissioner; John A. Buggs,
Staff Director.
Proceedings
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. I am very happy at this time to call this hear-
ing to order. The purpose of the hearing, or public consultation, is
reflected very accurately in the program for the day. I assume that
everyone has a copy of the program.
We are honored to have with us today Dr. Robert C. Weaver. It was
my privilege to be associated with Dr. Weaver during the days when
he was a public servant here in Washington. As we all know, his ser-
vices here led to his being appointed as Secretary of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development. He is certainly one of our na-
tion's outstanding leaders in the area in which he is going to direct his
attention this morning.
At the present time he is president of the National Committee
Against Discrimination in Housing, and also a distinguished professor
of urban affairs at Hunter College.
Dr. Weaver, I speak for all of my colleagues when I express to you
our deep appreciation for your willingness to develop this paper, and
then to be here with us this morning to discuss what we as a Commis-
sion regard as among the most important issues confronting us in the
area for which we have responsibility.15
Dr. Weaver.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. WEAVER, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, AND
FORMER SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT
DR. WEAVER. Thank you, Dr. Flemming, members of the Commis-
sion, ladies and gentlemen.
It is a great pleasure, Dr. Flemming, to be back working with you,
as was my privilege a couple decades ago.
Suburbanization has been going on much longer than most persons
realize. It, and most certainly the impulse to suburbanize, are probably
as old as the city itself, if we can judge from a letter, written in cu-
neiform on a clay tablet, addressed to King Cyrus of Persia in 539 B.C.
by an early suburbanite who extolled that life style: "Our property
seems to me the most beautiful in the world. It is so close to Babylon
that we enjoy all the advantages of the city, and yet when we come
home we are away from all the noise and dust."
Although many of the basic motives that triggered suburbanization
in ancient Babylon have changed little through the centuries, the form
and content of suburbs has undergone vast changes; never more so
than in the United States within the past three decades. Because of
magnitude alone, contemporary suburban settlement would have to be
assessed as a phenomenon that is uniquely different from its predeces-
sors; a classic example of the philosophic concept of quantitative
change resulting in qualitative change.
The suburban population of the United States in 1970 exceeded for
the first time that of the central cities and that of the nonmetropolitan
areas. The suburbs contained 74.9 million inhabitants; the central ci-
ties, 62.2 million; the nonmetropolitan areas, 63.2 million.
This phenomenon cannot be understood if we limit our investiga-
tions to observations made in our lifetime; not even if our age permits
us to make them before World War II. As noted by "The President's
Task Force on Suburban Problems" in 1968, "To be meaningful, any
examination of the suburbs as they are today—and as they will be in
the future—must consider the nation's growth trends that began before
the turn of the century."
As a matter of record, this phenomenon was already being studied
by scholars long before this century began. Thus, Charles Booth,
whose classic works on cities were written in the late 19th century,
described the decentralizing trend of industry at that time to the out-
skirts of London, where more land was available at lower prices. His
studies of the influence upon metropolitan form of social and16
economic classes, and of transportation and housing, which he con-
sidered keys to understanding the urban growth process, led him to
predict a trend toward local suburban centers.
Filtering such scholarly observations upon urban form through his
vividly imaginative mind, the genius that was H.G. Wells' predicted in
1902 that the very terms "town" and "city" will become as obsolete
as "mail coach" because spreading urbanization will submerge them as
distinct identities. Casting about for a proper designation of the pre-
dicted u
rban form of the future, Wells wrote that, "We may for our
present yurposes call these coming town provinces 'urban regions."'
Wells' "urban regions" had been in existence in the United States
for several decades at the time he wrote the above lines. But what has
come to be regarded as suburbanization has deep and often unrecog-
nized roots in population movements within cities. Movement of the
more affluent from concentrations of the poor has long characterized
urban life. Jean Gottman, for example, reminds us that it occurred in
the larger cities of Europe during the Industrial Revolution.
In the United States a similar process has long been typical, and so-
cial standing in American cities has increasingly been evidenced not
only by the type of housing but the type of neighborhood. Today the
latter is the more important. The flight from deterioration—real or an-
ticipated— has, in large part, been a movement away from poor im-
migrants, or more recently, from blacks, Puerto Ricans, or Chicanos.
Actually, however, the migration of Negroes to cities was quite small
as compared to the earlier volume of European immigrants. At its
peak the latter migration was at least 8 million in a decade and most
settled in the cities; Negro migration at its height was about a million
and a half in a decade. "So in terms of inflitrating cities with large
numbers of low-income people with a different culture, the Negro
migration has not been unusual."
Ours has long been one of the most mobile populations in the world.
Involved was not only movement across regional and State lines and
from rural to urban areas, but also within urban areas. Thus, the move-
ment from the center of the city to the periphery and beyond is
nothing new. Census data for many years concealed this fact, largely
because the city boundaries were distant from the active residential
land use.
At the same time, many American cities in the past annexed territo-
ry or otherwise extended their boundaries. As a result, large-scale
building, industrial, and commercial activity could and did take place
within the city's limits. A generation or longer ago, suburbs were
frequently within the boundaries of cities. They were at its fringes
which, at that time, contained much undeveloped land and large sec-
tions where streets had not been cut through.17
Several new factors have been introduced more recently. The first
was a revolution in transportation. The horsecar extended the geo-
graphic limits of urban development. Railroads, with their land
resources and commuter trains—as well as their intensive sales efforts
soon expanded by the activities of the real estate indus-
try—successfully played up class exclusiveness as an attribute of subur-
bia. Electric rapid mass transportation, successively in the form of
streetcars, elevated lines, and subways, facilitated much greater disper-
sal of the urban population within the city and beyond its corporate
limits into suburbs.
In the process, economic groups which had previously not been able
to afford the transportation costs were able increasingly to participate.
It was, of course, the automobile which made large-scale and far-flung
surburban living possible for millions of Americans. Its advent consum-
mated the final escape from the space limitations of the endowments
of the horse which had characterized the 19th century city.
The year 1900 marked the apex of preponderance of population for
a number of central cities in relation to their suburbs. In that year
Boston's population was already only 43 percent of its Standard
Metropolitan Area as it would be defined in 1950. They didn't have
any definition at that date. By 1970 it had shrunken to a mere 23 per-
cent. (Unlike most cities, Boston's boundaries have not been expanded
by annexation in over a century.) Cincinnati in 1900 contained 63 per-
cent of the population of its 1950 Standard Metropolitan Area, shrink-
ing to 33 percent in 1970. St. Louis' 71 percent in 1900 had become
26 percent in 1970. Buffalo's 69 percent had become 39 percent.
Cleveland's 85 percent had become 36 percent.
The year 1900 seems also to mark the beginning of a widespread
awareness of the suburban phenomenon. It was in the decade of
1900-1910 that the Bureau of Census first took statistical notice.
Beginning in 1910 the Bureau made population data available for what
it termed "metropolitan districts," forerunners of today's Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, the now familiar SMSAs.
In preparation for the 1950 census, it was decided that defining of
metropolitan areas and identification of classes of data to be collected
should be the responsibility of a broad-based, interdepartmental com-
mittee of the Federal Government. This marked the recognition of the
importance of metropolitan areas for recordkeeping, analysis, and pro-
jection for a wide range of subject matter.
SMSAs have since become a critically essential classification for all
departments of the Federal Government that touch upon urban affairs,
as well as for governments at State and local levels. They are equally
essential for private enterprise and scholarly research. It would be dif-18
ficult to imagine either the public or private sectors being able to
know what is happening in urban America and to plan their operations
in relation to it without the availability of data that treat cities and
suburbs as parts of a metropolitan whole.
Nor was it long before students of urban trends tried to classify the
new suburban phenomenon, to define it, to describe it and to formu-
late theories to explain its appearance and continuing evolution. One
of the first was Graham Taylor, who wrote Satellite Cities in 1915. Ten
years later (1925) Harlan Douglas published a more ambitious effort
to comprehend the new urban scene with his The Suburban Trend.
What Leo J. Schnore identifies as the seminal work on
"metropolitanism" was published in 1922 by N.S.B. Gras, an historical
analysis of the evolution of the city's economy into the "metropolitan
economy." In 1933, R.D. McKenzie published the first effort at com-
prehensive statistical treatment of metropolitan development, in the
course of which he documented "the rise of the metropolitan commu-
nity."
The decade of the 1920s had seen the first attempt to plan for an
entire urban region in the 6-year effort that produced the "Plan for
New York and Its Environs," leading to the formation of the Regional
Plan Association. Basic to the preparation of this plan were the re-
gional economic studies of Robert Murray Haig, professor of business
administration at Columbia University.
Dr. Haig's work proved to be the basic work in documenting and
analyzing the process by which the economic base of an entire
metropolitan area emerges and develops. His painstaking analysis of
the relocation of the various industries from Manhattan to nearby loca-
tions in Brooklyn and Jersey City, and subsequent removal to more
distant parts of the country, laid the factual basis for an understanding
that not only population, but also employment, is caught up in a
process of movement out from the center toward the periphery of
metropolitan areas.
Suburbanization slowed down during the Great Depression when
both economic expansion and residential construction came to virtual
standstills, then recovered slowly in the late 1930s, and was finally
stirred into feverish activity as the decade closed with rearmament and
the outbreak of war in Europe. War production in the 1940s brought
a reversal in the outward trend of population and employment as the
expansion of industrial capacity took place mainly in established cen-
ters which contained basic plants and housing and an available labor
force.
This was to prove to be the central cities' last economic advance as
compared with the suburbs. As one study noted, "The evidence of a19
further concentration of manufacturing employment in the large cities
during World War II now appears as a temporary interruption of a
long-term trend of a declining share that was begun as far back at least
as the beginning of this century."
Even before World War II came to an end, increasing numbers of
leaders in government and the private sector began to project concerns
for the postwar shape of things, especially with reference to where the
jobs that were to meet the goal of full employment were to be located
and where the houses were to be built to give American families
adequate shelter.
As early as 1942 one voice, speaking for town planners and
architects, called attention to the bleak prospects of America's matur-
ing cities. J.L. Sert, in a book prophetically titled Can Our Cities Sur-
vive? warned that "Up to recent times city planners have disregarded
the fact that, when a certain degree of maturity is reached in the cities
of today, they universally exhibit the same alarming symptoms. These
endanger their very existence." The failure to make the city livable,
Sert declared 33 years ago, causes people "to abandon their over-
crowded neighborhoods for 'a quiet home' in remote suburbs, un-
deterred by hours of uncomfortable travel back and forth. Industry,
too, moves out—to cheaper land, to regions of lower taxes, to con-
venience sites on rail sidings or side roads. The city is breaking up.
Such dispersion of great cities knows neither control nor planning. It
is provoked by urban chaos itself, and is facilitated by modern means
of transportation."
Unlike the central city, the basic function and form of which have
changed only in degree, the suburban settlements that emerged since
World War II have little in common with the ecological type called
"surburb" previous to that time. The contemporary suburb is different
from its earlier namesake in both function and form. Without the func-
tional role it has assumed, today's suburb could not have attained its
vast scale.
Essentially the difference between the prewar and postwar types of
suburban development is that the former existed in a symbiotic rela-
tionship to the city as one of its more remote residential neighbor-
hoods, while the latter increasingly duplicates the functions of the cen-
tral city and, consequently, competes with it as a destructive rival.
The persistent, even if at times interrupted, growth of population
and, more vitally, employment in the suburban rings around central ci-
ties accumulated over time what George Sternlieb identifies as the
"critical mass" that ignited to propel the suburbs ahead of their central
cities in many of the very functions that historically were the raison
d'etre for the cities' existence.20
At the core of the suburb's critical mass is employment. From the
slow growth of employment in the suburban rings from 1900 to 1950,
it took a forward leap in the decades since. Whereas previous to
World War II, suburban employment gains tended to keep pace with
those of their central cities, since 1950 they have tended to outstrip
them. In many of the large metropolitan areas the central city
recorded an absolute loss in number of jobs, while their suburban rings
gained spectacularly.
Commenting on the changing economic function of the central city,
Raymond Vernon, director of the multimillion dollar New York
Metropolitan Study in the late 1950s, concluded that "the outward
movement of people will be matched by an outward movement of
jobs."
The changed role of the suburbs, therefore, casts them in the role
of a new type of human settlement, an "outer city" wrapped around
the old central city, living in uneasy proximity to it, linked through sur-
viving govermental, utility, communications, and banking networks but
relatively independent socially, culturally, and, increasingly so,
economically.
Knowing why the millions of American households that opted to live
in the suburbs since World War II made that choice can tell us much
about the future of our cities.
Is suburbia populated by millions of refugees who reluctantly fled
disintegrating cities? Or is it populated by millions of pilgrims lured to
the promised land?
Putting it another way: Were they "pushed" or "pulled?" Repelled
or attracted?
Logically considered, neither of these motivations can stand by it-
self. Choice is always relative. Something is always better or
worse—more suitable or less suitable. A poor suburban situation will
obviously not be preferred over a good city one.
It is necessary, then, to conceive of localionai choices as reflecting
some measures of both "push" and "pull." Though the proportions of
each vary across the wide range of individual situations, the
overwhelming evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the
suburbs' "pull" was the predominant motive that brought millions of
households there in the past three decades and continues to shape
such locational decisions today. An image of millions of city-loving
Americans being driven to joyless exile in the suburbs by invading
hordes of undesirables conflicts with both documented evidence and
urban history.
Since the suburban option can only be exercised by those white
homeseekers who can meet the required economic criteria and by21
those minority homeseekers who, additionally, can overcome racially
discriminatory barriers, it is pertinent to inquire how many city re-
sidents live there because they prefer it and how many remain there
because they are held captive by economic and/or racial circum-
stances. Surveys that seek to answer this question indicate that a high
proportion of both whites and nonwhites consider themselves captives
seeking release.
There are many reasons why people move today. However, the
prevailing opinion of investigators is that most moves are probably job
related. Americans place a high value on increased earnings, or the
potential for career advancement, vis-a-vis residential continuity. A
major Chicago real estate firm reports that an analysis of house sales
in 1973 reveals that "rising affluence, changing neighborhoods, new
family formations, and the fulfillment of ivy-covered dreams don't even
come close to job transfers in the used home sales derby."
Even if Americans move frequently and pursue employment oppor-
tunities, why do they choose the suburbs?
If for the former farm boy who made good, a single family house
was a substitute for "My Old Sweet Home" (the original inspiration
for which was in a rural hamlet in far eastern Long Island), its location
in a suburb was even more evocative of his native village. Suburbia
became a nostalgic throwback to an earlier American experience
savored by those who rejected urban life styles and urban values.
Charles Abrams put the matter well: "The suburb in an expanding
world met the struggle for space, privacy and the nostalgia for country
life. Land was cheaper here, too; a family would get a house on two
lots with trees, a garden, and play space for children. Here was the
place to find a home and the bundle of rights, dreams, satisfactions,
and illusions that come wrapped with the deed." It is no longer neces-
sary to choose a suburban location with an eye toward convenience
and cost of commuting to the central city. The post-World War II sub-
urb now usually offers more job opportunities than does its central
city. Employment distribution in 1950 for the Pittsburgh SMSA
showed 63.7 percent of all jobs in the suburbs. For other large SMSAs
the percentages of jobs in the suburbs were as follows: Boston, 62.2
percent; Detroit, 61.4 percent; St. Louis, 58 percent; Washington,
D.C., 54.9 percent; Los Angeles, 54.3 percent; Philadelphia, 51.8 per-
cent; San Francisco-Oakland, 50 percent; Baltimore, 49.9 percent;
Chicago, 47 percent; Cleveland, 46 percent; and Minneapolis-St. Paul,
41 percent.
In summary, then, in answering the query as to why millions of
Americans opted for the suburbs and continue to do so when within
their means we can conclude that is explained by: (a) the high mobi'.i-22
ty of American households; (b) the subordination of residential con-
tinuity to increased earnings and career advancement; (c) the anticity
bias in the American value system; nostalgic identification of suburbs
with our rural past; (e) the growing proportion of all metropolitan job
opportunities, especially newly created ones, are in the suburbs; (f)
suburbs are perceived as especially beneficient to child rearing; and
(g) it has been Federal policy to favor suburban development by sub-
sidizing homeownership and facilitating road access.
These, then, are the suburban "pulls." What are the city "pushes?"
There are many factors affecting residence in cities that constitute a
"push" influence: declining job opportunities, reduced city services,
lowered quality of public schools, increased crime, rising local taxes,
etc. These factors affect all city dwellers, without regard to race.
However, many white city dwellers are affected by an additional fac-
tor that can act to "push" them to the suburbs: the presence in cities
of increasing numbers of nonwhites, especially under circumstances in
which nonwhites choose to live in housing outside of traditional racial
concentrations and/or where school enrollments are racially balanced
without regard to pupils' residence.
Because in recent decades the exodus from the central city to the
suburbs peaked at the same time that a large number of the new-
comers to the large metropolitan areas were readily identifiable
minorities, there has been much distortion of what has been involved.
Some have confused coincidence with causation. To them desertion of
the central central cities by middle- and upper-class and income whites
is purely and simply a means of escape from blacks, Puerto Ricans,
and Mexican Americans.
As noted above, suburbanization through migration has been almost
a universal phenomenon in the United States. Today it is characteristic
of Canada as well. In this country, many metropolitan areas with ex-
tremely small nonwhite populations are involved. Binghamton, New
York; Brockton, Massachusetts; Cedar Rapids, Iowa: Duluth, Min
nesota; and Superior, Wisconsin, are just a few examples.
Thus color alone cannot account for the great migration to the Na-
tion's suburbs. As a matter of fact, race became an identified factor
only after technology and rising incomes had made suburban living
possible for the great mass of Americans.
Had there been no migration of nonwhites to urban communities,
large-scale expansion of suburbia would have occurred. "Without the
problem of race Canada's urban history has developed along lines
much like the United States. The homogenization downward of the
central cities with the departure of the affluent followed by the middle
class and elements of the working class is similar."23
In this nation, obsession with race has not only distorted popular un-
derstanding of the process of suburbanization, but also obfuscated the
true nature of the crisis of our cities. As Sternlieb recently observed:
This process of the "defunctioning" of the central city would
have occurred even if there had not been a problem of race. It
would have been considerably slower in that case, and the capaci-
ty of society to adjust to it would have been greater, for the pace
of change in our central cities has unquestionably been speeded
up by racial tensions and fears. But serious though that cost has
been, perhaps the greatest cost of the race factor is that it has ob-
scured the real nature of what is going on in the central city. Even
if there were no racial difference in our society, there would
probably still be as many people on welfare and as many under-
or unemployed, and they would still be unwelcome among their
more affluent fellow citizens.
These "more affluent fellow citizens," in the absence of race as an
issue, would still have opted for suburban living and would have been
busily engaged in erecting zoning barriers and opposing subsidized
housing to keep out those of low income, as they do in the suburbs
of cities with relatively few minority residents.
Suburbia was not created in order to establish a haven for a racist
middle class (although many of its developers appealed to class and
color snobishness), but once suburbia was created to meet many needs
and desires, our society easily found a way to convert it into such a
haven.
At the same time, the myopia induced by accentuating race so that
any and all phenomena in which it plays a role attributes any and all
racial conflict in the urban complex as a major factor in accelerating
the flight of whites from central cities. But such is not the case.
For example, the recent opposition to, and violence in, school bus-
ing in Boston has not, to date, noticeably speeded up the movement
out of the city. Preliminary census data show that Boston's population
is holding steady. Masschusetts' Secretary of State, Paul H. Guzzi, no
later than November 29, 1975, said, "There is no evidence of an ex-
odus of people from the city."
The suburbanization of America is a fact—inevitably and irrevocably
so. But it need not have been suburbanization in the form or with the
content that emerged. In the long run, more likely by succeeding
generations rather than ours, even some of the wasteful and depressing
physical form of suburbia can be remedied. The social pattern of sub-
urbia, especially its racial exclusion, cannot and will not be altered un-
less and until we recognize the process and identify the many factors
which make up the push and pull in migration.
[The complete paper follows.]24
THE SUBURBANIZATION OF AMERICA
By Robert C. Weaver*
/. The Historical Pattern and Its Study
Suburbanization has been going on much longer than most persons
realize. It, and most certainly the impulse to suburbanize, are probably
as old as the city itself, if we can judge from a letter, written in cu-
neiform on a clay tablet, addressed to King Cyrus of Persia in 539 B.C.
by an early suburbanite who extolled that life style: "Our property
seems to me the most beautiful in the world. It is so close to Babylon
that we enjoy all the advantages of the city, and yet when we come
home we are away from all the noise and dust."
1
Although many of the basic motives that triggered suburbanization
in ancient Babylon have changed little through the centuries, the form
and content of suburbs has undergone vast changes; never more so
than in the United States within the past three decades. Because of
magnitude alone, contemporary suburban settlement would have to be
assessed as a phenomenon that is uniquely different from its predeces-
sors; a classic example of the philosophic concept of quantitative
change resulting in qualitative change. The suburban population of the
United States in 1970 exceeded for the first time that of the central
cities and that of the nonmetropolitan areas. The suburbs contained
74.9 million inhabitants; the central cities, 62.2 million; the non-
metropolitan areas, 63.2 million.
This phenomenon cannot be understood if we limit our investiga-
tions to observations made in our lifetime; not even if our age permits
us to make them before World War II. As noted by "The President's
Task Force on Suburban Problems" in 1968, "To be meaningful, any
examination of the suburbs as they are today—and as they will be in
the future — must consider the nation's growth trends that began before
the turn of the century."
2
As a matter of record, this phenomenon was already being studied
by scholars long before this century began. Thus, Charles Booth,
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whose classic works on cities were written in the late 19th century,
described the decentralizing trend of industry at that time to the out-
skirts of London, where more land was available at lower prices. His
studies of the influence upon metropolitan form of social and
economic classes, and of transportation and housing, which he con-
sidered keys to understanding the urban growth process, led him to
predict a trend toward local suburban centers.
3
Filtering such scholarly observations upon urban form through his
vividly imaginative mind, the genius that was H.G. Wells' predicted in
1902 that the very terms "town" and "city" will become as obsolete
as "mail coach," because spreading urbanization will submerge them
as distinct identities. Casting about for a proper designation of the pre-
dicted urban form of the future, Wells wrote that "We may for our
present purposes call these coming town provinces 'urban regions.'"
4
Wells' "urban regions" had been in existence in the United States
for several decades at the time he wrote the above lines. But what has
come to be regarded as suburbanization has deep and often unrecog-
nized roots in population movements within cities. Movement of the
more affluent from concentrations of the poor has long characterized
urban life. Jean Gottman, for example, reminds us that it occurred in
the larger cities for Europe during the Industrial Revolution.
5
In the United States a similar process has long been typical, and so-
cial standing in American cities has increasingly been evidenced not
only by the type of housing but the type of neighborhood.
6 Today the
latter is important. The flight from deterioration—real or an-
ticipated—has, in large part, been a movement away from poor im-
migrants or, more recently, from blacks, Puerto Ricans, or Chicanos.
Actually, however, the migration of Negroes to cities was quite small
as compared to the earlier volume of European immigrants. At its
peak the latter migration was at least 8 million in a decade, and most
settled in the cities; Negro migration at its height was about a million
and a half in a decade. "So in terms of infiltrating cities with large
numbers of low-income people with a different culture, the Negro
migration has not been unusual."
7
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Ours has long been one of the most mobile populations in the world.
Involved was not only movement across regional and State lines and
from rural to urban areas, but also within urban areas. Thus, the move-
ment from the center of the city to the periphery and beyond is
nothing new. Census data for many years concealed this fact, largely
because the city boundaries were distant from the active residential
land use. At the same time, many American cities in the past annexed
territory or otherwise extended their boundaries.
As a result, large-scale building, industrial, and commercial activity
could and did take place within the city's limits.
8 A generation or
longer ago, suburbs were frequently within the boundaries of cities.
They were at its fringes which, at that time, contained much un-
developed land and large sections where streets had not been cut
through.
Several new factors have been introduced more recently. The first
was a revolution in transportation. The horsecar extended the geo-
graphic limits of urban development. Railroads, with their land
resources and commuter trains—as well as their intensive sales efforts
soon expanded by the activities of the real estate indus-
try—successfully played up class exclusiveness as an attribute of
suburbia.
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Commuter trains, as the horsecar which permitted those who could
afford it to live beyond the poor, first in the city and then at periphery,
extended that option to small villages beyond it. Electric rapid mass
transportation, successively in the form of streetcars, elevated lines,
and subways, facilitated much greater dispersal of the urban popula-
tion within the city and beyond its corporate limits into suburbs. In the
process, economic groups which had previously not been able to afford
the transportation costs were able increasingly to participate.
It was, of course, the automobile which made large-scale and far-
flung suburban living possible for millions of Americans. Its advent
consummated the final escape from the space limitations of the endow-
ments of the horse which had characterized the 19th century city.
The year 1900 marked the apex of preponderance of population for
a number of central cities in relation to their suburbs. In that year
Boston's population was already only 43 percent of its Standard
Metropolitan Area as it would be defined in 1950. By 1970 it had
shrunken to a mere 23 percent. (Unlike most cities, Boston's bounda-
ries have not been expanded by annexation in over a century.) Cincin-
nati in 1900 contained 63 percent of the population of its 1950 Stan-
8 Marion Clawson, Suburban Land Conversion in the United States (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 34.
9 Abrams, op. cit., pp. 144-5.27
dard Metropolitan Area; shrinking to 33 percent in 1970. St. Louis'
71 percent in 1900 had become 26 percent in 1970. Buffalo's 69 per-
cent had become 39 percent. Cleveland's 85 percent had become 36
percent. The engulfment of Detroit by its suburbs was unusually
precipitous, because as late as 1920 Detroit accounted for 77 percent
of the population of its metropolitan area and shrank to 36 percent
by 1970.
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It is noteworthy that New York City in 1850, then consisting of the
island of Manhattan, contained only 50 percent of the population of
its metropolitan area as it came to be defined in 1950 (a definition
which excluded New Jersey). New York City was to achieve 68 per-
cent in 1900 as a result of the consolidation which created the present
city, consisting of the five boroughs. (In 1970 New York's population
of some 7.9 million represented only 39 percent of its 31-county
metropolitan region.)
The explanation of this relentless outward push of urbanization, then
increasingly taking place beyond the boundaries of central cities, was
given in succinct language by the above-quoted President's Task
Force:
In the decade before the dawn of the 20th Century, the frontier
was virtually closed to further expansion. This meant that, by and
large, subsequent population increases and movements would have
to be contained within existing borders, taking advantage of open
spaces within that territory rather than opening up new territories
to our burgeoning population.
This development was followed, in the first half of this century,
by a major shift of the nation's population and jobs from the land
into the cities; from rural areas into urban centers. As a result of
this internal movement, immigration, and natural urban increases,
the 1960 census showed nearly 70 percent of Americans to be liv-
ing in urban areas—a significant turnaround from the urban-rural
population distribution of half a century earlier.
Recently another shift has taken place—and is destined to con-
tinue. By and large, the cities have developed all the land within
their boundaries, and the suburbs are now the growth centers of
the nation. The suburbs are absorbing at an increasing rate the
people spilling outward from the urban cores, the many families
migrating inward from rural regions, and natural increases in
population. The suburbanization of America—rather than its ur-
banization—has become the country's dominant growth pattern.
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The year 1900 seems also to mark the beginning of a widespread
awareness of the suburban phenomenon. It was in the decade of
1900-1910 that the Bureau of Census first took statistical notice.
Beginning in 1910 the Bureau made population data available for what
it termed "metropolitan districts," forerunners of today's Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, the now-familiar SMSAs. In preparation
for the 1950 census, it was decided that defining of metropolitan areas
and identification of classes of data to be collected should be the
responsibility of a broad-based, interdepartmental committee of the
Federal Government. This marked the recognition of the importance
of metropolitan areas for recordkeeping, analysis, and projection for a
wide range of subject matter. SMSAs have since become a critically
essential classification for all departments of the Federal Government
that touch upon urban affairs, as well as for governments at State and
local levels. They are equally essential for private enterprise and
scholarly research. It would be difficult to imagine either the public or
private sectors being able to know what is happening in urban America
and to plan their operations in relation to it without the availability of
data that treat cities and suburbs as parts of a metropolitan whole.
Nor was it long before students of urban trends tried to classify the
new suburban phenomenon, to define it, to describe it, and to formu-
late theories to explain its appearance and continuing evolution. One
of the first was Graham Taylor, who wrote Satellite Cities in 1915. Ten
years later (1925) Harlan Douglas published a more ambitious effort
to comprehend the new urban scene with his The Suburban Trend.
What Leo J. Schnore identifies as the seminal work on
"metropolitanism" was published in 1922 by N.S.B. Gras, an historical
analysis of the evolution of the city's economy into the "metropolitan
economy." In 1933, R.D. McKenzie published the first effort at com-
prehensive statistical treatment of metropolitan development, in the
course of which he documented "the rise of the metropolitan
community."
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The decade of the 1920s had seen the first attempt to plan for an
entire urban region in the 6-year effort that produced the "Plan for
New York and Its Environs," leading to the formation of the Regional
Plan Association. Basic to the preparation of this plan were the re-
gional economic studies of Robert Murray Haig, professor of business
administration at Columbia University. Dr. Haig's work proved to be
the basic work in documenting and analyzing the process by which the
economic base of an entire metropolitan area emerges and develops.
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His painstaking documentation of the relocation of the various indus-
tries from Manhattan to nearby locations in Brooklyn and Jersey City,
and subsequent removal to more distant parts of the New York
metropolitan area or beyond it to other parts of the country laid the
factual basis for an understanding that not only population, but also
employment, is caught up in a process of movement out from the
center toward the periphery of metropolitan areas.
The suburbanization of jobs and its reciprocal relationship with
population movement remains a subject that requires continuing moni-
toring and refinement of theoretical insight. Our ability to predict in
this area can be decisive in forecasting the future of cities and suburbs.
Suburbanization slowed down during the Great Depression when
both economic expansion and residential construction came to virtual
standstills, then recovered slowly in the late 1930s, and was finally
stirred into "everish activity as the decade closed with rearmament and
the outbreak of war in Europe. War production in the 1940s brought
a reversal in the outward trend of population and employment as the
expansion of industrial capacity took place mainly in established cen-
ters which contained basic plants and housed an available labor force.
This was to prove to be the central cities' last economic advance as
compared with the suburbs. As one study noted, "The evidence of a
further concentration of manufacturing employment in the large cities
during World War II now appears as a temporary interruption of a
long-term trend of a declining share that was begun as far back at least
as the beginning of this century."
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Even before World War II came to an end, increasing numbers of
leaders in government and the private sector began to project concerns
for the postwar shape of things, especially with reference to where the
jobs that were to meet the goal of full employment were to be located,
and where the houses were to be built to give American families
adequate shelter. As early as 1942 one voice, speaking for town plan-
ners and architects, called attention to the bleak prospects of Amer-
ica's maturing cities. J. L. Sert, in a book prophetically titled Can Our
Cities Survive? warned that, "Up to recent times city planners have
disregarded the fact that, when a certain degree of maturity is reached
in the cities of today, they universally exhibit the same alarming symp-
toms. These endanger their very existence." The failure to make the
city livable, Sert declared 35 years ago, causes people
to abandon their overcrowded neighborhoods for "a quiet home"
in remote suburbs, undeterred by hours of uncomfortable travel
1
4 Daniel Creamer, Changing Location of Manufacturing Employment. (New York: The
National Industrial Conference Board, 1963), p. 48.30
back and forth. Industry, too, moves out—to cheaper land, to re-
gions of lower taxes, to convenience sites on rail sidings or side
roads. The city is breaking up. Such dispersion of great cities
knows neither control nor planning. It is provoked by urban chaos
itself, and is facilitated by modern means of transportation.
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Crying out in the frustration and despair of those who see when few
others do, Sert challenged his contemporaries, "it has not even oc-
curred to most people to question the condition of our cities. A con-
scious minority, however, familiar with the gravity of the situation and
recognizing its eventualities in the near future, might well ask them-
selves the question: Can—and should—our cities survive?"
Writing in December 1945, only a few months after V-Day, Charles
S. Ascher, then Director of the Urban Development Division of the
Federal National Housing Agency, argued the case for the assembly of
land in inner cities through clearance and warned against the con-
sequences of supplying all new housing on vacant land at the
metropolitan fringe. Citing the need for 12,600,000 new nonfarm
homes in the decade ahead, Ascher asked: "Where will these millions
of new homes be built?" He then described the deceptive ease of
spreading out over the distant landscape:
There is no dearth of land on the fringes of most cities. Land ap-
pears to be available in large tracts, easily assembled, at reasona-
ble prices. There is no cost for tearing down old structures. There
are often fewer controls in the outlying townships, no building
code, no zoning regulation. These factors attract the builder to the
fringe land.
The families who are to live in these new houses are also attracted
to the fringe in search of human values for themselves and their
children; openness, greenery, play space, community feeling. Low
taxes are accepted happily, without too much thought for the in-
adequacy of services that go with them.
This search is sometimes an illusion. If too few neighbors arrive,
services remain inadequate. Streets remain unpaved, there is no
good high school within easy reach. If the fringe land becomes
more intensely developed, the demand for urban services—police
protection, better schools—drives up the cost of government. The
empty lots are no longer open for softball games. The commuting
grind may become wearing after a while.
Meanwhile, slums and blighted areas in the centers of cities rot.
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If even heard, these and other voices went unheeded. As the first
troopships were reported on the high seas returning millions of citizen
soldiers to take up their lives where war had interrupted, most of them
concerned with prospects for employment and housing, Congress and
the Executive branch feverishly initiated programs to stimulate the
economy and get housing built. Those with concern for long-range
consequences were trampled underfoot by the stampede to "get things
moving"—and by those in a hurry to get to the places from which the
revived consumer activity could be most successfully exploited.
Most of the economy needed little from Government to "take off";
actually only that Government dismantle controls and get out of the
way. Millions of product-hungry consumers with bulging wartime
savings did the rest. Housing, however, required a liberal credit policy
and FHA supplied it. The country was off and running in its longest
and biggest economic boom. It was to transform the Nation in a
number of important respects. One was to carry our large cities
perilously close to the doom foretold by Sert. The other was to make
tens of millions of upward-mobile families also outward mobile. Mass
migrations covered the land as millions went from cities to suburbs,
leaving vacuums that sucked in other millions from impoverished rural
areas. One result was that the suburbs also were transformed.
//. The Changed Role of the Suburb Since World War
II
Unlike the central city, the basic function and form of which have
changed only in degree, the suburban settlements that emerged since
World War II have little in common with the ecological type called
"suburb" previous to that time. The contemporary suburb is different
from its earlier namesake in both function and form. Without the func-
tional role it has assumed, today's suburb could not have attained its
vast scale. There could hardly have been a social and/or economic
need at this magnitude for the classic type of "bedroom" suburb.
Essentially the difference between the prewar and postwar types of
suburban development is that the former existed in a symbiotic rela-
tionship to the city as one of its more remote residential neighbor-
hoods, while the latter increasingly duplicates the functions of the cen-
tral city and, consequently, competes with it as a destructive rival.
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The persistent, even if at times interrupted, growth of population
and, more vitally, employment in the suburban rings around central ci-
ties, accumulated over time what George Sternlieb identifies as the
"critical mass" that ignited to propel the suburbs ahead of their central
cities in many of the very functions that historically were the raison
d'etre for the cities' existence.
After pointing out that in Newark there is not a single first-run
theatre left in the entire city of 400,000 and that central city museums
and public libraries have their operating hours and acquisitions budgets
cut because of declining municipal tax revenues, Sternlieb observes
that,
meanwhile, the suburbs have achieved critical mass, a scale of
population and buying power which permits them to sustain
amenities of a type and at a level which once only the central city
was capable of sustaining. The shopping center which had at best
a single department store branch now has three and soon will have
four. The suburban music calendar is evolving from a marginal
summer collection of odds and ends to a year-round independent
activity. Small suburban hospitals have grown to thousand-bed
monsters which can supply all the services and specialists available
in the biggest central city hospitals.
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But at the core of the suburbs' critical mass is employment. From
the slow growth of employment in the suburban rings from 1900 to
1950, it took a forward leap in the decades since. Whereas previous
to World War II, suburban employment gains tended to keep pace
with that of their central cities; since 1950 they have tended to out-
strip them. In many of the large metropolitan areas the central city
recorded an absolute loss in number of jobs, while their suburban rings
gained spectacularly.
Among the Nation's 10 largest SMSAs, between 1960 and 1970,
New York City lost 9.7 percent of its jobs, while its suburbs gained
24.9 percent. Los Angeles lost 10.8 percent, while its suburbs gained
16.2 percent. Chicago lost 13.9 percent, while its suburbs gained 64.4
percent. Philadelphia lost 11.3 percent, while its suburbs gained 61.5
percent. Though San Francisco and Oakland made a minute gain of
0.4 percent, their suburbs gained 22.7 percent. Washington, D.C.,
gained 1.9 percent, but its suburbs gained a spectacular 1 17.9 percent.
Boston lost 8.6 percent, while its suburbs gained 20.2 percent. Only
in Pittsburgh did the central city hold its own with a 4.4 percent in-
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crease, compared to only a 2.5 percent increase in its suburbs. St.
Louis lost 15.2 percent, while its suburbs gained 80.4 precent.
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Commenting on the changing economic function of the central city,
Raymond Vernon, Harvard economist and director of the multi-mil-
lion-dollar New York Metropolitan Study in the late 1950s, concluded
that,
the outward movement of people will be matched by an outward
movement of jobs. Retail trade will follow the populations. Manu-
facturing and wholesaling establishments will continue to respond
to obsolescence by looking for new quarters and by renting in
structures in the suburban industrial areas where obsolescence is
less advanced. The movement of jobs will reinforce the movement
of residences.
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Metropolitan developments during the 16 years since Vernon made
these predictions have given us no reason to find fault with them. His
optimism regarding continuing high levels of office employment in cen-
tral cities, however, seems to have been exaggerated as significant
numbers of both corporate headquarters and smaller business offices
continue to drift away to suburban locations.
The changed role of the suburbs, therefore, casts them in the role
of a new type of human settlement, an "outer city" wrapped around
the old central city, living in uneasy proximity to it, linked through sur-
viving governmental, utility, communications, and banking networks,
but relatively independent socially, culturally, and, increasingly so,
economically.
The populations of these new outer cities are relatively more
homogeneous ethnically and in social class than the populations of
central cities. The suburban population is characteristically younger,
whiter, more affluent, better educated and more prestigiously em-
ployed than the majority of central city residents. Though controversy
is generated inevitably by the issues at stake in suburban political and
community affairs, the suburban population achieves a consensus in
feeling that they have "arrived" socially and economically by achieving
suburban residence.
This status image of suburban life is accepted by most of the inhabi-
tants of central cities also. Such acceptance is critically essential to the
continuing dynamism of the suburbanization process by supplying
endless candidates for suburban status who seek but to realize it when
the practical means are at hand.
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///. Motivations of Housing Consumers in Opting for
the Suburbs
Knowing why the millions of American households that opted to live
in the suburbs since World War II made that choice can tell us much
about the future of our cities; more precisely, the extent to which the
impulse to suburbanize is likely to influence locational choices of
present city residents can tell us what population changes to expect.
Is suburbia populated by millions of refugees who reluctantly fled
disintegrating cities? Or is it populated by millions of pilgrims lured to
the promised land? Putting it another way: Were they "pushed" or
"pulled?" Repelled or attracted?
Logically considered, neither of these motivations can stand by it-
self. Choice is always relative. Something is always better or
worse—more suitable or less suitable. A poor suburban situation will
obviously not be preferred over a good city one.
It is necessary, then, to conceive of locational choices as reflecting
some measures of both "push" and "pull." Though the proportions of
each vary across the wide range of individual situations, the
overwhelming evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the
suburbs' "pull" was the predominant motive that brought millions of
households there in the past three decades and continues to shape
such locational decisions today. An image of millions of city-loving
Americans being driven to joyless exile in the suburbs by invading
hordes of undesirables conflicts with both documented evidence and
urban history.
Since the suburban option can only be exercised by those white
homeseekers who can meet the required economic criteria, and by
those minority homeseekers who, additionally, can overcome racially
discriminatory barriers, it is pertinent to inquire how many city re-
sidents live there because they prefer it and how many live there
because they are held captive by economic and/or racial circum-
stances. Surveys that seek to answer this question indicate that a high
proportion of both whites and nonwhites consider themselves captives
seeking release.
The ease with which Americans exercised their option to subur-
banize was facilitated by their uniquely high mobility. As one of Henry
James' characters put it as long ago as the 1880s, "***At the end of
three or four years we'll move. That's the way to live in New York—to
move every three or four years. Then you always get the last thing***.
So you see we'll always have a new house; you get all the latest
improvements***."
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A study of housing consumer behavior sponsored by ACTION, the
National Council to Improve Our Neighborhoods, in the late 1950s,
one of the most intensive and extensive investigations of the subject,
reported, among other factors, on housing mobility:
The willingness of the American family to change location with
changing circumstances is without parallel. About 20 percent of
all persons move during any given year. For example, between
March 1958 and March 1959, the Bureau of the Census reports
that 32.8 million persons—almost one out of every five—moved
from one dwelling to another. Two-thirds of the movers stayed in
the same county, however. A large proportion of those who
moved were young adults. Of the group between the ages of 20
and 24, two out of five changed their residence between 1958 and
1959.
If past behavior is an accurate gauge of future trends, it is
reasonable to suppose that within one year 20 to 25 percent of
all families will have moved at least once; that within two years,
30 to 33 percent will have moved; that within five years, 50 to
57 percent will have moved; that within ten years about 75 per-
cent will have moved; and that within twenty years, no more than
10 percent will be living in dwellings they occupy today.
Apparently not more than half of the people who move do so
because of dissatisfaction with house or neighborhood. The rela-
tionship between mobility and dissatisfaction with a dwelling may
stand unbalanced, however. A shortage of dwelling units can
depress the mobility rate even when dissatisfaction is high. Also,
less than half of the persons who say they are dissatisfied with
their housing actually translate their desire to move into action.
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There are many reasons why people move today. However, the
prevailing opinion of investigators is that most moves are probably job
related. Americans place a high value on increased earnings, or the
potential for career advancement, vis-a-vis residential continuity. A
major Chicago real estate firm reports that an analysis of house sales
in 1973 reveals that "rising affluence, changing neighborhoods, new
family formations, and the fulfillment of ivy-covered dreams don't even
come close to job transfers in the used home sales derby."
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of intracity migration found the same emphasis on jobs. "When inter-
viewers ask American migrants why they have moved, the migrants
give answers relating to jobs far more than any other answers: the lar-
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gest number usually report a specific job brought them to the city, but
another sizable number say they came looking for work."
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Even if Americans move frequently and pursue employment oppor-
tunities, why do they choose the suburbs?
Americans have never demonstrated any special love for the city. On the
contrary, an anticity bias seems to run through our national mores.
Jefferson's outspoken views, widely quoted, were not idiosyncratic.
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National response to the financial plight of New York City, beginning with
the President, has overtones of both antipathy to, and envy of, the big city
that typifies values with which a majority of Americans identify. It has long
been fashionable among Americans to consider big cities as places to visit but
not to live in. Except for about a score of the largest, many American cities
tend to resemble large towns, with single, detached houses the predominant
type.
For many generations immigrants to large cities were either Europe-
an immigrants or American boys from the farm. The latter usually
"made good" and bought a single family house in what was known as
a "residential neighborhood" or escaped to a suburb. The immigrants
usually raised a family in the inner city and lived to see their offspring
follow the American ex-farm boys, after an interval of two or three
decades, to a "residential neighborhood" or, perhaps, even to the sub-
urbs. The inner city was for the poor relatives, those not sufficiently
capable or lucky to "make it" upward and outward.
If for the former farm boy who made good a single family house was
a substitute for "My Old Sweet Home" (the original inspiration for
which was in a rural hamlet in far eastern Long Island), its location
in a suburb was even more evocative of his native village. Suburbia
became a nostalgic throwback to an earlier American experience
savored by those who rejected urban life styles and urban values.
Charles Abrams put the matter well:
The suburb in an expanding world met the struggle for space,
privacy and the nostalgia for country life. Land was cheaper here,
too; family would get a house on two lots with trees, a garden,
and play space for children. Here was the place to find a home
and the bundle of rights, dreams, satisfactions and illusions that
come wrapped with the deed.
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Robert C. Wood, in his pioneering study of the political rationale for
suburban government, argued that:
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Suburbia, defined as an ideology, a faith in communities of
limited size and a belief in the conditions of intimacy, is quite real.
The dominance of old values explains more about the people and
the politics of the suburbs than any other interpretation***. The
conviction that provincial life is best has been with us for a long
time and it has endured in the face of greater attacks than the
ones contemporary America presents. We show our instinctive
commitment to the ideology by the fact that we rarely examine
its assumptions critically. We show our conscious allegiance by the
oratorical homage we pay to the ideal of small neighborhoods, sin-
gle homes, and political jurisdictions of limited size.
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This ideology has been woven into our national value system: Virtue
is associated with homeownership and small town residence; vice (or,
at least, lesser moral stature) is associated with tenancy and big city
residence. The suburb is viewed as the best accommodation possible
for residence within the orbit of economic opportunity concentrated in
our metropolitan centers.
America's prediliction towards homeownership, although generally
recognized and equally approved—often unrealistically—has per-
tinence in the analysis of the rise and expansion of suburbia. It should,
however, be recognized that homeownership is a middle-class concept
which assumes middle-class values and opportunities for those who
participate. As we have found, to our dismay, attempts to extend it
across the board to those who do not have middle-class opportunities
or relative security and reasonable levels of income can be, and has
often been, tragic.
One of the most significant potential benefits of owning a home is
appreciation in property value. And this is most likely to occur in the
suburbs where the activity of one's neighbors, the recent investment
of public funds for infrastructure and public services, as well as the
process of urbanization per se create higher values. Thus the cult of
ownership of individual homes serves to accelerate suburbanization.
Nor is it necessary any longer to choose a suburban location with
an eye toward convenience and cost of commuting to the central city.
The post-World War II suburb now usually offers more job opportuni-
ties than does its central city. Employment distribution in 1970 for the
Pittsburgh SMS A showed 63.7 percent of all jobs in the suburbs. For
other large SMSAs the percentage of jobs in the suburbs were as fol-
lows: Boston, 62.2 percent; Detroit, 61.4 percent; St. Louis, 58 per-
cent; Washington, D.C., 54.9 percent, Los Angeles, 54.3 percent,
Philadelhipa, 51.8 percent, San Francisco-Oakland, 50 percent; Bal-
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timore, 49.9 percent; Chicago, 47 percent, Cleveland, 46 percent; and
Minneapolis-St. Paul, 41 percent.
Students of housing-consumer preferences provide convincing
evidence of additional reasons why Americans perceive of suburban
residence as the preferred environment. In a landmark study of con-
sumer preferences in the late 1950s by ACTION, they found that all
existing documentation confirmed a strong choice for suburban living,
both by those who had realized it and those who still lived in the city.
A Fortune survey in 1946 found that, among residents within large ci-
ties (over 100,000), only 36 percent really preferred their large-city lo-
cation. An equal number said they would prefer to live in a small town
close to the city. Conversely, only 5 to 15 percent of those already liv-
ing in the suburbs expressed a desire to move back into the city.
ACTION'S researchers found that other surveys examined confirmed
Fortune's results. This caused the researchers to sum up their findings
with the conclusion that:
The suburban dream prevails among most consumers in what-
ever location and whatever section of the country. The suburban
urge is strongest among young families with children living in large
cities; achieved suburban living is most satisfactory to families in
the age group between thirty and fifty years, and the suburban
neighborhood, although still attractive, is least appealing to
household members over fifty.
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Strong consumer preferences and strong voter preferences do, on
the whole and in the long run, tend to coincide. If suburbs were popu-
lar with such a decided majority, politicians could assure themselves
popularity by catering to prosuburban feelings and use the power and
resources of government to expedite the realization of the consumers'
suburban dream. Insuring of mortgages by the Federal Government, a
device developed by the New Deal in an effort to halt foreclosures and
stimulate employment for construction workers, became the magic
wand that made suburban homeownership possible for millions of
Americans. FHA and VA mortgages triggered an enormous
homebuilding boom in the 1950s. The preponderance of these starts
were in suburban locations.
"Unquestionably the most significant factor in housing finance in the
last twenty-five years has been the emergence of the Federal Govern-
ment as a major force in the housing industry," reported the ACTION
team headed by Martin Meyerson in 1960.
Meycrson et al., op. cit., pp. 237-238.39
Federal aids to housing now affect 35 to 50 percent of all new
residential building***. In addition to these more directly mea-
surable aids, a very large proportion of the remaining new re-
sidential construction is financed through savings institutions
whose deposits are insured by the Federal Government. Thus, the
direct and indirect impact of federal aids on housing accounts for
a majority of all new houses built and may affect three-quarters
of the total income in some years.
2
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The suburbs received additional Federal assistance in the form of
massive highway-building programs that made suburban housing ac-
cessible to a vastly increased job market as well as suburban shopping
centers to an enlarged trade area and suburban industrial parks to an
enlarged labor market. By the 1960s suburbs could no longer be
referred to as the "boondocks." Many city dwellers found it less time-
consuming to drive out to suburban centers to work or to shop than
to use the city's archaic streets to get to its central business district.
Federal tax policy also favored the suburbs by giving an incentive
to homeownership through deductions for payment on mortgage in-
terest and property taxes, with no comparable benefits to tenants.
Marion Clawson, in his monumental study of suburban land develop-
ment, summed up this incentive:
A homeowner receives a substantial part of his income from his
own home, in the form of housing, but this income does not have
to be included in his income tax return. Slitor has calculated that
these three aids (imputed rent, interest and taxes) to homeowner-
ship in 1958 amounted to $3.2 billion, or about $100 per owner-
occupied dwelling. These financial advantages to homeownership
tend to become more important, even on a relative basis, as per-
sonal incomes rise, in part because of the higher tax rates on
larger incomes. On the basis of rather typical income and housing
conditions, the federal income tax under current tax rates is
reduced by from 14 to 31 percent of the interest and tax pay-
ments on the home. This is obviously a substantial incentive to
home purchase.
3
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In summary, then, in answering the query as to why millions of
Americans opted for the suburbs and continue to do so when within
their means, we can conclude that is explained by: (a) the high mobili-
ty of American households; (b) the subordination of residential con-
tinuity to increased earnings and career advancement; (c) the anticity
bias in the American value system; (d) nostalgic identification of sub-
urbs with our rural past; (e) the growing proportion of all metropolitan
2
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job opportunities, especially newly created ones, are in the suburbs; (f)
suburbs are perceived as especially beneficient to child rearing; and
(g) it has been Federal policy to favor suburban development by sub-
sidizing homeownership and facilitating road access.
These then are the suburban "pulls." What are the city "pushes?"
There are many factors affecting residence in cities that constitute a
"push" influence: declining job opportunities, reduced city services,
lowered quality of public schools, increased crime, rising local taxes,
etc. These factors affect all city dwellers, without regard to race.
However, many city dwellers of white race are affected by an addi-
tional factor that can act to "push" them to the suburbs: the presence
in cities of increasing numbers of nonwhites, especially under circum-
stances in which nonwhites choose to live in housing outside of tradi-
tional racial concentrations and/or where school enrollments are ra-
cially balanced without regard to pupils' residence.
In the light of a suburbanization process that began before the turn
of the century, how much weight are we to accord to the factor of
race in assessing the outward migration of millions of Americans from
city to suburb? It is certainly worth exploring.
IV. The Impact of Race Upon Suburbanization
In the wake of the prosperity of World War II and subsequent
economic growth and rising incomes, not only were the affluent able
to enter the suburbs, but skilled and semiskilled workers, clerks, small
merchants, and young professionals could do so too. Some came from
the cities; others moved from rural America directly into suburbia.
Their concept of what was typically American was seized upon by
home builders, financial institutions—and most assuredly by FHA—all
intent to develop and support homogeneous neighborhoods. Such a
population, according to all the actors, was an absolute requirement
for the protection of real estate investment. When most Americans
were released from age-old constraints of poverty and space, the sub-
urbs became the growth centers of the Nation.
Because in recent decades the exodus from the central city to the
suburbs peaked at the same time that a large number of the new-
comers to the large metropolitan areas were readily identifiable
minorities, there has been much distortion of what has been involved.
Some have confused coincidence with causation. To them desertion of
the central cities by middle- and upper-class and income whites is
purely and simply a means of escape from blacks, Puerto Ricans, and
Chicanos.
3
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As noted above, suburbanization through migration has been almost
a universal phenomenon in the United States. Today it is characteristic
of Canada as well. In this country, many metropolitan areas with ex-
tremely small nonwhite populations are involved. Binghamton, New
York; Brockton, Massachusetts; Cedar Rapids, Iowa; Duluth, Min-
nesota; and Superior, Wisconsin, are just a few examples. Thus color
alone cannot account for the great migration to the Nation's suburbs.
As a matter of fact, race became an identified factor only after
technology and rising incomes had made suburban living possible for
the great mass of Americans.
3
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Had there been no migration of nonwhites to urban communities,
large-scale expansion of suburbia would have occurred. And, of
course, nonwhites participate in the process when they can do so.
"Without the problem of race Canada's urban history has developed
along lines much like the United States. The homogenization
downward of the central cities with the departure of the affluent fol-
lowed by the middle class and elements of the working class is
similar."
3
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In this nation, obsession with race has not only distorted popular un-
derstanding of the process of suburbanization, but also obfuscated the
true nature of the crisis of our cities. As Sternlieb recently observed:
This process of the "defunctioning" of the central city would
have occurred even if there had not been a problem of race. It
would have been considerably slower in that case, and the capaci-
ty of society to adjust to it would have been greater, for the pace
of change in our central cities has unquestionably been speeded
up by racial tensions and fears. But serious though that cost has
been, perhaps the greatest cost of the race factor is that it has ob-
scured the real nature of what is going on in the central city. Even
if there were no racial difference in our society, there would
probably still be as many people on welfare and as many under-
or unemployed, and they would still be unwelcome among their
more affluent fellow citizens.
3
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The "affluent fellow citizens" referred to by Sternlieb, in the
absence of race as an issue, would still have opted for suburban living
and would have been busily engaged in erecting zoning barriers and
opposing subsidized housing to keep out those of low income, as they
do in the suburbs of cities with relatively few minority residents.
Sternlieb is probably right to suggest that, in the absence of race,
the pace of change might have been slower in many cities and subur-
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ban exclusion on the basis of income might have been more moderate.
We are dealing, after all, with a racist society where the public power
is widely used to assure a racially discriminatory effect; where private
actions in violation of minority rights are widespread; and where many
whites are prepared to pay a premium to assure themselves separation
from blacks.
Because we are a racist society, there is a tendency to attribute all
or most of the problems of our cities to the presence of racial minori-
ties. This leads to two equally misleading conclusions. The first, and
most dangerous, is to assume that were we racially homogeneous the
cities would have none of the crucial problems that they face. The
second, in a large measure a reaction to the overemphasis on the racial
issue, is the assertion that race is not relevant to the city's problems.
Suburbia was not created in order to establish a haven for a racist
middle class (although many of its developers appealed to class and
color snobishness); but, once suburbia was created to meet many
needs and desires, our society easily found a way to convert it into
such a haven. This outcome can, of course, be explained with due re-
gard to our federal system of government, of constitutional interpreta-
tions, of State's rights, and of home rule. But it is necessary to con-
clude that it was no accident that in our society the institutional ar-
rangements that emerged with suburbanization operated, even if
blindly, to yield the decaying sections of old cities primarily to minori-
ties and the attractions of suburbia primarily to whites.
At the same time, the myopia induced by accentuating race so that
any and all phenomena in which it plays a role are seen exclusively
as racial matters not only distorts reality, but occasions acceptance of
current racial residential distribution as inevitable and unchanging. It
identifies any and all racial conflict in the urban complex as a major
factor in accelerating the flight of whites from central cities.
3
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But such is not the case. For example, the recent opposition to, and
violence in, school busing in Boston has not, to date, noticeably
speeded up the movement out of the city. Preliminary census data
show that Boston's population is holding steady. Massachusetts' Secre-
tary of State, Paul H. Guzzi, no later than November 29, 1975, said,
"There is no evidence of an exodus of people from the city."
3
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course, as ACTION noted, this may also reflect the shortage of alter-
native shelter in today's housing market.
The suburbanization of America is a fact—inevitably and irrevocably
so. But it need not have been suburbanization in the form or with the
content that emerged. In the long run, more likely by succeeding
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generations rather than ours, even some of the wasteful and depressing
physical form of suburbia can be remedied. The social pattern of sub-
urbia, especially its racial exclusion, cannot and will not be altered un-
less and until we recognize the process and identify the many factors
which make up the push and pull in migration.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Dr. Weaver, I deeply appreciate this presenta-
tion. You have summarized very effectively an indepth analysis of the
issues that you have identified in your paper. I certainly hope that
many, many persons will have the opportunity and will take advantage
of reading it.
At this time, the members of the Commission would appreciate the
opportunity of engaging in some dialogue with you on some of the is-
sues. I will recognize first the Vice Chairman of the Commission, Dr.
Stephen Horn.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Weaver, I am impressed by your statement. I really don't have
too many questions because I made the argument you have made in
this Commission back in 1971. I must say that the result was rather
emotional and heated, as some of my colleagues who were on the
Commission at that time had the picture of suburban access along the
lines that you point out are filled with a number of fallacies. Subur-
banization has occurred in a number of countries in the world and in
cities and suburban areas of the United States where there are very
few minorities present. I think we have to get out of seeing solely ra-
cial causes of suburbanization, although there are racial consequences.
We need to look at this larger phenomena.
One of the points that has interested me over the years since we
have held our hearings is the degree to which socioeconomic class, be
it the black or white middle class, is a factor in this movement toward
the suburbs and in some of the problems. I wonder if you have suffi-
cient data to deal with the "class" aspects as opposed to the "racial"
aspects, and if you have any suggestion as to the type of data that per-
haps ought to be collected to help us get at some of these problems.
DR. WEAVER. I think you have struck on one of the most difficult
and complicated aspects of this whole problem. It is almost impossible
to separate class and color. They get so intermingled.
But I think if you go back and try to get to the root causes and try
to get to the universal phenomenon, that class becomes a much more
important thing than color, as a basic aspect. On the other hand, it
becomes complicated because to so many Americans dark pigmenta-
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tion means lower class. So very often when people are talking about
class, they are really thinking about color—when they are talking
about color, they are also reacting to class.
Here I think it is extremely difficult to differentiate. My own—and
I have done some studies on this, several articles and parts of some
books—conclusion is that, if you are looking at it from the point of
view of housing, you will find that Americans in this country, by and
large, are very much class conscious and very much opposed to "lower
class"—whether it is economic or social class—neighbors. When you
add color to this, it complicates a phenomenon that is already univer-
sal. It goes beyond color groups. You will find certain class aspects,
I regret to say, are among minorities, as well as majorities. This, of
course, rejects the fact they are Americans.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. Along that line, in an additional statement
I wrote in a report of this Commission, I quoted Mayor Stokes when
he appeared before the Commission and pointed out the great and
fearsome resistance, as he said, to low-income housing in the various
white areas of Cleveland, but the resistance came from middle-class
blacks to lower-class blacks and both to white Appalachians.
COMMISSIONER FREEMAN. I also want to express my appreciation for
a very incisive study.
There is one point that seems to me needs to be given further con-
sideration, and that is—and let me give you an example of St. Louis
suburbia. St. Louis County has about 195 separate villages, townships.
When the Commission held its hearing there, one factor that was very
clear was that, even though suburbia had opened up to a small extent
to middle-class black persons, the same was not true with respect to
low-income black persons.
Now, the white family of $10,000 income could go into suburbia
even though that family would be considered low income. The white
low-income family does have somewhere to go in suburbia and is not
restricted by race. The low-income black person, does not find a_liome
available in suburbia. So I think we need to recognize that as to low-
income families; even though there are areas where poor people are
not wanted, it is less likely that a poor black family can get a home.
And there are governmental implications here, because the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development is responsible for enforce-
ment of Title VIII. I would like you to comment on the extent to
which the lack of departmental enforcement is a factor in the per-
petuation of the exclusion of the low-income black family from the
suburban community.
DR. WEAVER. I must say these are really basic issues and are very,
very complicated.45
I was listening as you talked, and I happen to be doing a paper for
another occasion and I am opening it by saying that one of the trou-
bles with most of us who are in the field of housing and urban affairs
is that we of necessity generalize from our own experience and our
own geographic location. You were talking about St. Louis, and I was
immediately thinking about New York and its environs, so we are both
doing the same thing.
I am not at all sure what the basic phenomena are that undergird
what you have said. I think there is no question but that there are
many suburbs in many parts of the United States where a middle-
class—no matter how you define it—black family can, if it has a little
bit of guts and a little bit of stick-to-it-tiveness and determination, get
a place to live. Some of them may even be welcome. They won't have
a band come out for them, yet there will be no great struggle.
By the same token, the lower-income black family for whom subur-
ban living is much more significant because it may mean the difference
between a job and no job at all, whereas the middle-class family that
has a job in the central city could probably get one anyway, so that
the job implications are not at all as severe for the middle-income as
for the lower-income black family—and this would go for the other
American groups as well—this family has great difficulty.
In the areas in which I have been working in recent years, this again
is like class and race. It is very difficult to distinguish what is going
on because you will find that many of these areas will, in order to keep
out low-income black families, keep out low-income white families,
too. They are against all subsidized housing; they are against all apart-
ment building that would permit the type of homes that would let in
lower-income families.
In New Jersey, I can tell you place after place where there is strong
opposition to any form of lower-income housing. There is economic
discrimination and economic segregation there that is supported by
zoning regulations, supported by development requirements of maybe
an acre or 2 acres for a dwelling unit, or perhaps X number of square
feet, which immediately excludes anybody who earns less than $15,000
or $20,000 a year or even above.
Now, this is across the board. How much of that ends at being class
and begins to become color, or how much of it is color is, I think,
covered by what I said earlier.
I think it is basically a class thing and is accentuated when color en-
ters into it. I am sure in some parts of the United States it is basically
the color thing and the class attitude is also present. But whether we
can define the mix exactly, and it is always helpful to be able to define
social problems, it is so obvious that I don't think we need to spend46
too much time defining it. It is like the story of the guy who asked
his friend if he had a thermometer when he was freezing one morning
in Chicago. The other said, "Why do you need it?" The first replied,
"To find out how cold it is." And the second said, "Well, it is too
cold."
I would say that, basically, there has to be a program such as I think
we had in the Housing Act of 1968, which provides for an increased
supply of low- and moderate-income housing if you are going to do
anything to solve this problem. That is number one.
Then there has to be an enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of
1968, which was intended to supplement the Housing Act, which
would get the supply. The Civil Rights Act would see that supply was
made available without discrimination across the board because there
is no need to have a lack of discrimination if you have nothing to dis-
criminate in.
You have to have the supply; and many of the suburbs just don't
have any housing of the cost range which would facilitate lower-in-
come households' residence; so you have to build it. That is the reason
why housing allowances will not solve the problem. But that is another
story.
Well, these two things then, it seems, are tied together: first, the pro-
gram to provide a larger supply; secondly, a program to see that that
supply is fairly distributed. Within that, however, there is a large gap.
And that is what can be done by way of inducement, because I don't
think you can use fiat to get a community which is reluctant to build
housing for low- and moderate-income families, even though there is
a program to do it and there are developers willing to do it. You have
to have some carrots.
The Housing Act of 1974 is reputed to do this, and with its stipula-
tion for having a housing program as a requirement for community
facilities—a housing program which according to the law makes ar-
rangements and accommodations for those that are living and are ex-
pected to live in the community. But that "expecting to live" has been
almost completely ignored to date in the administration of the act; the
same way that the affirmative action provisions of Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968 have been largely ignored. There affirmative
action is called for, and you and I know this has been more in the
breach than in reality. There has to be good administration and good
enforcement of the law. These are required to solve any problem.
The older I get, the more convinced I am about something I wrote
in 1948. At that time I observed that most of us, particularly many so-
cial scientists, tend to look for the cause and the solutions of these
problems. You may be able to find some of the causes and identify47
the major causes, but you do not find the solutions. You find a series
of potential solutions which, if put in the right combination and carried
out with right enthusiasm, will help you deal with the problem.
But few of these problems are ever solved. In fact, it has been my
experience when you solve one, another breaks out. It's like putting
on your thumb on a little bit of mercury. You push it out, and it
bumps up out over there.
COMMISSIONER FREEMAN. There is one other consideration. That is
with respect to the installation and relocation of governmental installa-
tions. When a Government agency decides to move into a community,
this as you know has an economic benefit to that community. The em-
ployees of that agency, however, range from the GS-1 up to the
GS-16—say, GS-4 would probably be within the definition of low-in-
come. It has been the position of this Commission that this is a respon-
sibility of that agency when it proposes to move into a community, or
when communities are vying or competing for that agency to move
there, to assure that all employees will have equal opportunity for
housing.
I would like you to speak to this because this is an area in which
it seems to me Government by its inaction has supported that commu-
nity in excluding low-income families when this, it seems, would be the
carrot that would at least cause a community to change.
DR. WEAVER. I don't think there is any doubt about that. It seems
as a matter of public policy it is unconscionable for the Government
to spend the taxpayers' money, provide public employment, and then
put that money in a place where they know out in front that it is going
to be limited to only a certain part of the total eligible employees.
This, it seems to me, is being actively engaged in facilitating dis-
crimination, whether there is anything in the law that prohibits it
specifically or not. The general law, it seems to me, would. But I am
not a lawyer. I will let the lawyers bring it into what form it should
be.
I might say that this whole issue is one that has roots that go back
to the middle sixties. I recall when we had an atomic energy installa-
tion somewhere in Illinois, about 40 miles west of Chicago, where this
whole matter came up. It was the source of a great deal of activity
and negotiation. As I recall, the Government went somewhere short of
saying housing had to be provided to minorities. But it went somewhat
further of not doing anything. Its position was specifically, as I re-
member, to extract an agreement that housing would be forthcoming.
I don't think that housing was forthcoming.
Subsequent to that, there were a series of agreements entered into,
as I recall, between the various procurement agencies and GSA48
[General Services Administration], in particular, and the agencies that
were setting up facilities to the effect that agreements should be
developed to assure housing for minorities.
There were several court cases. I remember one which the NCDH
had somewhere in New York State in which this whole issue came up.
I think it is a matter where, my guess would be, there is enough in
the regulations and agreements and law to give a foot to stand on to
challenge what happens, and not enough to make it a reality.
COMMISSIONER FREEMAN. I think it is not being enforced.
DR. WEAVER. NO, I don't think it is, either.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Commissioner Ruiz.
COMMISSIONER RUIZ. Yes, Dr. Weaver, I am not convinced that it
is purely economic, despite the Canadian example. Perhaps we in the
United States are more racist than the Canadians. I recall the exclu-
sionary covenants in California where, within the intercity neighbor-
hoods, no blacks wanted, no Mexican Americans wanted. It wasn't
economic, no. No Jews wanted.
Have you made a study of the impact of exclusionary covenants as
it would affect your report, the white flight predisposition on account
of race that to me has been obvious in the community in which I have
lived?
DR. WEAVER. I think the whole paper is an attempt to do that. Let
me say that I am not in opposition to your notion that racist attitudes
have a tremendous amount to do with what goes on in this country.
I am simply saying that, as a part of that racist attitude, there is a ten-
dency to attribute to the presence of minority groups, color minority
groups, the total responsibility for things which have happened in other
parts of this country and at other times in this country and in other
countries where race is not a basic issue. So to say it is purely racial
is, I think, not supported and, I think, a mistake.
Now, the quote I give from Sternlieb and my analysis indicate that
the fact of race accentuates and makes the problem more difficult.
But what I am trying to say is that the notion of identifying race as
the basis for suburbanization is fallacious. The concept that the in-
cidence of migration of blacks, Puerto Ricans, or Mexican Americans
in our cities is wholly or primarily responsible for people's running
away from the cities to the suburbs is not supported by the facts.
COMMISSIONER RUIZ. With respect to those areas where there are
only whites, I can observe and understand what you have related. With
respect to those areas, however, where there is the black man and ra-
cial minorities, what proportion would you attribute in those
areas—because in Canada we don't have that trouble—what propor-
tion of the white flight would you attribute as an expert? Could it be49
10 percent, 20 percent? Any percent? Or irrelevant? Would you at-
tribute white flight?
DR. WEAVER. Obviously, first, I wouldn't say it was irrelevant.
Secondly, if I am an expert and hope to remain an expert, I would not
attempt to put any figure on it.
You assume people know what motivates them and wouldn't lie
about it after they know what motivates them. Some 25 years ago, we
were doing studies of attitudes. There was a very, very nice, but obvi-
ously black woman who was a cashier. Brown as a berry. The person
who had been waited on by another Negro clerk and gave her the
money said, "You know, I just cannot stand to be waited on by
Negroes, and I will never go to a store where they have Negro help,"
and she had just been helped by one.
So it is awfully difficult to measure these matters, and I certainly
would not try to say what proportion.
What I am saying is—by inference—logically that, if a given action
takes place both where there are minorities and where there are not
minorities, and if it goes in the same degree with people of supposedly
the same cultural background and set of behavior, then it is illogical
and without basis to say that the whole source or the main source of
that action in the place where there are minorities is due to the
presence of minorities. That is all I am saying. That is all the literature
says.
COMMISSIONER RUIZ. That is the reason I was trying to get a percent-
age. Your forte there is not 100 percent, and I don't think most people
would believe you.
DR. WEAVER. It is like a man whose mother-in-law is there and every
time she is he gets a stomach ache. What percentage of that is due
to his stomach and what percentage is due to his mother-in-law?
COMMISSIONER RUIZ. IS there anything on the drawing board relative
to a future migration or outward movement from the suburbs back to
the farm?
DR. WEAVER. I doubt it. I thought you were going to ask is there
anything on the drawing board about a movement from the suburbs
back to the central cities. This is not as farfetched as it sounds if the
energy crisis continues and if our ecological concerns grow—I think
we have gone overboard on ecology—but whether we have or not
ecological considerations are a fact of life. In any event, one thing I
think a social scientist, if he wants to survive, avoids, and that is mak-
ing prophecies in such situations. I think he points up potentialities.
But human beings are peculiar animals and it is very hard to guess at
what they are going to do.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Commissioner Saltzman.50
COMMISSIONER SALTZMAN. Dr. Weaver, you have struck a resonant
chord, I believe, in your paper, describing the reality of the middle-
class person who wants to be surrounded by his lawn, and riding on
his electric mower in suburbia. He feels this is part of the American
ideal, the American promise.
In that context then, do you feel that the Government has a right
to say to him that his American dream has altered by the Govern-
ment's imposition of low-income, nonhomogeneous groups into his
neighborhood?
DR. WEAVER. Well, yes and no.
Let me say a little word about the American dream because I am
a very—as you might even deduce with a great deal of difficul-
ty—strictly a central-city person. Maybe the reason for that is that I
was born in the suburbs here in Washington.
At that time, the suburb was in the City of Washington. We had a
very large lawn, 100-foot front, 250-foot deep. We were one of the
eight Negro families in a community of 3,000. Consequently, my
parents felt our lawn had to be cut better than the neighbors' lawn,
and I had to cut it. Every time I see a lawnmower, it is like the guy
with his mother-in-law. I get indigestion.
I think your question makes two assumptions. First, that these peo-
ple that have gone out in suburbia have gone out there voluntarily,
which they have, and that they have done so without Government
assistance, which is inaccurate. The Government through FHA and VA
mortgages made it possible for the suburbs to be built. It, de facto, sub-
sidized the mortgages because, if there had been a general depression,
the taxpayers would have to bail the mortgager out, despite the fact
it has been self-supporting until recently.
The American government initiated a highway program, the mag-
nitude of which is unbelievable, and the inflexibility of which, as far
as people are concerned, is equally unbelievable in that most of those
who administered it think because a straight line is the shortest path
between two points such should be a highway's path.
The tax system in this country offers a tremendous bonanza to
homeowners. In the first place, the homeowner has to pay no income
tax on the value of the home which, if it were anything else, would
be the source of income on which he would have to pay Federal,
State, and local taxes. He doesn't pay income tax on the interest on
his mortgage, and he gets exemption from Federal income tax for his
local real estate tax. We "poor" renters get nothing comparable, so it
is not only discriminatory but is extremely helpful to the suburbs and
their residents.51
Therefore, the suburbs didn't just naturally grow; they grew because
they were nurtured by the biggest public agency we have, the Federal
Government. Therefore, what the Federal Government hath created,
the Federal Government has some responsibility to see that it is en-
joyed by all the population—because even the poorest of us pay taxes,
and some of those taxes went to develop the suburbs. Therefore, I
think the Government does have some concern, does have some
responsibility to see that these goodies are not only enjoyed by their
chosen occupants; but, because our society is a multiclass society, the
benefits of the suburbs should be available to as wide a segment of the
population as possible.
COMMISSIONER SALTZMAN. I appreciate that answer, Dr. Weaver. But
doesn't that raise, then, an additional problem? And I don't ask you
to be a prophet, only a potentializer.
DR. WEAVER. A who?
COMMISSIONER SALTZMAN. A potentializer.
If the Government then interposes itself to bring additional peoples
and groups out to the suburbs, aren't we then necessarily going to see
the demise of the central city and the continued growth of satellite
kinds of cities, where the core is no longer economically viable and,
in other ways, no longer feasible in which to live?
DR. WEAVER. Well, I don't think so because I think these are almost
two separable phenomenon. In the paper in which I have been giving
excerpts from, I have addressed myself to the latter, which is the erod-
ing base, economic base of our central cities. I don't have to tell any-
one here that this is true because it is true everywhere. There is an
interesting piece on it in this morning's Washington Post by Austin
Scott.
What has happened, as I tried to hint here, is that as the suburbs
have developed almost complete autonomy they have taken over many
of the basic roles of the central cities.
What the central cities need is a combination, in my opinion, of cer-
tain Federal support for functions which the central cities perform that
are national in the reason that they exist, and national in their impact.
They also need certain actions—Federal, State, and local—to shore up
their economic base so that they would do two things.
First, stop losing the population which helps the economic base,
which is the moderate- and the higher-income population. Losing low-
income population isn't going to kill the central cities because this is
one of their greatest problems. They have too much of it, from the
point of view that low-income families usually involve more expendi-
tures, particularly if employment is not available and the economic
base isn't there, than the collection of revenues. What the central ci-52
ties need is more higher-income families and more businesses which
will give economic base and employment to the lower-income families
they already have. So these things are not as a dichotomy, one to the
other.
If the low-income family can go to the suburbs and be looked at as
regional residents, they will become a less drain on the region—forget
whether it is on the suburb or on the central city—because they will
be more self-supporting, because they will be getting more income and
paying more taxes than they cost.
There is nothing more costly to a community than people who don't
have economic opportunity. Not only do they pay little taxes; but,
because they don't have a feeling of belonging and because they are
alienated, you get a tremendous lot of antisocial behavior which is very
costly to some site.
So unless and until people in that position are so located that they
have access to jobs—and the new jobs are out there in the suburbs and
not, by and large, in the city—then they are going to be costly to the
whole metropolitan community and the cost is going to fall primarily
on the central city. If you move them, they will become less costly and
ultimately noncostly to the whole community. So you get not only a
betterment of the central city, but you will get a much sounder econo-
my in the whole metropolitan area.
COMMISSIONER SALTZMAN. I am not really clear in my mind. If you
are going to have all services available in the suburban community,
who is going to need the central city? What is its function?
DR. WEAVER. Well, of course, I have a very strong feeling, and this
is one that is difficult to document because, again, going back to what
I said to Mrs. Freeman, each one of us tends to generalize from t£e
cities he knows the best.
I happen to know Washington and New York and to some degree
Chicago the best, places where I have lived. Of course, Washington is
peculiar. It has its economic base, the Federal Government. So it is
unique and peculiar.
I would say that most of the central cities in this country—not all
of them, I regret to say—have certain peculiar functions which they
can perform better and much more satisfactorily than can the suburbs.
What has happened is that many of the things which were peculiarly
theirs 15 or 25 years ago are no longer peculiar to them. They have
lost some of these things. They are, in my opinion, failing to exploit
to the maximum degree those that they have still left. I wouldn't go
into great detail on that now, because I don't have enough time and,
secondly, I have another paper which I don't want to give until I give
it to the next audience.53
The problem we don't know and we have to look at is whether or
not, maximizing these potentials, there is a sufficient area where there
will be a possibility of competing to support the central city. I think
there will be a lot of people like myself who would rather live in the
central city than in any suburb. I realize we are in a minority, but I
think there are many of us. And I think a lot of people who go out
to the suburbs join us in that thought.
Let's face it. These central cities have to become more habitable.
They have to become more attractive. They have got to do something
about crime. And these are things that can be done; they can't do it
alone, but I think they can be done. For my own peace of mind, I
hope they will do it at least for the next few years when I am around.
COMMISSIONER SALTZMAN. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Mr. Buggs.
MR. BUGGS. Yes.
Dr. Weaver, as you well know, our concern here today has to do
with problems of school desegregation. All of us agree and understand
the fact that we are going to have problems of the kind we are now
experiencing until such time as integration really takes place from a
residential point of view through the country. Title VIII, which was
enacted by the Congress in 1968, obviously was needed and is still
needed.
In the view of many, the implementation of that act, the forceful im-
plementation of that act, is still not enough to promote an integrated
residential pattern. What, in your judgment, can the Federal Govern-
ment and other elements of government do to promote such an in-
tegrated residential pattern throughout the country?
DR. WEAVER. All right.
Several things. In the first place, I must say I have been a little bit
put out by all of a sudden in the National Committee Against Dis-
crimination in Housing finding a new set of allies. These are people
who formerly had no interest in integrated housing, no interest in
opening up housing to minorities, but all of a sudden now have
become great proponents of this cause. Rather than doing anything
about the schools, they would do something about the housing.
I am reminded of John Maynard Keynes, when he was criticized
because his economics were short run and not long run, and replied
that in the long run we will all be dead. It seems that is the answer
to those people who suddenly have this great yen for opening up hous-
ing.
Obviously, you have to do both. It would be a much clearer and
much better solution if we could break down the segregated patterns
in housing and thereby have a breakdown of the segregated patterns54
in schools. But you know and I know, because of political and
economic and psychological reasons, we are not going to break down
the housing patterns in the near future. If we are going to do anything
about the school patterns, we have to do it vis-a-vis the school pat-
terns.
So, for the long run, we have to work on the housing situation as
we have been discussing it here. But in the short run, as far as the
schools are concerned, I think that has to be done within the
framework of the schools.
I am not an expert in this field. You have experts in the field on
the program, and I am going to leave that discussion to them because
I am sure they would not want me to get into their area of expertise.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Dr. Weaver, I have been very much interested
in this dialogue in terms of its impact on some of the issues that are
before the Commission at the present time.
I might say in connection with your last observation about waiting
until we get desegregation in housing before we anticipate or can have
desegregation in education, it reminds me a little bit of my contacts
with older persons throughout the country. When I talk about long-
term planning, someone is sure to get up and say, "That is fine, but
I won't be here."
As I listened to your paper and listened to this dialogue, it seems
to me you put your finger on the fact that, by and large, people in
suburbia don't want neighbors who come from the low-income catago-
ry. Is that a fair generalization?
DR. WEAVER. Yes, and I go further and say that this is nothing pecu-
liar to suburbia because, if you look at the early American cities, peo-
ple in the cities didn't want them either. Look at New York City, how
the upper class went up and up in Manhattan, each time getting away
from the newcomer. And what has happened has been that they are
still doing it, but they no longer have to do it within the city limits
because of the transportation explosion and the resulting rapid growth
of suburbia.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. I started living in Washington in 1927, so I
have seen that same kind of evolution take place as you witnessed.
I would like to make this comment. This unwillingness to have per-
sons of low income becomes a basis for discrimination against housing
for older persons because time and again efforts to open up some new
facility are blocked for the same reason.
Now, it is clear that over the past few years, attention has focused
sharply on suburbia, as far as some persons are concerned, whenever
the Federal courts order the desegregation of public schools in order
to protect the constitutional rights of children and young people. As55
a result of your being in close contact with this process of suburbaniza-
tion, do you feel that ordinarily there is an immediate, significant
response, or a response over a period of a few years on the part of
persons living in the city in terms of a movement to the suburbs?
What I am driving at here is, oftentimes the allegation is made, right
after a court order to desegregate, that we have had an immediate ac-
celeration of movement to suburbia. Now, assuming that there is a
desire on the part of some to respond in some way, is the process such
that they could actually respond in, let's say, a comparatively short
period of time?
DR. WEAVER. I regret to say, because the implications of this for
housing are horrible, that the answer to that, I think, has to be in the
negative.
If you look at the volume of housing starts we are having, and at
the volume of housing permits, and if you look at the availability of
mortgage credit and the costs of mortgage money, I think that it is al-
most an economic impossibility.
Secondly, even if the economics were not so damaging, from what
we know from past experience and from what we know about the
motivation of people moving out of the central city, particularly over
the short run, that it is very dubious that this would have that impact.
If there were the possibility and if there were a general movement,
this would accelerate. But as far as initiating it or being the prime
cause of it, my judgment would be no.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Thank you very much.
DR. WEAVER. NOW, this is a judgment.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Right. I appreciate that. But I appreciate that
it is a judgment of one who has been studying the process and is very
familiar with the process.
Now, assuming that there is an effort on the part of some within the
inner city, after the court order on desegregation, to respond by mov-
ing to suburbia, will suburbia attempt to tighten its defense against the
invasion of persons of low income? Will they think, for example, about
new zoning laws or something of that nature?
DR. WEAVER. I don't think there can be a categorical answer. It
would depend upon the nature of the suburb, the nature of the income
groups involved, and all of these things.
If you had a tremendous movement of this type, it probably would
go first not to the newer suburbs, but to the older suburbs—which are
already on the way to being changed, both ecologically, demographi-
cally, and otherwise, and where the homes would be within the paying
ability of, we would assume, lower-middle-class whites from the central
cities—and there I don't think there would be any movement against56
it because I think this would be a filtering process where the present
residents, if there were an increase in housing supply, would be very
happy to move up and to sell their houses to a new source of demand,
just as in urban renewal, for example. One of the interesting things was
the fact that the urban renewal displacement of minorities also created
a demand for housing which accelerated the departure of the majori-
ties because they wouldn't have been able to go and sell their house
at a decent price if it hadn't been for the fact that a new set of de-
mands was there.
So this is such a complicated market that I think you have to look
at it segment by segment to see what would happen. It would depend
upon the suburbs and income groups and supply. If you don't have an
increase in the supply of housing, the degree of movement will be
limited by these economic factors.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. I assume from your paper and what you have
said that you would feel that, to the extent that suburban communities,
oftentimes helped by the State and Federal governments, are able to
build defenses against the invasion of the low-income neighbor, they
are not only protecting themselves against the low-income neighbor,
but because of the characteristics of the low-income group they are
also insuring a degree of segregation in their schools.
DR. WEAVER. Yes, and I don't know whether—I don't know what
studies have been done to try to establish that fact. It is a logical fact.
And I suppose what the student of people's opinions and attitudes—I
must say I am not a student of attitudes. I am a behavior man. I don't
give a damn what a man's attitude is. I want to know how he behaves,
because there is a great gap between what you find out under the sur-
vey he is going to do, and what he does.
After he has done it and it hurts you, I think it is much more impor-
tant to know that he is going to do it than to know why he did it
because he's probably not going to do it again for the same reason.
He will probably do it again, but for a different reason.
I suppose it would be very interesting to discover how important the
other side of the coin is. In other words, how much of the opposition
to low income and to other "undesirable" people is the matter of
schools.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. I was very much interested in your comment
on the new section of the Housing and Community Development Act
and your observation that up to the present time there has been very
little emphasis on applying or implementing that part of the law that
deals with those who expect to live in the areas. Do you have any
specific suggestion as to an administrative step that could be taken to
bring about an implementation of that part?—because I agree with
you, to me that is a very important part of section 8.57
DR. WEAVER. I try very carefully to avoid offering advice or com-
ment to those who have succeeded me in HUD, and I don't feel I
should depart from that.
So leaving that side of it out entirely, from what I understand—and
I have no inside information—there has been quite a bit of concern
about this, both in the Congress—because it was the Congress, as you
recall, which wrote this in, not the administration—the House and the
Senate, too, feeling that this part of the legislation has not been given
adequate attention.
I am also advised that at the present time HUD is rewriting the regu-
lations on this. And the first thing obviously is to put something in the
regulations which interprets what the act is supposed to say. I would
think that here the important thing is going to be keeping the Congress
very much concerned with this, not only from a point of view of con-
tent but also from the point of view of the fact that Congress does not
like to be ignored. I think this latter one will probably get you more
Brownie points than the former.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. I agree.
DR. WEAVER. It seems to me the first thing is to get the regulations
straightened out. They have been very wishy-washy, very ambiguous to
date, and I think that has to be done because without that you have
no foundation.
Secondly, it seems to me that here is where I think the Commission
can have some great importance in surveillance to see that this is being
carried out. I don't want to hint, and I am sure you don't want that
implication, that this is purely and simply the Commission's job. This
is something in which you are one of many groups which should be
interested in this.
But I think it is of very, very great importance because the whole
way the applications are being dealt with is basic. In the whole idea
of revenue sharing and putting it back to the people, there was a very
little bit of Federal review and what there was was a postaudit review.
I think there is experience now that would question whether or not this
is adequate. So it is a question of what is done under the new law as
far as the community level vis-a-vis the development plan, but also
what kind of machinery is set up in HUD to see that, whatever its
regulations may be, assuming they are adequate, that they are carried
out.
Nobody wants to go back to categorical grants, but it seems to me
we have gone from too much surveillance to not enough. It seems
there has to be some place in the Federal Government where some-
body has to look at performance because, as many people have
pointed out, once the Federal Government gets out, the lowest com-58
mon denominator gets in. This is documented. Jessie Burkhead of
Syracuse University, in a recent paper, and others pointed it out.
I know I have had mayors cuss me out publicly and then call me
up and say, "For God's sake, don't give in on that, but I can't fight
it out here." If you are going to do something for the people in some
site and a locality who need it the most, the local government and the
strong mayor often is helped if he has somebody whom he can blame
for doing the right thing. Otherwise he is going to be a statesman, and
Bob Wagner once defined a statesman as a defeated politician.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. YOU do feel there are some constructive pos-
sibilities built into section 8?
DR. WEAVER. Yes, and I think there are many constructive policies
in the new legislation. I don't think they have been realized, but I think
this is something all of us have to be concerned with, then, after they
are realized in the regulations, to see they are realized in fact. They
won't be self-administered and they won't be self-supportive.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. I don't want to tempt you to break your rule,
but let me ask this question: Do you feel there is any real justification
for administering 235 in such a way as to virtually bar low-income
people from participation in that program, anything in the history or
experience in the implementation of 235?
DR. WEAVER. When Senator Percy came out with the idea of sub-
sidized homeownership as the principal tool for housing the poor, I at-
tacked the proposal. I pointed out that without careful counseling it
would do more harm than good. I subsequently noted that homeowner-
ship was a middle-class concept which assumed middle-class opportu-
nities, including a fair degree of economic and job security; thus too
great emphasis upon ownership was dangerous. I lost that battle, and
the only way I could get the 1968 act through was to put a
homeownership provision for low-income households. It went through
both Houses, and there were provisions for counseling.
As your report indicated, counseling wasn't done until 1972. I don't
think it was even asked for until 1971. So I would add that one of the
problems of section 235 was inclusion of existing housing. This, too,
I opposed, not because I don't feel existing housing was good enough,
but I knew the sort of people who ran existing housing, and I knew
that poor, unsophisticated people would be exposed to what we used
to call the "suede shoes boys" who would sell anything to anybody.
In the case of many of them, after these sales were made, you
couldn't find them. They would say to the poor family, "Look, you
don't want to rent, you want to buy. You only have to put $200
down."
Some would put up the $200 and receive much more in commission.
So they would be ahead that far.59
The abuses in that type of legislation are legion. They were not an-
ticipated either in the way the law was finally drawn up and certainly
not anticipated in the way it was administered. On the other hand, to
go in and say it doesn't work and, therefore, we are going to cut it
out and convert it entirely, I think is not the thing to do.
I think the thing to do is to analyze why it didn't work. It didn't
work because, first, it got too much into the existing housing field, and
this is one you can't monitor. Secondly, it didn't work because we
didn't have a counseling service. Third, it didn't work because it was
pushed too fast without recognizing that there were human beings in-
volved and the degree to which it was pushed should have considered
which people would be involved and what would happen to them.
So it seems to me that to react so strongly and to make it a different
type of program raises a very basic issue, and that is, what is the social
justification for 5 percent mortgages to people who are in the income
groups that are now to be involved? Why should they be subsidized?
Is there a social benefit commensurate with the public expenditure in-
volved? And if this group is subsidized and that subsidy is taken away
from those who need it more, is that a socially desirable thing to do?
So I think all these things are involved, and I have a feeling it could
be reviewed more carefully and perhaps come out more positively
from a point of view of social justice and public policy position.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. May I express to you again our deep ap-
preciation for your paper, for the summary that you have presented
to us, and for the way in which you have responded to our comments
and our questions. This is going to be a great help to us as we con-
tinue. Thank you. We appreciate it very, very much.
I am going to take, at this time, a recess until about 17 minutes of
11:00.
[Recess.]
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. It is a privilege to have with us now Mr.
Robert B. McKay. We are very happy to have Dean McKay here with
us today and to discuss with us his paper on courts, the Congress, and
school desegregation. Dean McKay.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. MCKAY, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE,
AND FORMER DEAN, LAW SCHOOL OF NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY
[Mr. McKay, because of the legal specificity of his paper, read it
verbatim.]60
COURT, CONGRESS, AND SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION
By Robert B. McKay*
The Constitution of the United States provides for a three-way
separation of power, giving substantial but not unlimited authority to
Congress, to the President, and to the Federal courts. A system that
allows one branch to define the power of each of the other branches,
and the limitations on each, invites conflict. This is particularly true
when the power of final decision is given to the judicial branch, which
has been properly described as the least powerful because it com-
mands neither the power of purse nor sword.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that American constitutional history
includes a number of instances of tension between Court and Congress
or between Court and President. The highlights are familiar.
• President Jefferson was furious with Chief Justice Marshall's
rebuke to the President and to Congress in Marbury v. Madison in
1803, but rendered impotent by a decision technically in his favor.
• President Jackson is alleged to have threatened darkly: "Mr.
Marshall has made his decision. Now let him enforce it."
• The 1857 Dred Scott decision, holding slaves to be property and
not persons, was one of the factors that led to the Civil War.
• President Lincoln almost certainly overstepped his constitutional
authority during the Civil War, but the Supreme Court offered no
challenge until after the war was over.
• The constitutionality of the Reconstruction Acts was not tested
when Congress' power to deny appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court was upheld in Ex Parte McCardle in 1869.
• President Franklin Roosevelt's dissatisfaction with the Supreme
Court treatment of New Deal legislation resulted in efforts to enlarge
the Court and thus presumably to change the course of decision. When
his plan was labeled "Court-packing," the proposal was doomed, and
Roosevelt suffered his first serious setback at the hands of Congress.
• In the mid-fifties, there were repeated attempts to amend the
Constitution to overturn Supreme Court decisions unpopular in Con-
gress and assertedly with the public as well. But all were defeated—the
Bricker Amendment to modify the treaty power and a series of
proposals arising out of the anti-Communist sentiments of the time.
* Robert B. McKay is director, Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies Program on
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• In the mid-sixties there was a substantial campaign to modify the
one-man, one-vote principle of the Reapportionment Cases. But this
also failed, perhaps significantly in this instance because the public,
which in general approved the Supreme Court rulings, eventually made
that view clear to its elected representatives.
Now comes the turn of school desegregation, with Supreme Court
rulings that are publicly applauded, but, in many cases, privately disap-
proved. After the initial stir created by Brown v. Board of Education,
implementation went forward slowly until the late sixties with the deci-
sions in Jefferson, Green, and Alexander (to be discussed below) that
made imperative immediate steps for effective desegregation. At the
time that was generally acceptable because Congress and the President
were in step with the Court. This meant that compliance was actively
encouraged by each branch of the Federal Government. When no
respectable voice was raised against desegregation, rapid progress was
possible, North and South. The high tide of forward movement
probably was in 1971 when, in the Swann cases, the Supreme Court
recognized busing as a remedy that might be constitutionally necessary
in some circumstances.
It was then that it was discovered that to describe busing as
"forced" would allow revival of old prejudices, particularly when ex-
pressions of bias, even hate, were made respectable by the President
of the United States. The not-surprising results were a near-total stop
of voluntary desegregation efforts and the present legislative campaign
to restrict the remedies available to the Federal courts in the limitation
of segregation. The turnaround in attitude and practice is a tragedy of
the first magnitude.
Congressional attempts to curb the power of the Federal courts in
the area of school desegregation date largely from the Supreme
Court's decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). It is a response to the Court's approval in that
case of busing as a remedy that it may in some circumstances be used
to alleviate the effects of de jure racial segregation. On the surface,
therefore, the opposition is to busing and not to the entire process of
school desegregation. This is consistent with polls that reveal an in-
creasing public acceptance of school integration
1 and increasing re-
sistance to busing as a means of accomplishing integration.
2 However,
the history of the resistance to school desegregation over the past two
decades
3 makes it difficult to accept the idea that racism plays no part
1 N. Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1975, p. 30.
2 N. Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1973, p. 55.
3 See generally, L. Panetta & P. Gall, Bring Us Together (1971); G. Orfield, The
Reconstruction of Southern Education (1969); R. Sarratt, The Ordeal of Desegregation
(1969); J. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men (1961).62
in the antibusing movement.
Whatever its sources, opposition to busing appears to command a
majority in Congress. This has not yet led to a head-on confrontation
with the courts because legislation thus far enacted has been framed
to avoid constitutional difficulties. And it now appears that the primary
focus of congressional interest is an antibusing amendment to the Con-
stitution. While, to the proponents of busing, this would be far more
serious than legislation, an amendment would not raise the possibility
of a clash with the judicial branch. Moreover, the prospects for
passage of a constitutional amendment are highly speculative.
Analysis of the proposed amendments and statutes requires a review
of both the existing statutes and the case law. It will then be possible
to assess the constitutionality of past and present antibusing efforts.
Background to Swann
Inevitably, analysis of school desegregation law must begin with
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I). That
landmark opinion contained no ruling on relief. Instead, the remedy in
the four cases before the Brown Court was announced 1 year later in
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 254 (1955) (Brown II), where
it was held that the plaintiffs were to be admitted to the public schools
on a racially nondiscriminatory basis "with all deliberate speed." This
general language proved spectacularly unsuccessful in giving direction
to the lower courts in the enormously difficult process of remedying
school desegregation.
The nature of the obligation imposed on school boards by Brown II
was left for clarification in the lower courts. When the cases before
the Brown Court were remanded, the district court in one of these
cases described the duty of school officials in what came to be a very
well-known passage:
[I]t is important that we point out exactly what the Supreme
Court has decided and what it has not derided in this case. It has
not decided that the federal courts are to take over or regulate
the public schools of the states. It has not decided that the states
must mix persons of different races in the school or must deprive
them of the right of choosing the schools they attend. What it has
decided, and all that it has decided, is that a state may not deny
to any person on account of race the right to attend any school
that it maintains. This***the state may not do directly or in-
directly; but if the schools which it maintains are open to children
of all races, then no violation of the Constitution is involved even
though the children of different races voluntarily attend different
schools*** The Constitution, in other words, does not require in-
tegration. It merely forbids discrimination. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F.
Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).63
This distinction between integration and desegregation established
the formula for remedial procedures in the first decade after Brown.
In the court opinions a short phrase drawn from Briggs—"the Con-
stitution does not require integration, it merely forbids segrega-
tion"-soon became a familiar refrain.
4 Under this formula little in-
tegration took place because school boards were required to do
nothing other than to avoid the official assignment of students to par-
ticular schools according to race. Despite the maintenance of segrega-
tion in virtually all southern school systems, this period saw the first
congressional attempts to curb the Federal courts in the area of school
desegregation;
5 but no legislation was enacted.
The mid-sixties saw major changes in school desegregation law. Im-
petus for these changes came from the passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and the growth of the civil rights movement.
6 It is worth
noting that during this time—indeed, during the entire period from
1955 until 1967—the Supreme Court decided few desegregation cases
and provided little help for the lower courts.
7 The burden of
desegregating the southern schools was borne by the lower courts, a
fact to be considered when legislation is proposed that would eliminate
or diminish the power of these courts to remedy school segregation.
In the mid-sixties the lower courts began to abandon the Briggs dic-
tum in favor of a rule that school boards in formerly de jure segregated
systems were charged with an affirmative duty to integrate black and
4 See Bradley v. School Board, 317 F.2d 429, 438 (4th Cir. 1963); Jeffers v. Whitley,
309 F.2d 621, 629 (4th Cir. 1962); Boson v. Rippy, 285 F.2d 43, 45-46 (5th Cir. 1960);
Kelley v. Board of Education, 270 F.2d 209, 229 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 361 U.S. 924
(1959); Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1957); Rippy v. Borders, 250 F.2d
690, 692-93 (5th Cir. 1957); Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent School District, 241
F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir.) cert, denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957); Bell v. School City of Gary,
Indiana, 213 F.Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), affd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963); Evans v.
Buchanan, 207 F.Supp. 820, 823-24 (D. Del. 1962); Jackson v. School Board , 203
F.Supp. 701, 704-06 (W. D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds , 308 F.2d 918 (4th Cir.
1962).
5 See Thompson & Pollitt, Congressional Control of Judicial Remedies: President
Nixon's Proposed Moratorium on "Busing" Orders, 50 N.C.L. Rev. 809, 816-17 (1972).
One bill would have deprived the Federal courts of jurisdiction to hear any suit question-
ing State laws relating to the public schools. H.R. 1228, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
Another bill would have deprived the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction in cases
attacking public school systems "on grounds other than substantial inequality of physical
facilities and other tangible factors." S. 3467, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
6 Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. Board of
Education, 39 Law & Contemp. Prob. 7, 16-19 (1975).
7 The Court decided only three significant school desegregation cases during this
period. Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (ordering the reopening
of schools that had been closed to avoid desegregation); Goss v. Board of Education, 373
U.S. 683 (1963) (holding invalid a minority-to-majority transfer plan); Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that desegregation could not be delayed because of inter-
ference by State officials). These cases urged more rapid progress while giving little ad-
vice on the mechanics of the desegregation process. Read, supra n.6, at 19.64
white students. The new standard became: "The only school
desegregation plan that meets constitutional standards is one that
works." United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d
836, 847 (5th Cir. \966),affd en bane, 380 F.2d 385, cert, denied, 389
U.S. 840 (1967). This case was extremely important to the develop-
ment of school desegregation law; most of the problems it considered
continue to plague the law today.
8
The circuit courts adopted conflicting positions on the affirmative
duty question
9 until the issue was resolved by the Supreme Court in
Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In Green, the
Supreme Court rejected a freedom-of-choice plan that had failed to
produce any significant amount of integration. The evil in the system,
according to the Court, was that "racial identification of the system's
schools was complete," id. at 435, and this was deemed to be
"precisely the pattern of segregation to which Brown I and Brown II
were particularly addressed, and which Brown I declared unconstitu-
tionally denied Negro school children equal protection of the laws."
Ibid.
To remedy this segregation, the Court held that the school board
was "charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimina-
tion would be eliminated root and branch." Id. at 437-38. The burden
was placed on the school board "to come forward with a plan that
promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now."
Id. at 439 (emphasis in original). While this decision indicated that
further delay would not be tolerated and established the affirmative
duty as national law, it did not order any busing. Because the school
system in the Green case was set in a rural county with no housing
segregation, the Court suggested that zoning, i.e., a "neighborhood
school" plan, would be appropriate. Id. at 439. In retrospect, however,
it is clear that busing orders had to result if Green was to be applied
to school systems with segregated housing patterns.
Two years after Green the Supreme Court decided Alexander v.
Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969). The Alexander
8 See Read, supra n.6, at 21-28.
9 The Fourth and Sixth Circuits refused to accept the doctrine of an affirmative duty.
Green v. County School Board, 382 F.2d 338 (4th Cir. 1967), vacated and remanded, 391
U.S. 430 (1968); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 380 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1967), vacated
and remanded, 391 U.S. 450 (1968). The Fifth Circuit adopted the doctrine in the Jeffer-
son case. And the Eighth Circuit took different positions depending on the panel. Com-
pare Raney v. Board of Education, 381 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 443
(1968), and Clark v. Board of Education, 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966) (opposed), with
Jackson v. Marvell School District No. 22, 389 F.2d 740 8th Cir. 1968); Kemp v. Beasley,
389 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1968); and Kelley v. Altheimer, 378 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1967)
(supporting adoption).65
Court held that school boards were not entitled to any further delay
in implementing desegregation plans
because continued operation of segregated schools under a stan-
dard of allowing "all deliberate speed" for desegregation is no
longer constitutionally permissible. Under explicit holdings of this
Court the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual
school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only uni-
tary schools.
Id. at 20. Taken together, therefore, Green and Alexander established
that school boards in formerly de jure segregated systems could no
longer maintain a dual system or racially identifiable schools and that
they were required to take immediate steps to remedy segregation.
Logically, this meant that where housing segregation existed, it would
not be enough to assign students to their neighborhood schools. In-
stead, actual integration—i.e., the elimination of racially identifiable
schools—would have to be accomplished and this would require the
identification of students by race and their assignment to schools on
that basis.
1
0
Swann and Its Companion Cases
This logic prevailed another 2 years later in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra, the first case that presented a
busing order for Supreme Court review. Swann traced the history of
the resistance to school desegregation, noting that the "objective today
remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-im-
posed segregation." Id. at 15. The district courts have broad equitable
powers to accomplish this objective, ibid., and these powers include
the use of mathematical ratios as a starting point in shaping remedies,
id. at 25, and the assignment of students according to race in order
to promote integration, id. at 28.
1
0 It may appear that the identification of students by race in order to assign them
to schools as part of a desegregation plan is inconsistent with Brown's outlawing of the
assignment of students by race for the purpose of segregation. Indeed, antibusing
spokesmen claim that Green, Alexander, and Swann represent a full circle from Brown.
However, some have contended that Brown is ambiguous because it is not clear whether
the decision prohibits racial assignment or segregation—segregation understood not as
action to segregate, but as a demographic fact involving separation of the races. Fiss,
School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 Philo. & Pub. Affairs 3 (1974).
Green, Alexander, and Swann can thus be interpreted as taking the latter view of Brown
as holding that whenever segregation is a foreseeable and avoidable result of government
operations, those operations must be altered to prevent segregation and to promote in-
tegration. See also Fiss, The Jurisprudence of Busing, 39 Law & Contemp. Prob. 194,
199-200 (1975).66
In the school district involved in Swann "assignment of children to
the school nearest their grade would not produce an effective disman-
tling of the dual system." Id. at 30. Accordingly, the Court approved
the busing order. And, recognizing that "[a]n objection to transporta-
tion of students may have validity when the time or distance of travel
is so great as to either risk the health of the children or significantly
impinge on the educational process," the Court nonetheless held that,
"Desegregation plans cannot be limited to the walk-in school." Id. at
30-31.
In evaluating the antibusing efforts of Congress, the companion
cases to Swann are as important as the main decision. First, in Davis
v. Board of School Commissions, 402 U.S. 33 (1971), the Court
reviewed a district court order that left 12 all-black or nearly all-black
elementary schools because a highway divided the metropolitan area
of Mobile, Alabama, into predominantly white and predominantly
black areas and the district court had treated the two areas as distinct
"without either interlocking zones or transportation across the
highway." Id. at 36. The court of appeals had developed a modified
plan, but this still left 6 black schools because the eastern and western
zones were still treated in isolation from each other. Ibid.
The Supreme Court rejected the approach of treating the two areas
in isolation, holding that "inadequate consideration was given to the
possible use of bus transportation and split zoning." Id. at 38. And, in
an important paragraph, the Court stated that:
[Neighborhood school zoning, "whether based strictly on home-
to-school distance" or on "unified geographic zones," is not the
only constitutionally possible remedy, nor is it per se adequate to
meet the remedial responsibilities of local boards. Having once
found a violation, the district judge or school authorities should
make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situa-
tion. A district court may and should consider the use of all
available techniques including restructuring of attendance zones
and both contiguous and noncontiguous attendance zones***. The
measure of any desegregation plan is its effectiveness. Id. at 38.
This paragraph serves to emphasize the principle inherent in Swann
that once any finding of de jure segregation is made, everything possi-
ble must be done to desegregate and this will naturally include busing
where there is any significant degree of residential segregation.
That the Court will not be deterred from using busing where it is
a necessary remedy for school segregation was confirmed in another
companion case, North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402
U.S. 43 (1971). In that case, the Court affirmed an order declaring67
unconstitutional a North Carolina statute prohibiting racial assignment
of students and busing based on racial assignment. The Court held that
a ban on racial assignment "would deprive school authorities of the
one tool absolutely essential to fulfillment of their constitutional
obligation to eliminate existing dual school systems." Id. at 46. The
Court also concluded that the ban on busing was invalid because "bus
transportation has long been an integral part of all public educational
systems, and it is unlikely that a truly effective remedy could be
devised without continued reliance upon it." Ibid.
The Swann cases in effect hold that in many situations there will be
no remedy for segregated schools other than busing. As the remedy
becomes part of the right, any limitation on busing becomes a pre-
sumptive interference with the right to an integrated education. This
merger of right and remedy is the main constitutional obstacle to an-
tibusing legislation.
Pre-Swann Statutes
The first legislation that is relevant to this inquiry is, ironically, the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 407 of that act authorizes the Attor-
ney General to maintain school desegregation actions upon the receipt
of written complaints. And that section goes on to grant jurisdiction
over such actions to the Federal courts with the following proviso:
[N]othing herein shall empower any official or court of the United
States to issue any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any
school by requiring the transportation of pupils or students from
one school to another or one school district to another in order
to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing
power of the court to insure compliance with constitutional stan-
dards. 42 U.S.C. §2000c-6(a).
The purpose appears to be to guarantee that no expansion of judicial
power will result from the statute; but it is not designed to restrict "the
existing power of the court to insure compliance with constitutional
standards." This is the interpretation that was given to section 407 in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra at 17-18 in
reliance on both the language and the legislative history of the statute.
Concluding that the section was based on congressional desire not to
extend the power of the Federal courts to remedying de facto segrega-
tion, Swann held that section 407 was irrelevant where, as there,
"state-imposed segregation" was involved. Id. at 18.
It is somewhat bewildering, therefore, that numerous members of
Congress seem to believe that section 407 prohibits the Federal courts
from ordering busing as a remedy for de jure segregation.
1
1 They have
1
1 See, e.g., Hearings on School Busing Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 39 (1972) (statement of Rep.
Rarick); id. at 44 (statement of Rep. Mizell); id. at 73 (statement of Rep. Waggonner).68
sought to label members of the Court as "blind men" and to accuse
the Court of having totally ignored section 407 in Swann. Such miss-
tatements, relying on an appeal to base emotion, call into question the
motives behind antibusing legislation. To suggest that the Supreme
Court itself violates the law when it orders busing is particularly objec-
tionable because so patently inconsistent with the statute itself.
The approach of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was followed in the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §1232(a),
which prohibited the use of Federal funds for the assignment or trans-
portation of students or teachers in order to overcome racial im-
balance. The legislation continued the de jure-de facto distinction,
which allowed the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) to play a major role in ending de jure segregation.
1
2
This effort brought congressional reaction in the late sixties and
early seventies corresponding to the increase in HEW's activities in
promoting desegregation. Beginning in 1969, HEW appropriation bills
have carried some variation on the so-called Whitten Amendment
prohibiting HEW from forcing school districts to bus students, forcing
the closing of any school, or forcing any student to attend a particular
school against the choice of his or her parents.
1
3 The force of these
amendments was weakened in 1969 and 1970 by inclusion of language
indicating that the prohibition of HEW activity would not apply where
it conflicted with the Constitution.
Chief Justice Burger's 1971 opinion in Swann showed that, despite
two Nixon appointments to the Supreme Court, the judiciary would
not falter in its efforts to eradicate the vestiges of dual school systems
in the South. And northern cases were beginning to work their way
through the courts producing orders requiring busing. This set the
stage for much more drastic antibusing language and proposals for an-
tibusing constitutional amendments.
1
2 "Tille Vi of *** [the 1964 Civil Rights Act] proscribed discrimination in any pro-
gram or activity receiving federal financial assistance, under threat of loss of funding,
*** when combined with the Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965, *** which greatly
increased the amount of federal money available for the nation's public
schools—particularly schools in low income areas such as the Deep South—Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided federal officials with both a powerful club and
a tempting carrot. With one hand they could offer generous amounts of federal aid to
recalcitrant school districts and with the other they could demand that desegregation ef-
forts begin at the risk of the district losing all of those new found dollars." Read, supra
n.6, at 17-18 n.42.
1
3 See Hearings, supra n. 1 1 at 141 (statement of Rep. McDonald); Comment, Con-
gress and the President Against the Courts: Busing as a Viable Tool for Desegregation,
19 Wayne L. Rev. 1483, 1493-95 (1973).69
The Nixon Busing Bills of 1972
Early in the 1972 session of Congress, Senator Griffin introduced an
antibusing amendment to the Higher Education Act
1
4 providing that,
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to make
any decision, enter any judgment or issue any order the effect of
which would be to require that pupils be transported to or from
school on the basis of their race, color, religion, or national origin.
This drastic amendment was narrowly defeated by a 50 to 47 vote on
February 29, 1972. A similar amendment, introduced by Senator Dole,
was defeated the next day by only a one-vote margin, 48 to 47.
Meanwhile, on February 29, the Senate had adopted the much milder
Mansfield-Scott Amendment that formed the basis for the final an-
tibusing provisions of the Education Amendments of 1972, discussed
below.
These votes were soon followed by Administration action when Pre-
sident Nixon outlined sweeping proposals on education and busing in
a message to Congress on March 17, 1972.
1
5 Implementing legislation
in the form of two separate bills was introduced a few days later.
1
6 A
co-sponsor of both bills in the House was the then Republican minority
leader Gerald Ford. The two bills reflected the President's two-stage
plan: "an immediate stop to new busing in the short run, and construc-
tive alternatives to busing in the long run."
The Student Transportation Moratorium Act was the short-run mea-
sure; it would have required that any busing order entered by a
Federal court or any busing plan mandated by HEW would be stayed
until July 1, 1973, or the date of new remedial legislation offering al-
ternatives to busing, whichever was earlier. This bill basically did not
survive in any form. More important was the Administration's long-run
proposal, the Equal Educational Opportunities Act. Its stated aim was
"to provide federal finance assistance for educationally deprived stu-
dents and to specify appropriate remedies for the orderly removal of
the vestiges of the dual school system." It set forth a priority of
remedies from which Federal courts and agencies must choose "the
first" or "the first combination thereof which would remedy such deni-
al" of equal educational opportunity. The stated remedial sequence
was as follows: assignment to the nearest possible school; majority-to-
minority transfer plans; revision of attendance zones; construction of
new schools; establishment of magnet schools or educational parks;
and "any other plan which is educationally sound and administratively
feasible." But specific limits would have been imposed on the use of
1
4 S.659, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
1
5 118 Cong. Rec. S. 4164 (1972).
1
6 H.R. 13914, H.R. 13916, S. 3388, S. 3395, 92d Cong., 2d Sess (1972).70
transportation in implementation plans, depending on the level of
school attended. This bill, eventually enacted in revised form in 1974,
will be discussed further below. Both Administration bills raised sub-
stantial questions about their constitutionality, provoking a wave of
commentary.
1
7 (The constitutional issues are also discussed below.)
These drastic bills were unsuccessful during 1972. Instead, Congress
adopted a conference committee's milder antibusing amendments,
§§801-806 of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
§§1651-1656. Section 801 prohibits the use of Federal funds for bus-
ing either to overcome racial imbalance or to carry out a plan of
desegregation except upon request of local school officials. And all
Federal officials are prohibited from requiring busing as a condition
for receipt of funds. Parents or guardians of children subject to court-
ordered busing are authorized by section 804 to reopen or intervene
in the implementation of the order if, in language that tracks Swann,
"the time or distance of travel is so great as to risk the health of the
student or significantly impinge on his or her educational process."
Sections 805 and 806 were directed at problems of sectional dis-
crimination in providing for uniform nation-wide rules of evidence to
prove racial discrimination in student assignment and in providing that
the portion of section 407 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that is
discussed above applies to all public school systems in the United
States, "whether *** situated in the northern, eastern, western or
southern part of the United States."
Section 803, which expired by its terms on January 1, 1974, is the
only section that has played any significant part in litigation. It pro-
vided that district court orders requiring transportation (as busing is
euphemistically called) for the purposes of achieving a balance among
students with respect to race, sex, religion, or socioeconomic status be
stayed until all appeals from such orders had been exhausted. The ra-
cial balance language of this section recalled similar language in the
1964 Civil Rights Act which had been construed in Swann as applying
1
7 R. Bork, Constitutionality of the President's Busing Proposals (1972); Goldberg, The
Administration's Anti-Busing Proposals—Politics Makes Bad Law, 67 Nw. U.L. Rev. 319
(1972), Thompson & Pollitt, Congressional Control of Judicial Remedies: President
Nixon's Proposed 382-83 on Orders, 50 N.C.L. Rev. 809 (1972); Comment, On Insulat-
ing Busing from Congressional Review: the Swann Right to a Racial Mixture, 22 Am.
U.L. Rev. 795 (1973); Comment, Congress and the President Against the Courts: Busing
as a Viable Tool for Desegregation, 19 Wayne L. Rev. 1483 (1973); Note, Breaking
the Law: Antibusing Legislation and the Constitution, 3 NYU. Rev. L. & Soc. Change
1 19 (1973); Note, Segregation—Congress Attempts to Limit the Effectiveness of Busing
Orders in School Desegregation Cases, 53 B.U.L. Rev. 235 (1973); Note, The Nixon
Busing Bills and Congressional Power, 81 Yale L.J. 1542 (1972); Note, Moratorium on
School Busing for the Purpose of Achieving Racial Balance: A New Chapter in Congres-
sional Court-Curbing, 48 Notre Dame Law. 208 (1972).71
only to de facto segregation. The President recognized this and other
significant differences between these provisions and his proposals in
reluctantly signing them into law. He stated that Congress "has not
provided a solution to the problem of court-ordered busing; it has pro-
vided a clever political evasion."
As predicted, section 803 did not stay any busing orders. In Drum-
mond v. Acree, 409 U.S. 1228 (1972), Mr. Justice Powell, relying on
Swann's interpretation of section 407 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
held that section 803 applied only to de facto segregation. After this
decision the lower courts treated section 803 as being inapplicable to
de jure segregation, NAACP v. Lansing Board of Education, 485 F.2d
569 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Board of Education, 476 F.2d 621
(10th Cir. 1973); and it expired at the beginning of 1974.
Interim Developments: Keyes and The Two Bradley
Cases
Antibusing legislation was not seriously considered in 1973, but it
became an important subject of congressional concern again in 1974.
In the interim period developments in the case law set the stage for
the eventual congressional reaction. In 1973, the Court decided its first
major school desegregation case involving a northern city—Denver.
Keyes v. School District No. 7,413 U.S. 189 (1973).
De jure segregation had been found by the district court in the
northeast section of Denver, but it was held that the school segregation
existing in other areas of the city was de facto. Nevertheless, the dis-
trict court ordered widespread desegregation in order to equalize edu-
cational opportunities for all black pupils in Denver. The Tenth Circuit
upheld the finding of de jure segregation, but reversed the order in-
sofar as it applied to the de facto areas on the basis that the Federal
courts lacked the power to grant such orders.
The Supreme Court resolved the difference between the district
court and the court of appeals by holding that a system-wide remedy
is appropriate if it is shown that "an intentionally segregative policy
is practiced in a meaningful segment of a school system" and the
school authorities are then not able to meet "the burden of showing
that their actions as to other segregated schools within the system are
not also motivated by segregative intent." Id. at 209.
This standard of intent—certainly an unusual test to be applied by
the Court
18—has proven difficult to apply.
1
9 But it indicated that a
1
8 Cf. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973); Wright v. City of Emporia,
407 U.S. 451 (1972); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-83 (1968); Griffin v. County School Board, 311 U.S. 218,
231 (1964).
1
9 See Marshall, The Standard of Intent: Two Recent Michigan Cases, 4 J. Law &
Ed. 227 (1975).72
heavy burden could be placed on school authorities to explain how
local schools had become segregated and therefore suggested that mas-
sive school desegregation, accompanied by busing, would soon be
coming to the North and West. This was certain to have an impact on
Congress, an impact which was enhanced by developments in
metropolitan desegregation cases.
The first metropolitan desegregation case to reach the Supreme
Court was Bradley v. School Board, 412 U.S. 92 (1973), which af-
firmed by an equally divided Court the Fourth Circuit's reversal of a
district court desegregation plan that encompassed both Richmond and
its suburbs. There was no majority because Mr. Justice Powell had
disqualified himself, having once been a member of the Richmond
School Board. The Court granted certiorari to resolve this issue in the
Detroit case and while decision in that case was pending, Congress, as
discussed below, was considering drastic antibusing legislation. When
the Detroit case was decided and it was held that a metropolitan
desegregation plan was improper, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974), Congress backed down somewhat.
1974: Revival of the Nixon Bill
In the 1974 session of Congress, the Nixon Educational Oppportuni-
ties Act of 1972 was revived in somewhat modified form. As passed
by the House, the bill contained a flat ban on the transportation of stu-
dents for desegregation purposes rather than the earlier proposal to
ban transportation of students below the seventh grade.
2
0 The House
bill also contained a provision for the reopening of any desegregation
plan in effect when the bill was enacted to allow modification of the
plan so that it would comply with the bill.
2
1
An identical proposal to the one approved by the House was in-
troduced in the Senate by Senator Gurney of Florida. It was defeated
by a 47 to 46 vote. By another vote of 47 to 46, the Senate adopted
2
0 The sincere motives for the restrictions on busing of very young children that were
contained in the Nixon bill are easily discerned, but if effective desegregation is to
remain as a goal, this type of restriction on busing is extremely counterproductive. As
Orfield reports, "One of the few points of consensus in desegregation studies and in in-
terviews of school officials is that young children experience the least difficulty in adapt-
ing to desegregation." And he argued that: "Desegregation plans that operate on the as-
sumption that children should remain in their neighborhoods for the first grades and
then transfer to desegregate schools can find no support in social science research. The
information we do possess about the operation of the process strongly argues for making
early desegregation a top priority in litigation and planning. This is one of the few clear
and unambiguous recommendations that can be made on the basis of existing research."
Orfield, How to Make Desegregation Work: The Adaptation of Schools to Their Newly-
Integrated Student Bodies, 39 Law & Contemp. Prob. 314, 334-35 (1975).
2
1 H.R. 69, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. (1974).73
a Mansfield-Scott compromise proposal, which did not include the
reopener provision. Although it also banned transportation of students
to schools beyond the school closest or next closest to their homes,
it softened this ban by stating that it is "not intended to modify or
diminish the authority of the courts of the United States to enforce
fully the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution."
2
2
The bills went to a conference committee and the House instructed its
conferees to insist on the House busing provisions. President Nixon indicated
that he might veto the entire Elementary and Secondary Education Act
unless it contained the House provisions. However, the Supreme Court
decision in Milliken v. Bradley, supra, was handed down while the conference
committee was working and this appeared to mollify the House. The final
conference report adopting the Senate language was approved in the House
by a vote of 323 to 83.
2
3 Discussion of the legislation as finally approved,
sections 202 - 259 of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20
U.S.C. §§1701 - 1758, will be limited here to the provisions that most affect
the courts.
Section 203 sets out several congressional findings and also contains
the Senate language indicating that these provisions are not intended
to affect the power of the courts to enforce the Constitution. Section
213 provides that Federal courts and agencies should use only those
remedies that are necessary to correct "particular denials of equal edu-
cational opportunity or equal protection of the laws." This is ap-
parently directed at the case law rule, discussed above, of taking max-
imum steps to desegregate wherever a single violation is found.
Section 214 establishes the same priority of remedies as contained
in the original Nixon bill. Section 215 prohibits transportation orders
beyond the school next closest to the student's home. Section 216, ap-
parently directed at metropolitan desegregation plans, provides that
school district lines may not be ignored or altered unless the lines
"were drawn for the purpose, and had the effect" of causing segrega-
tion. Proceedings may be reopened under section 218 if there is a bus-
ing order in effect that would risk the health or affect the education
of students. Other provisions to a large extent repeat the 1972 legisla-
tion discussed above.
Because of the qualification that this legislation is not intended to
affect judicial power, it is not likely to produce any confrontation with
2
2 S. 1539, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. (1974).
2
3 30 Cong. Q. Almanac 441 (1974).74
the courts. The only reported case dealing with these statutes is Hart
v. Community School Board, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). There sec-
tions 208 and 215(c), which provide that population shifts producing
segregation in a desegregated system do not per se form the basis for
a new desegregation order, were held to apply to de facto and not de
jure segregation. Id. at 52. And the court found that section 256,
which prohibits busing orders "unless the court first finds that all alter-
native remedies are inadequate," was inapplicable because the only al-
ternative remedy offered to the court required more busing than the
remedy adopted by the court. Id. at 43, n.70.
Prospects for the Future: Legislation
The present session of Congress has seen attempts at the passage of
further antibusing legislation that are significant not so much because
of the nature of the proposed legislation, as because of the support it
has gathered. While the House passed the standard Whitten Amend-
ment to the HEW appropriations bill, the Senate, after complex
maneuvering, passed an amendment that may be somewhat stronger in
prohibiting HEW from imposing desegregation plans that require bus-
ing. The most important aspect of the Senate action is that this amend-
ment was sponsored by Senator Biden of Delaware, who has previously
voted against antibusing legislation, and it was supported by several
other Senators who have previously been opposed to antibusing
legislation.
2
4 The House and the Senate provisions are now being con-
sidered by a conference committee.
2
5
The Senate has in the past few years been much more reluctant than
the House to pass antibusing legislation. The switch of Biden and
several other northern liberals to the antibusing position suggests,
therefore, that stronger legislation may be forthcoming. It is difficult
to imagine, however, what stronger legislation could be passed without
raising severe constitutional questions. Still, if a constitutional amend-
ment is to be passed—and I do not believe that one will—then more
legislation will probably be forthcoming and a clash with the judiciary
may be unavoidable.
Prospects for the Future: Constitutional Amendments
In the course of considering antibusing legislation over the past few
years, Congress has also considered numerous proposals for constitu-
2
4 See 33 Cong. O. Weekly Report 2227 (October 18, 1975); 33 Cong. O. Weekly
Report 2034 (Sept. 27, 1975).
" 33 Cong. O. Weekly Report 2119 (Oct. 4, 1975).75
tional amendments. The most prominent proposal has been the amend-
ment offered by Representative Lent.
2
6 It would prohibit the assign-
ment of students on the basis of race, but the effects of such an
amendment are not totally clear. At present, the Senate Judiciary
Committee is conducting hearings on a variety of amendment
proposals, but there is no indication that any of them is likely to suc-
ceed.
Two other developments indicate that an amendment is not likely to
be successful. First, President Ford has refused for the present to en-
dorse an antibusing amendment.
2
7 Second, the House Democratic Cau-
cus recently voted down, by a vote of 172 to 96, a resolution directing
Democrats on the Judiciary Committee to send to the House floor
within 30 days an amendment "that would guarantee each child the
right to attend the primary and secondary schools nearest his own
home within his respective school district."
2
8 This apparently indicates
that the two-thirds support necessary to pass a constitutional amend-
ment cannot be mustered at this time. And if this is true in the House,
it is even more likely to be true in the Senate.
HEW
While Congress has been mainly concerned with busing ordered by
the courts, legislation has also been directed at the role of HEW in
enforcing the 1964 Civil Rights Act by requiring busing. As discussed
above, Congress has in recent years routinely attached amendments to
HEW appropriations bills prohibiting the use of funds to require busing
as part of a desegregation plan. Both the 1972 and 1974 legislation
discussed above also seek to prohibit HEW from using its power over
Federal funding of local school districts to impose a desegregation plan
involving busing upon those school districts.
It is doubtful that any of these congressional actions were really
necessary. Since the start of the Nixon administration, HEW's civil
rights enforcement effort has been drastically curtailed.
2
9 This was
shown by the case of Adams v. Richardson, 356 F.Supp. 92 (D.D.C.
1973), modified, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973), where the court
found that HEW had failed to meet its responsibility under the 1964
Civil Rights Act to insure desegregation in hundreds of southern
2
6 H. R. J. Res. 620, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
2
7 N. Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1975, p. 36.
2
8 N. Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1975, p. 1.
2
9 For the early development of this policy, see generally L. Panetta & P. Gall, Bring
Us Together (1971). A chronology of the Nixon Administration's actions in the area of
school desegregation into 1972 can be found in Hearings on the Equal Educational Op-
portunities Act of 1972 before the Subcommittee on Education of the Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. at 526 (1972).76
school districts. Two years later this case was back in court because
HEW was again failing to do more than solicit voluntary desegregation
plans. Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F.Supp. 269 (D.D.C. 1975). The dis-
trict court stated that:
HEW has often delayed too long in ascertaining whether a com-
plaint or other information of racial discrimination constitutes a
violation of Title VI. HEW has also frequently failed to commence
enforcement proceedings by administrative notice of hearing or
any other means authorized by law although the efforts to obtain
voluntary compliance have not succeeded during a substantial
period of time. *** Apart from the school districts expressly
covered by this Court's February 16, 1973 Order, HEW has not
initiated a single administrative enforcement proceeding against a
southern school district since the issuance of this Court's Order 25
months ago. Id. at 273.
An independent study of HEW by the Center for National Policy
Review found that HEW enforcement of school desegregation in the
North and West over the past 3 years had been extremely lax. Of 84
cases undertaken by HEW since 1964, only four districts had been
forced to undergo formal enforcement proceedings, and funds had
been cut off in only one district. Fifty-two of these cases remained un-
resolved as of July 1, 1973, and no enforcement of any kind has been
taken in 37 of these 52 cases.
3
0 This inaction in the North and West
resulted in the filing of a suit on July 3, 1975, to compel HEW to
act.
3
1 Perhaps the final evidence of HEW's position was added when
the Department claimed that it could not process discrimination com-
plaints because its responsibilities under Adams, supra, were consuming
all of its resources. This claim was made despite the fact that HEW
returned $2.6 million unspent to the Federal treasury in the past fiscal
year.
3
2
Constitutional Issues
The antibusing legislation ihat has thus far been enacted presents no
significant constitutional issues because it has been explicitly framed to
avoid such problems. However, the possibility that the legislation might
be more drastic has provoked a fairly large body of legal
commentary.
3
3 While a great deal of uncertainty prevails, some con-
clusions about the constitutional issues can be drawn.
3
0 N. Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1974, p. 34.
3
1 N. Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1975, p. 21.
3
2 N. Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1975, p. 49.
3
3 In addition to the sources cited in footnote 17, see Holmes, Hffectivc Desegregation
Without Busing: The Constitutionality of Anti-Injunction Legislation, 7 Urban L. Ann.
141 (1974).77
A decision about the constitutionality of antibusing legislation de-
pends largely on the precise nature of the legislation. With that caveat
in mind, we can proceed to the two possible bases for such legislation.
First, there is the congressional power to control the jurisdiction of the
Federal courts under Article III of the Constitution. To evaluate this
basis, it must be applied to some specific form of legislation. The most
often proposed possibilities are either an unqualified ban on busing or-
ders, as was almost the case with the 1974 legislation, or a removal
of Federal court jurisdiction over school desegregation cases.
3
4
In the case of legislation that bans busing orders, it is questionable
whether such legislation is really jurisdictional regardless of whether or
not its language speaks of jurisdiction. It seeks to control the power
to grant a particular remedy rather than the power to hear cases in-
volving a particular subject matter.
3
5 In addition, it seeks to withdraw
"jurisdiction" only after the merits have been decided, but it would
then prohibit the court from ordering the busing that it had decided
was required by the Constitution.
3
6 This is not constitutionally accepta-
ble. Finally, there is general agreement that a total ban on busing,
however characterized, would be unconstitutional since the Supreme
Court has indicated, as discussed above, that busing may be an in-
dispensable remedy for the protection of constitutional rights in some
cases.
3
7
The constitutionality of legislation that seeks to define when busing
orders are permissible, rather than to bar such orders altogether,
presents more difficult questions. But when it comes to delicate
balancing of this sort, it seems clear that jurisdiction is not the issue.
Such legislation is more properly considered, therefore, as an exercise
of Congress' power to enforce the provisions of the 14th amendment
under section 5 of that amendment. This section gives Congress the
power to "enforce, by appropriate legislation," the substantive provi-
sions of the amendment. This means that Congress may create
remedies for violations of the equal protection clause, including school
segregation which violated equal protection. This might appear to give
Congress power to control busing as a remedy. However, as noted
3
4 For example, bills introduced by Representative (now Senator) William Scott dur-
ing the 1972 session of Congress were designed to withdraw original Federal jurisdiction
from all controversies concerning the public schools. H.R. 12817 & H.R. 13176, 92d.
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
3
5 Holmes, supra n.33 at 149 n.52.
3
6 Cf. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. [13 Wall.] 128 (1871); see also Note, Breaking
the Law: Antibusing Legislation and the Constitution 3 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change
119 (1973).
3
7 This point is even conceded by Bork, supra n.17, at 16 and Wright, Statement in
Hearings, supra n.ll, at 1631, 1633—two prominent supporters of the constitutionality
of President Nixon's antibusing proposals.78
above, the remedy of busing is often indispensible for effectuation of
the right. And it seems reasonable to believe that in the present politi-
cal climate, the Federal courts are not likely to order any more busing
than appears to be absolutely necessary to protect constitutional
rights.
38
If this is the case, then congressional power to restrict busing would
appear to be severely limited unless section 5 gives Congress the
power to define the constitutional right and, indeed, the power to
dilute that right as it has been previously declared by the courts. Con-
gressional power to enlarge equality is suggested by Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), where the Court held that section 5
authorized Congress to define the scope and meaning of the equal pro-
tection clause to expand its protection of minority rights beyond judi-
cial interpretations of its direct prohibitions unaided by legislation. In
that opinion, id. at 651 n.10, and since then
3
9 the Court had said that
this does not give Congress the power to dilute constitutional rights,
but the exact scope of the congressional power has remained
unclear.
4
0
It seems safe to say that section 5 does not authorize Congress to
dilute rights independently protected by the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights or to construe the due process or equal protection clauses to
deny individual rights that turn "on a universal and relatively absolute
rule of law not requiring evaluation of the surrounding circumstances
or resolution of questions of degree."
4
1 The best example of a congres-
sional construction of the 14th amendment that would be prohibited
is a Federal statute that authorized the States to maintain segregated
school systems.
4
2 Similarly, if busing and other remedies for school
segregation are "constitutionally required remedies"
4
3 and therefore
indispensable to the protection of constitutional rights, as suggested in
Swann, it should follow that prohibition of busing as a remedy would
1
8 In several recent cases the Federal courts have declined to order the busing neces-
sary for the maximum possible desegregation of a school district and have instead ap-
proved plans involving less busing and less integration. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1975,
p. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1975, p. 36; Northcross v. Board of Education, 489 F.2d 15
(6th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 416 U.S. 962 (1974); Goss v. Board of Education, 482 F.2d
1044 (6th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 1 171 ( 1974); Mapp v. Board of Education,
477F.2d851 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 4 14 U.S. 1022(1973).
:1!
) Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128-29 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969).
4
0 For commentary, see Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and
Equal Protection, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 603 (1975); Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitu-
tional Determinations, 40 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 199 (1971); Burt, Miranda and Title II: A
Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81.
4
1 Cox, supra n.40, at 254; Cohen, supra n.40, at 614-15.
4
2 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n. 10 (1966); Cox, supra n.40, at 254.
4
1 Cohen, supra n.40, at 615.79
be invalid. That does not necessarily prohibit all regulation of busing
as a remedy for segregated schools. There must be some play in the
joints, in which Congress could legitimately differ with the past prac-
tices of the Federal courts regarding relief without going so far as to
deny the power to order constitutionally necessary remedies.
Archibald Cox argues that Green and Swann dealt with "remedies
for constitutional violations rather than basic constitutional
commands."
4
4 Relying on this distinction he advances the view that
Congress could prescribe remedies for segregation "including busing
for a maximum distance or maximum time," and he believes that it is
"irrelevant whether the relief is greater or lesser than the courts would
order. In either event, the relief is not part of the Constitution."
4
5
It may not be that simple. Congress almost certainly could not con-
stitutionally ban all busing, but the measures short of this that would
violate the Constitution are difficult to delineate. A carefully drawn
statute based upon findings derived from believable evidence of the
adverse effects of busing on health or education might pass constitu-
tional muster if it left room for the courts to vary its application in
diverse fact situations. Such a statute, if drawn in good faith and not
as a disingenuous attempt to maintain segregation, might even be wel-
comed by hard-pressed judges. This standard would probably not be
satisfied by the current congressional approach of limiting busing to
the school closest or next closest to the student's home, but it is dif-
ficult to be more precise about what would or would not be constitu-
tional.
A withdrawal of Federal court jurisdiction over school desegregation
cases or all public school cases is another matter and could only be
justified, if at all, under Article III. In considering such legislation, it
is necessary to separate the issue of control over the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction from the issue of control over the jurisdiction of the lower
Federal courts. First, as to the lower courts, dicta in several Supreme
Court cases
4
6 and a leading analysis of the history of the Constitutional
Convention
4
7 suggest that Congress has plenary power over the lower
Federal courts and could entirely abolish those courts. From this, some
argue that the withdrawal of lower court jurisdiction over a particular
class of cases is a lesser included power, particularly since constitu-
tional rights could still be vindicated in the State courts with review
4
4 Cox, supra n.40, at 258.
4
5 Id. at 259.
4
6 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Sheldon v. Sill,
49 U.S. [8 How.] 441 (1850).
4
7 P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal
Courts and the Federal System 1 1-12 (2d ed. 1973).80
in the Supreme Court. But surely, at the very minimum, improper in-
tent to restrict constitutional rights could be a basis for challenging
selective withdrawal of jurisdiction.
4
8
Moreover, the thesis that Congress has the power to abolish the
lower Federal courts has been doubted.
4
9 The argument is that the
Constitutional Convention sought to assure that a Federal court would
always be available to decide constitutional issues; that the Supreme
Court was largely able to fulfill this function for all Federal issues until
the mid-nineteenth century; that since general Federal-question ju-
risdiction was granted to the lower courts in 1875, those courts have
become indispensable in fulfilling the role the Supreme Court is no
longer capable of meeting alone; and that it is therefore no longer
reasonable to assert that Congress has the power to abolish the lower
Federal courts. Similarly, it is argued that Congress also lacks the
power to withdraw jurisdiction from the lower courts over a particular
class of constitutional issues, since the responsibility to decide those is-
sues was given to the Federal judiciary and cannot be entrusted to
State court action with Supreme Court review.
5
0
This argument is particularly strong in the case of school desegrega-
tion. The importance of the role that the lower Federal courts have
played in the development of school desegregation law is confirmed by
Judge McGowan:
5
1
The promulgation of those principles [announced in Brown v.
Board of Education] would have provided an infinitely more
daunting prospect in the absence of the machinery provided by
the inferior federal courts. Their performance in the discharge of
this difficult task has been less than even, but is it conceivable
that the job could have been entrusted entirely to the state courts,
bearing in mind the differences in loyalties and the vulnerability
to local pressures inherent in an elective system of judges? The
federal judges themselves have, even with the security provided
them by the Constitution, found the going hard. It is not fanciful
to think that it would have been too much for unsheltered state
judges***. Certainly it would have been hard to ask them to risk
such an exposure with so few shields.
4
8 It is possible that an argument based on an allegation of an improper intent to
restrict constitutional rights could be used to challenge legislation withdrawing jurisdic-
tion over school desegregation cases. See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation
in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205, 1306-08 (1970).
4
9 Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction,
83 Yale L.J. 498, 500-13 (1974).
5
0 Id. at 521.
5
1 C. McGowan, The Organization of Judicial Power in the United States 16 (1969).81
This argument is reinforced by those who say that Congress may not
interfere with the performance of any judicial function that is central
to the constitutional role of the Federal courts. Separation of powers
requires no less. Fortunately, it is unlikely that such legislation will be
enacted since, in withdrawing jurisdiction over all school desegregation
cases rather than just prohibiting busing orders, the legislation would
probably be too broad and too apparently racist to gather majority
support.
The same bottom line also applies to control over the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction. Any argument for such power must rely
primarily on the dubious precedent of Ex Parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506
(1896). Such legislation would be directly in conflict with the proposi-
tion advanced by several commentators that the framers intended the
Supreme Court to have power to make uniform Federal law and that
withdrawal of this power in any class of cases is therefore improper.
5
2
Even Robert Bork, who helped draft and supported the Nixon bills,
agrees that Congress lacks this power.
5
3
MR. MCKAY. SO, Mr. Chairman, I conclude with an expression of
pleasure that you are undertaking this important and immensely dif-
ficult subject. The task you undertake is vital to the welfare of the Na-
tion.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Thank you very much, Dean McKay. May I
express our appreciation for your very significant contribution to our
deliberations.
Commissioner Freeman.
COMMISSIONER FREEMAN. Dr. McKay, I also want to restate my ap-
preciation for your excellent brief. I have a concern with respect not
only to the constitutional questions here, but going to the de facto
segregation and the fact that segregation is one of the major issues of
this country.
With respect to busing, busing for desegregation purposes takes
about 4 percent of the total busing that goes every day. That means
the rest of the busing is for issues not related to desegregation at all.
The concern is that where that has become such an issue nationally,
if there is the amendment, if there is the backtracking, it seems to me
5
2 See, e.g., Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953); Ratner, Congressional Power
Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 157, 201-02
(1960).
5
3 Bork, supra n.17, at 7.82
that we are really talking about an issue that is a tip of the iceberg
because, if we eliminate busing for desegregation purposes, and the
persons opposed to busing are also opposed to desegregation, then that
will be one way in which we will cut back on the civil rights of minori-
ties. Next will be the elimination of any enforcement of desegregation
in housing, any enforcement of desegregation with respect to voting.
And I am disturbed that the mood of this country may be propelled to going
back to where, even when the Declaration of Independence was adopted,
where it was declared that all men were created equal. They were not talking
about the slaves. They were not talking about the women.
I am wondering if you would comment on this, because it seems to
me that we are on a pendulum that is going back, and that this is just
the tip of the iceberg.
MR. MCKAY. I very much share your concern about the public reac-
tion to the issue of busing.
When you say that only 4 percent of the busing is used for
desegregation, that is more than I thought. I understood it was only
2 percent.
But in any event it is a small proportion of the total. Nearly one-
half of all the children in the United States are bused to some extent.
It has been a long-accepted pattern, and thus we know that the emo-
tional reaction to busing to promote desegregation is only symbolic. It
is for that reason that I think it is particularly important to resist the
efforts to curb busing. This may not be the central issue in school
desegregation, but it is central to the reaction of the public as a whole.
What I think is particularly unfortunate is that there has been a
failure of leadership on the subject. Only in a very few years, since
1954, have we had strong leadership in favor of school desegregation
in the executive and legislative branches. When there is no such
leadership at the top, it becomes very difficult for school boards, for
community leaders, even for Federal judges, to resist that trend. Ac-
cordingly, I think it becomes most important to ieinstitute the notion
of responsibility on the part of those who have high authority in this
country. It is in that respect that I am particularly hopeful that this
Commission will take a strong stand to persuade others of the moral
and constitutional Tightness of the issue.
COMMISSIONER FREEMAN. HOW do we do this?
MR. MCKAY. I think the first thing is to make it clear that this is
but a symbolic issue, that busing is not really the center of it at all;
that there are more fundamental values at issue; and that until school
desegregation is accomplished in this country, we cannot move on to
the accomplishment of other goals that all accept.83
I believe school desegregation is closely related to the problems of
the decline of the cities because a racism problem is at issue there as
well. I believe school desegregation is closely related to the failure of
the criminal justice issue. In each of those areas, intelligent leadership
in this country knows essentially what should be done, but, because of
our lack of moral courage, we fail to face up to the hard emotional
issues. I give to you the task of turning the country around.
COMMISSIONER FREEMAN. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Commissioner Ruiz.
COMMISSIONER RUIZ. I want to congratulate you, counsel. I thought
that was a terrific brief.
You set forth excellently, near the end of the report, in five
words—really, four words—the separation of powers. If the separation
of powers concept were made ineffective by some type of inconceiva-
ble legislation, wouldn't that destroy the Constitution?
MR. MCKAY. Yes, sir. I am a great believer in the separation of
powers. It seems to me, if I understand the thrust of your question cor-
rectly, that it is very important that the courts retain their authority
to define and defend the Constitution against intrusions by Presidents,
as we have seen in recent years, or by Congress, as we have seen from
time to time.
COMMISSIONER RUIZ. In response to my colleague's question about
what we, the Commission, might be able to do, do you think it would
be a good idea that this special issue and the destructive result of what
would occur with relation to the destruction and destroying of the
separation of powers be brought to the attention of the people of the
United States?
MR. MCKAY. Yes, sir, I most emphatically do. Without any deroga-
tion of the other important issues on your agenda—and I know there
are many and they are very vital to the country—in my judgment, this
takes precedence over all the others.
COMMISSIONER RUIZ. Because there are many people in the United
States that have renewed confidence in the courts now, although they
have lost some confidence in the Congress, I wanted your reaction to
that particular phase because I think it is very important, it is very
"gutty," as you expressed it there in four words. Perhaps that is one
thing we can cue in on. Thank you.
MR. MCKAY. Yes, sir.
We impose what seems to be an almost intolerable burden on the
Federal courts which have carried the banner magnificently, in my
judgment. But for them to be required to carry the load almost alone,
without the assistance of the other branches of government and
without the assistance of the public, is ultimately destructive of those84
judgments. You all know the stories about the villification of judges,
North and South, who have courageously done what the Constitution,
in my opinion, requires them to do.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Mr. Saltzman.
COMMISSIONER SALTZMAN. I am not a lawyer, Dr. McKay. I want to
thank you as a layman in this field because I think your brief has been
most helpful to me.
I gather it is the implication of the brief that the desegregation of
schools is not an issue as relevant to the quality of education, or even
other social concerns, as it is really basically and fundamentally a con-
stitutional issue.
MR. MCKAY. Yes, sir.
COMMISSIONER SALTZMAN. Would you respond to the thought that
the courts are the wrong or least-effective instruments for achieving
school desegregation?
MR. MCKAY. I wouldn't say they are the least effective. The truth
is that they have been the only effective instrument so far. I agree with
you that they are not the best to do it.
COMMISSIONER SALTZMAN. That is not my statement.
MR. MCKAY. I understand. I do not mean to challenge you.
The fact is that matters of high social policy of this character should
be worked out by the legislative and executive branches working in
cooperation. We have been denied the luxury of doing it the best way,
and the courts have been the only instrument to do it at all.
While we have not succeeded by any means in the objectives of
Brown v. the Board of Education, enormous changes have come in our
society, not only in the schools, but in employment, recreation, access
to housing, everything that I believe would not have been available had
there not been a Brown decision in 1954.
COMMISSIONER SALTZMAN. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Commissioner Horn.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. I wonder if you could tell me how Congress
can constitutionally limit a Federal official in HEW, who takes an oath
of office to support the Constitution of the United States, from enforc-
ing desegregation to the next nearest school and then not be able to
limit the courts to such a standard.
MR. MCKAY. Let me say first that I think an argument can be
mounted that Congress may not even have the authority to limit an
official of HEW who has, as you say, taken the constitutional oath to
uphold the Constitution.
But that is certainly a different issue in character, I think, than con-
gressional restriction of the Federal courts. The separation of powers
doctrine does not have exactly the same bite when Congress tells85
members of the executive department how they can spend funds ap-
propriated by Congress as it does when it seeks to tell the Federal
courts how they may conduct their business as to which they have a
constitutional mandate.
In short, the executive branches are not as free of congressional
restrictions as are the courts. But I think a very interesting argument
can be made along the lines that Congress at least should not, and per-
haps cannot, interfere with the power of Federal officials to do that
which they see as their constitutional duty in the use of funds ap-
propriated to them.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. Suppose the Federal court in 1971 in the
Charlotte Swann case had said that busing must be used to achieve ra-
cial balance, and Congress had come in with what the actual court
decision was in 1971, that we are not talking about the achievement
of racial balance but desegregation of the schools, and that we are not
precluded from looking at population statistics in making a judgment
as to whether schools have been effectively desegregated. Would that
have been appropriate for the Congress to do?
MR. MCKAY. If the Court had taken the affirmative position that it
was necessary to achieve desegregation everywhere—I take it you are
talking about de facto as well as de jure segregation?
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. Although this was a de jure case. But, let us
just limit it to the 1971 case, or include both.
MR. MCKAY. What it actually held, or what it might have held?
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. If it had held beyond what it held, could
Congress have then come in and in passing a law set a standard that
was equivalent to the 1971 standard actually set by the Court, and
would that have been an intrusion by the Congress on judicial power?
MR. MCKAY. If the Court had said that it was constitutionally
required by the equal protection of the laws clause not only to prohibit
certain action, but affirmatively to require certain action, then Con-
gress presumptively would have been unable to overturn that.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. YOU are saying the only option the Congress
has to limit the remedies of the Court in essence is the constitutional
amendment?
MR. MCKAY. Not quite. The Court did say in the Swann case that
health factors and educational factors might be taken into account in
busing remedies. That's why I suggested if there is a carefully and
genuinely concerned statute drawn to take those factors into account,
that is consistent.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. YOU just admitted the Court could have gone
beyond that and there wouldn't have been much Congress could have
done if the Court had gone beyond that, except for a constitutional
amendment.86
MR. MCKAY. We are protected against that by the Court not taking
unreasonable or irrational positions.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. We hope. "Who watches the guardians?" as
Plato would put it.
MR. MCKAY. The authority I think ordinarily does not go very far
beyond the public sentiment. In only two cases, as you look at the
amendments to the Constitution, has there been an amendment
designed to overturn a decision of the Supreme Court; the 16th
amendment relating to income taxes and the 19th amendment relating
to right to vote. Those were cases where the Supreme Court may well
have made a mistake.
But, in all the other areas in which some members of the community
have thought the Court had gone too far, Supreme Court rulings have
proved resistant to constitutional amendment. The reason, in my
opinion, is that the Court did not go beyond a reasonable and rational
interpretation.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. In light of my colleagues' previous com-
ments, I would say this is a government not simply of separation of
powers; but, as we all know, it is a government also of checks and
balances. The question is: Is there an appropriate check to any use of
judicial power, beyond a constitutional amendment?
MR. MCKAY. If it is a decision squarely grounded on the Constitution
and where the Court makes it clear what the constitutional core of the
decision is, I would answer that only a constitutional amendment could
turn it around.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. If I could just follow upon that, as I am very
much interested in your comment in your paper you have just sum-
marized, to the effect that conceivably it would be possible for the
Congress, after taking evidence, to develop standards or guidelines
which would govern transportation of pupils.
Is it true, however, that no matter how carefully they might draw
those standards, that a Federal district court judge with a particular set
of facts in front of him could decide that by adhering to one particular
standard he would be denying the constitutional rights of the parties
before him?
MR. MCKAY. Yes, sir. I think that would be his duty, to examine any
standards given by Congress to make sure that there was not a denial
of a constitutionally-guaranteed equal protection.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Up to the present time, a number of times the
Congress has included language that in effect recognizes this duty.
MR. MCKAY. Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. That has been included as an amendment to
this so-called antibusing legislation. I am glad they put in such an
amendment.87
MR. MCKAY. Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. But it seems to me, whether it is in there or
isn't in there, the same would apply as far as a district court judge is
concerned when confronted with the facts of a particular case.
MR. MCKAY. In a way it is kind of a cheap shot for Congress to say
on the one hand, busing is prohibited, except so and so, then to say,
of course we don't mean to interfere with constitutional rights. Thus,
they can play upon public emotions and report to the constituents this
great thing they have done while making sure they aren't going to be
reversed by the Supreme Court because they haven't said anything.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Again, thank you very much for this presenta-
tion.
[Applause.]
I would like to say this. I didn't say it at the beginning of the hear-
ing, but there are more here now than were here at the beginning.
In light of your comment in response to Commissioner Freeman's
question, this Commission has decided to give this issue the highest
priority.
MR. MCKAY. I am delighted.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. We are going to devote considerable amount
of our time and resources over a period of the next few months to ex-
ploring the various issues that are tied in with this overall issue. We
hope to be in a position by August to put out what we probably will
refer to as the state of the union document dealing with the issue of
desegregation and including our own findings and recommendations
based on public consultations of this kind, staff work undertaken by
our staff, and other public hearings similar to the one we held in
Boston.
So, we are delighted to be in a position where we can say we agree
with you wholeheartedly.
We are in recess now until 1:00 o'clock. We are going to try very
hard to start at 1:00 because we have a very full agenda for the after-
noon.
I have been asked to call your attention to the fact that, as I un-
derstand it, there is a considerable number of Commission publications
just outside of the auditorium, which we invite you to examine and
utilize in any way you seee fit.
[Recess.]
Afternoon Session
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. I will ask the meeting to come to order.88
I think everyone here has a copy of the agenda for the afternoon.
I would like to indicate how we are going to proceed. Dr. Coleman
will present a summary of his paper. Then Dr. Green will follow im-
mediately afterwards to present his paper, or a summary of his paper.
When Dr. Coleman and Dr. Green have finished, members of the
Commission will have some questions that they will want to address
to both of them. Then, after that, we will introduce the panel consist-
ing of Dr. Wolf and Dr. Epps and they will be reacting to what has
happened up to that particular point in their own way. Then when they
have finished reacting, the members of the Commission may very well
want to address some questions to them. Then you will notice that a
summary, a synthesis, is to be presented by Mr. Francis Keppel, former
Commissioner of Education, now with the Aspen Institute.
We appreciate very, very much the willingness on the part of all the
participants to meet with us in connection with this consultation and
to share with us their respective points of view.
At this point, I am very happy to present to the Commission and
to those who are listening in on this consultation, Dr. James Coleman,
professor of sociology at the University of Chicago. Dr. Coleman.
STATEMENT OF JAMES S. COLEMAN, PROFESSOR OF
SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
DR. COLEMAN. Thank you very much, Commissioner Flemming.
What I would like to do this afternoon is to summarize the work
which I have carried out with Sara Kelly and John Moore, two col-
leagues of mine. The principal question which I would like to focus
attention on is the question of possible effects of school desegregation
on the loss of white children from central school systems in large ci-
ties. Before I do this, however, I would like to say something briefly
about some trends in racial segregation in schools between 1968 and
1973.
I am not certain that the order of this session is entirely appropriate
because, in fact, Mr. Green's paper is mostly about me; my paper is
mostly about school desegregation. I think he and I differ on two is-
sues. We differ both with regard to what the facts of the matter are
and with regard to what are appropriate avenues of carrying out school
desegregation and carrying out affirmative integration of schools. How-
ever, I think it is possible to proceed this way, so I will go ahead and
do so.
First of all, if we look between 1968 and 1972, we find that there
was enormous variation between regions in the degree to which there
was desegregation, the degree to which there was any reduction in
segregation.89
In particular, the Southeast region of the country shifted from the
most segregated in the country to the least segregated. Several other
regions, in particular the West-South Central region, Mountain and
Pacific region—the last two of which don't have many blacks in them
and, therefore, are not as important from the view of the average
black in this country—nevertheless, did show significant declines in the
degree of segregation within the schools of their districts. Other re-
gions, however, showed almost no decline, or in some cases no decline
at all.
There is a second feature that occurred in this period. It was that
desegregation was much greater in small districts than in large districts.
This was true partly because of the fact that most desegregation took
place in the Southeast, and the principal small districts in which there
were many blacks are in the South. But even within the Southeast
desegregation was more pronounced in smaller districts. If any of you
have a copy of the paper, you can see on table 2 that this is the case.
Now, the fact that even in the Southeast, where the principal
desegregation occurred throughout the country, there was more
pronounced desegregation in the small districts than in the large dis-
tricts suggests that segregation itself is a different phenomenon in the
large cities than in the smaller districts and it is more resistant to
desegregation policies.
In addition to what was happening within districts, and everything
I have talked about so far is segregation within districts, there were
also changes in the degree of segregation between districts. Now this
is a different form of segregation. It is segregation as a result of people
residing in different school districts. Now, in contrast to the trend in
reduced segregation that was occurring within school districts, espe-
cially the Southeast but in some other regions of the country as well,
there was an opposing trend in the segregation of white and black chil-
dren among school districts.
In almost every region of the country, if you look at table 3, there
was an increase in the degree of segregation between school districts
from 1968 to 1972. That increase is an increase which in effect results
from different residence of blacks and whites in 1972 and 1968; and,
from what we know about demographic changes and demographic pat-
terns, that different residence is primarily due to shifts in the white
population from central cities to suburbs. As the Census Bureau has
pointed out, such shifts have been responsible for the major changes
in central-city composition in recent years.
This combination of the increase in segregation between school dis-
tricts and decrease in segregation within districts means that the
segregation between districts within a region is greater than that within90
districts in three of the nine regions in 1972, while it was greater in
no region in 1968. Consequently, we can say that the form of segrega-
tion that arises through residential segregation of blacks and whites
into different districts has increased throughout the country at the
same time that the form of segregation that exists within districts has
been reduced, although that reduction has been primarily in the South.
This increase in between-district segregation at the same time that
there is in some regions reduced segregation within the district raises
a question about a possible causal connection between the two. That
is what I want to turn to next and that is what the area of principal
controversy is over. That is, did desegregation within central school
districts during this period lead to a loss of white children from these
central-city districts which has the result of separating black and white
children into separate school districts? In other words, did desegrega-
tion in central-city school districts lead to a loss of white children that
brought about segregation or helped bring about segregation between
districts?
Now it is clear that the loss of white children from central-city
schools was occurring before any desegregation, independent of it. It
has occurred in those cities where no desegregation occurred as well
as those where it did occur. What I would like to ask is whether this
loss of whites from the central-city school is accelerated when substan-
tial desegregation takes place. It is to that question I would like to
direct your attention.
To answer that question involves a number of complications. One of
the complications is that most desegregation in this period took place
in the South, so that, except as there was a similar response in those
few places in the North that did desegregate, the generalization of
results to northern cities must remain a question. This is true prin-
cipally in medium-sized cities because there were few northern large
cities which did desegregate. Secondly, a second complicating factor
is that there was a general loss during this time of whites from central
cities, a loss which preliminary analysis indicates is greater as the size
of the city is greater and as the proportion of blacks in the city is
greater.
Third is the fact that the available data don't really show movement.
All they do is show student populations traced for each of the 6 years
we traced, from 1968 to 1973, in each school district and each school
in each school district. This isn't the same as movement, though
something about movement can be inferred from these measures. This
is the kind of data which almost all studies, although not all studies,
of possible loss of whites from desegregating districts have used.91
And the final complicating question is that, if there is a loss of
whites when desegregation occurs, it is not clear what the time
progression of this loss is. The question is, when does it begin? Does
it continue? Does it accelerate as the proportion of whites in the
schools declines, or is it a one-time response which does not continue
once the degree of desegregation is constant? Or does it in fact reverse
itself with whites returning to the district schools a year or so after
they have desegregated?
Desegregation in smaller districts took place primarily in 1970, in
the fall of 1970 in the South, but desegregation in larger cities, par-
ticularly in the North, has taken place all the way up to this fall.
Now, despite difficulties, and there are difficulties which have faced
everyone who has attempted to answer these kinds of questions, what
I have attempted to do is to answer the question insofar as possible
of whether desegregation of the central city affects the loss of whites
from that central city. I have tried to do so through a number of
means, and I will describe a few of them. First of all, recognizing the
fact that the loss of whites from central cities depends upon their size,
recognizing the fact that the loss of whites from central cities is highly
related to the proportion of blacks in the central cities, whatever that
proportion is a surrogate for, it is possible then to attempt to control
for those two factors and to ask when we look at cities which are com-
parable with regard to those two factors, what is the apparent affect
of school desegregation?
Now, what we have done is to separate the cities into two groups.
One is 21 of the 23 largest central-city districts in the country. I am
sure this will come up as a point of contention because I notice in Mr.
Green's paper that a great deal of issue was made over this. I an not
quite sure why because Mr. Pettigrew, as coauthor, understood from
the very outset what our criteria of selection were; and, in fact, the
set of schools was expanded at Mr. Pettigrew's suggestion to include
a slightly larger set of schools which included more Northern
desegregation experience. This led to moving from the 20 largest to
the 23 largest central-city districts, to allow inclusion of two cities,
Denver and San Francisco, which had undergone some degree of
desegregation.
Criteria which were used for selecting these districts were all school
districts which were classified as central-city school districts by the
United States Office of Education. We took the first 23 of those school
districts, eliminated Albuquerque (which in any case makes little dif-
ference to our results) because it was not one of the top 50 cities in
size of city. And we eliminated Washington because it is racially
homogeneous.92
In addition, we examined the next 46 cities, essentially dividing the
first 70 cities into two groups. The first set of cities included cities
which were over about 90,000 in the early years, although they were
smaller than that in the later years, and then the next set of cities were
those which were among the first 70, but smaller than that.
The question then in these two groups of cities, what was the ap-
parent effect of school desegregation upon loss of whites?
Now, in the paper, those apparent effects are stated.
First of all, that there is an additional loss of whites from the central
city, beyond what would exist in the absence of any blacks in the cen-
tral city. There is an additional loss of 6.8 percent of whites in the lar-
gest cities and 4.5 percent of whites in the smaller cities when the city
is 50 percent black. I should reemphasize that the proportion of blacks
in the cities is a surrogate, as a number of these studies and Mr. Green
mentions as well, for a number of factors which characterize
something about the age of the city and other matters.
Now the question is, what additional loss occurs if the city ex-
periences a decrease in the index of segregation (which is our measure
of the degree of desegregation) of two-tenths. This is not a large
decrease in the sense that full-scale racial balance in most of these ci-
ties would constitute a decrease of six-tenths to eight-tenths in that
index. A decrease of two-tenths is predicted for the largest 21 cities
to bring about an additional loss of 5.5 percent of whites in the largest
cities and of only 1.1 percent of whites in the smaller cities.
Then there is a small effect of the size of the city in addition. The
end result of this is that in the largest cities there is in the year of
desegregation, according to our analysis, a significant impact upon the
loss of whites from the central city which would, in a city which is 50
percent black, just about double the loss of whites in that city in that
year.
This is not the case in the smaller cities; not that there is no pre-
dicted loss, but the predicted loss is considerably less. The question is,
however, whether this is a phenomenon which is similar from city to
city, and it is very clear that it isn't. When we were looking at different
cities it was clear that, for example, desegregation in Florida was
metropolitan-wide because the school districts in Florida are county-
wide districts, and desegregation in Florida also was desegregation in
systems which were predominantly white.
Some initial exploratory analysis showed us that both factors—that
is, the existence of white suburbs outside the central-city district, and
the proportion of blacks in the city—affected the degree to which
desegregation brought about a loss of whites, at least according to our
analysis.93
I would like to direct your attention, then, to the results of the anal-
ysis for the two sets of cities. These results are very similar for the two
sets of cities but are more pronounced in the largest cities. I will have
to explain a little bit about how to read these results.
The results in both of these tables indicate the percentage of whites
that would be expected to be lost, the percentage decline in whites in
the central city in the year of desegregation, as a function of two
things: the proportion of blacks in the central city schools, which is
what you see along the top line, going from .25 to .75, and the degree
of between-district segregation which you see along the left, which
goes from zero to four-tenths.
What do I mean by between-district segregation? Essentially what
that means is the degree to which there exists predominantly white
suburbs outside the district which is desegregating, outside the central
city. Typical values of between-district segregation range between two-
tenths and six-tenths. For example, in Chicago, .48; New York, .34;
in Detroit, .57. This was in 1972 which is the last year for which we
have figures.
So in typical northern cities, it ranges ordinarily between two- and
three-tenths, and six-tenths. The proportion black ranges quite widely
in the cities. In a city such as Tampa, which did carry out desegrega-
tion, but which had no between-district segregation in the metropolitan
area because it consisted of two counties which have almost identical
proportions black and the desegregation was county-wide, in a district
which has zero between-district segregation and 25 percent black in
the district, then the experience of these cities over the years 1968 to
1973 would predict only a 2 percent loss, that there would be only a
2 precent drop in the proportion of whites in the district.
That is the upper left-hand figures in the table. On the other hand,
the other extreme (although this isn't an extreme because, as I said,
in Detroit the between-district segregation is .57 rather than .4), for
a between-district segregation of .4 and proportion black of .75 (which
is in fact what the proportion black is in Detroit), then the expected
percentage of white loss in that year of desegregation would be 30 per-
cent.
The same results are evident on the right-hand table for the smaller
cities, except smaller in magnitude. That is, the same direction of ef-
fects and the same general character of effects. What this suggests is
that the effect is not wholly desegregation in itself, but it is desegrega-
tion in conjunction with these two other factors, the proportion black
in the city's schools and the availability of predominantly white subur-
ban districts.94
This is desegregation in a system which has a high proportion black
and in a system in which there are available white suburbs for whites
to move to. If there are no available white suburbs, then the predicted
loss is given by the first line. This would be the the situation, for exam-
ple, in the Florida districts which desegregated, and in a number of
others in the South because southern school districts tend to be coun-
ty-wide rather than city-wide or township-wide as they tend more often
to be in the North. This, I think, is an extremely important specifica-
tion of the results because it indicates the conditions under which, ac-
cording to at least my analysis, desegregation does have a negative im-
pact on the degree of contact between, or let me put it differently,
upon the degree of residence of blacks and whites in the same school
district.
Now, the next question that can be addressed is the question
whether there is a one-time effect or not a one-time effect. And as
best we can determine, though I said this is a most difficult thing to
determine because much of the desegregation occurred in 1973, which
is our last year, or in 1972, which is the next-to-last year, it is a one-
time loss rather than a continued loss.
So if we were attempting to carry out policies which did not
separate blacks and whites in the sense of leading whites to move into
the suburbs more than they currently are, then we ask the question,
what is long-term impact? According to equation one, which is the first
results I described to you, there is a 3 percent difference in the pro-
portion black in the central city the first year after desegregation and
that 3 percent follows all the way through.
According to the more complete results, ones which I described to
you just now, showing the effect of the existence of white suburbs and
the effect of the proportion black in the city, the effect of desegrega-
tion according to our analysis is more substantial in the sense that the
proportion black has increased in the first year from .5 to .58, whereas
without desegregation it is only increased to .51, which is a 7 percent
difference.
That 7 percent difference magnifies to a 10 percent difference after
10 years. The important point is that most of the effect is contained
in the first year. That's due to the fact that, as far as our analysis can
tell, the white loss effect of school desegregation is a 1-year effect. It
may not be, and I think it is very important to determine whether this
is the case, because if it is not the case, then these figures would show
a very different set of results, that is, much more extensive long-term
effects of desegregation.
I should emphasize one thing else in addition, that these projections
are figures for a hypothetical city with particular initial proportion95
black, all white suburbs, and so on. However, if we do look at some
cities which are not hypothetical and ask a question of what the pre-
dictions in this case would be for full-scale desegregation in some of
those cities—for example, Detroit. Last summer in Detroit there was
a school desegregation case pending. The plaintiffs' plan for school
desegregation consisted of full-scale racial balance. That was a city in
which the degree of segregation was .64, in 1972, and in which the
between-district segregation was .57 and in which the proportion black
was .75.
Now, in that, under those conditions, the first-year effect is a very
overwhelming effect. In other words, under extreme conditions where
the between-district segregation is very high, as in Detroit, and the
proportion black in the city is very high, according to these predictions
in the absence of desegregation, there would be an increase from .75
to .77 in the proportion black, which is about the increase Detroit has
experienced per year over the last few years.
In the presence of full-scale desegregation (which the judge in-
cidentally did not rule in favor of), it would have gone from .75 to
.94 in 1 year. So that the important point about the difference between
these different conditions is that the effect of desegregation in a cen-
tral city so far as we can determine from our analysis differs very
sharply as a function of these two things, as a function of the propor-
tion black in the schools of the city which is desegregating, and as a
function of the difference between the proportion black in the central
city and suburbs; that is, the availability of white suburbs for one to
move to.
Let me draw your attention to one other thing before I close, and
that is if you look at table 10 it indicates that the degree of impact
of desegregation, according to our estimates, in different cities is
strikingly different.
As Mr. Green and Mr. Pettigrew point out in their paper, it is most
striking in Memphis and Atlanta. There are two cities which show a
gain at the time of desegregation. As I point out in the footnote, these
were two of the cities in which there was annexation at the time of
desegregation, so it may well be that that appparent gain is a function
of the annexation.
But if you notice in many of the other cities, in the other cities there
are wide variations. That is, variations from 2.6 percent as an esti-
mated effect of desegregation of two-tenths in Tampa, to 16.7 percent
in Atlanta, with an average of 5.2 percent. So the variation is really
quite great, and the variation is a function, as I said, of the histories
of particular cities, the characteristics of particular cities, and charac-
teristics of the particular desegregation plan.96
I would like to conclude by saying that this leads me to the following
conclusion. That the emerging problem with regard to school
desegregation is the problem of desegregation between central city and
suburbs. In addition, it leads me to the conclusion that the current
means by which schools are being desegregated are intensifying that
problem rather than reducing it. That the emerging problem of school
desegregation in large cities, I believe, is a problem of metropolitan-
area residential segregation, black central cities and white suburbs,
brought about by a loss of whites from central cities. This loss is inten-
sified by extensive school desegregation in the central cities, but in ci-
ties with a high proportion of whites and predominantly white suburbs
it proceeds at a relatively rapid rate with or without desegregation.
Thank you.
[The complete paper follows.]
School Desegregation and Loss of Whites
from Large Central-City School Districts*
By James S. Coleman
The analysis of this paper is directed primarily to the question of the
effect of school desegregation on loss of white children from large cen-
tral-city school systems. Before addressing this question, however, I
will examine briefly trends in racial segregation in the schools within
the same district, and then segregation of black and white children
among different school districts.
Trends in Segregation Within Districts
There are several salient features of the trends in school segregation
over the country between 1968 and 1972. First is the enormous varia-
tion among regions. In the Southeast, the fall of 1970 saw probably
the single most extensive change in school organization in the history
of American education. The school districts of the region shifted from
the most segregated in the Nation to the least.
In several other regions, there were reductions in segregation less ex-
tensive than in the Southeast, although the only other changes affect-
ing many black children were in the Southwest. Throughout the parts
* The analysis in this paper is taken from James S. Coleman, Sara D. Kelly, and John
A. Moore, "Trends in School Segregation, 1968-73," Washington, D.C.: The Urban In-
stitute, 1975. The data are taken from annual reports by all school districts in the
country to the Office for Civil Rights of HEW on the racial composition of each school
in the district.97
of the North where most blacks lived, there was little or no reduction
in segregation over this period. Table 1 summarizes these
changes—and the absence of changes—for each of the regions.
As the table shows, there was very little change in segregation in the
North and Midwest, during this period of remarkable change in the
South.
A second principal feature of the desegregation that occurred during
this period was that it took place to a much greater extent in small
districts than in large ones. This was in part because nearly all the
small districts in which there are many blacks are in the South, where
nearly all the desegregation took place, but in part because even in the
South, the desegregation was more pronounced in the smaller districts.
Table 2 shows well the differential reduction of segregation in this
period both in the U.S. as a whole and in the Southeast, where
desegregation was most pronounced. The smaller districts, which out-
side the Southeast were the least segregated already, showed greatest
reduction in segregation, while the largest districts, over 100,000 in
size (of which there are about 20 in the country as a whole) which
were already the most segregated, showed least reduction in segrega-
tion. Between 1968 and 1973, of the 22 largest central-city districts,
only 5 showed a reduction of segregation of more than 0.3 (Memphis,
Tampa, Atlanta, Denver, and San Francisco), while 6 showed a reduc-
tion of less than 0.1, and 6 showed slight increases in segregation (New
York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Cleveland, St. Louis, and Boston). These
results suggest that segregation is a very different phenomenon in the
large cities than in smaller districts, and is much more resistant to
desegregation policies.
All of this, however, refers to matters of school desegregation within
districts. Although nearly all desegregation policy has been limited to
reassignment of children among schools within a district, the actual
presence of black and white children in the same school depends not
only on such assignment within districts, but also upon the presence
of black and white children in the same districts. Consequently, what
is necessary to get a more complete view of what has happened over
this period is to examine changes in segregation between districts as
well as the segregation within districts. It is to this between-district
segregation that I now turn.
Trends in Segregation Between Districts
At the same time that school desegregation was occurring in many
school districts of the country, an opposing trend was occurring in the
segregation of white and black children among school districts. ThereUnited States
New England
Middle Atlantic
Border
Southeast
West South Central
East North Central
West North Central
Mountain
Pacific
.63
.35
.43
.48
.75
.69
.58
.61
.49
.56
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Table 1*#
Segregation within school districts in 1968 and 1972
in the U.S. and each region
Region 1968 1972 Change
.37 -.26
.33 -.02
.43 -.00
.44 -.04
.19 -.56
.48 -.21
.57 -.01
.56 -.05
.25 -.24
.42 -.14
* Several regions have been reclassified, because the character of racial segregation has differed
within the region. Hawaii and Alaska have been separated as "outlying" States from the
Pacific region; and the South Atlantic and East South Central have been combined and
redivided into Border (Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky) and Southeast (all
others in these two regions). In all tabulations, the outlying States, Hawaii and Alaska, are
dropped, because there is no black-white segregation in their schools, and the number of
blacks in those States is very small.
# The segregation measure is based on the proportion of whites in the average black child's
school, standardized for the proportion of whites in the district.
Table 2
Segregation within school districts of different sizes
in 1968 and 1972 in the U.S. and the Southeast
U.S. Southeast
District Size
100
25-100
10-25
5-10
2.5-5
2.5
1968
.71
.66
.54
.59
.56
.44
1972
.65
.39
.22
.14
.14
.03
Chang
-.06
-.27
-.32
-.45
-.45
-.41
1968
.84
.77
.70
.74
.74
.70
1972
.44
.28
.16
.13
.09
.04
Chang
-.40
-.49
-.54
-.61
-.65
-.66
Table 3
Segregation between school districts in 1968 and 1972
in the U.S. and each region
Region 1968 1072 Change
.36 +.04
.31 +.06
.44 +.06
.48 .00
.22 +.04
.37 +.05
.32 +.02
.39 +.04
.17 +.02
.34 +.04
United States
New England
Middle Atlantic
Border
Southeast
West South Central
East North Central
West North Central
Mountain
Pacific
.32
.25
.38
.48
.18
.32
.30
.35
.15
.3099
was an increase, in nearly every region of the country, in segregation
between districts.
1 Table 3 shows this, with an increase in segregation
everywhere except in the Border States.
The combination of this increase and the reduced segregation within
districts means that by 1972, the segregation between districts within
the region is greater than that within districts in three of the nine re-
gions, while it was greater in no region in 1968. Thus the form of
segregation that arises through residential separation of blacks and
whites into different districts has increased throughout the country at
the same time that the form of segregation that exists within districts
has been reduced.
The same contrasting changes can be seen for the largest
metropolitan areas. Although within-district segregation decreased to a
greater or lesser extent in 16 of the 22 largest central-city districts
between 1963 and 1972, the segregation between districts in the
metropolitan areas of these central cities decreased in only one, the
Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, with increases as high as .15 (in
Atlanta), .11 (in Houston), and .10 (in Detroit and Dallas). It is, in
fact, in these largest metropolitan areas that the segregation between
districts is increasing most rapidly. Furthermore, this form of segrega-
tion is one that is a more severe segregation, because it constitutes
greater residential distance between black and white children than ex-
ists when segregation is among schools within the same district.
The increase in between-district segregation at the same time that
there is in some districts reduced segregation within the district raises
the question about a causal connection between the two: Did
desegregation within central-city school districts during this period lead
to a loss of white children from these central-city districts which has
the result of separating black and white children into separate school
districts? It is clear that the loss of white children from central-city
schools was occurring before any desegregation, and occurred in those
cities where no desegregation occurred as well as in those where it did
occur. What we want to ask is whether this loss of whites from the
central-city schools is accelerated when substantial desegregation takes
place. It is to that question that I now turn.
1 The segregation indices were calculated as in the preceding section, except that
school districts rather than schools were taken as the unit of observation. Thus the index
is based on the average proportion of white children in the average black child's school
district, standardized by the proportion of whites in the region (or laier, the
metropolitan area).100
The Size of Individual Segregating Responses to
Desegregation
It is clear from the preceding sections that there is a segregating
process occurring through individual movement, primarily of white
families, from schools and districts in which there is greater integration
or a greater proportion of blacks, to schools and districts in which
there is less integration or a smaller proportion of blacks. The con-
sequences of this, of course, are to partially nullify the effects of
school desegregation as carried out by various governmental or legal
agencies.
What is not yet clear is whether desegregation itself induces an in-
creased movement of whites from the desegregated district. This is a
difficult but important question to answer, because desegregation in
particular school districts is a direct outcome of social policy or legal
rulings, and it is important to ask whether there are indirect con-
sequences of desegregation itself which partly nullify it, and if so, what
the size of this response is under various circumstances.
2
The question is difficult because casual observation shows that
desegregation has evoked differing reactions in different cities, and
because desegregation has taken place in very different settings. For
example, in many areas of the South, school systems are county-wide,
encompassing both in city and the surrounding suburbs. Leaving a
desegregated system in that setting entails leaving the public school
system itself, or a rather distant move (unless adjacent counties have
also desegregated, which was a common occurrence in the early
1970's in the South). This, of course, is more difficult than a move
to a separate, predominantly white suburban school system, which is
the common pattern in the North. Another variation is in city size,
which creates nearly a qualitative difference in the character of
desegregation, for full-scale desegregation in a large city entails mixing
student populations that are much more socially distinct and more re-
sidentially separated than in small cities.
Additional complications include these:
a) Most desegregation in this period took place in the South, so that
except as there was a similar response in those few places in the
North that did desegregate, the generalization of results to northern
cities must remain a question.
2 There have been several studies of the effect of school segregation on the loss of
white children from the desegregating school system. In an attitude survey of parents
in eight Florida countywide desegregated school districts, one group of authors (Cataldo
et al., 1975) concluded that when the racial composition of schools is less than 30 per-
cent black, almost no whites leave; but beyond 30 percent a higher proportion leave.101
b) There was a general loss during this time of whites from central
cities, a loss which preliminary analysis indicates is greater as the
size of the city is greater, and as the proportion black in the city
is greater.
c) The available data show simply the student populations of each
race for each of the 6 years, 1968-73, so that only changes in stu-
dent populations are directly measured. This is not exactly the same
as movement, although something about net movement of a racial
group out of the district's schools can be inferred from these mea-
sures of gain or loss.
3
d) If there is a loss of whites when desegregation occurs, it is not
clear what the time progression of this loss is. When does it begin?
Does it continue, and accelerate as the proportion white in the
schools declines, or is it a one-time response which does not con-
tinue once the degree of desegregation is constant? Or does it in fact
reverse itself, with whites returning to the district's schools a year
or so after they have desegregated? Initial observation of particular
cities which have fully desegregated suggests that a loss due to
desegregation begins in the same year that desegregation takes place,
but its subsequent course is less clear. Using these indications from
individual cities, we will first attempt to examine the loss of whites
in the same year that desegregation occurs.
These difficulties are not overcome simply, but the data are exten-
sive, showing racial composition of schools over each of the 6 years,
1968-73.
4 The cities to be examined are divided into two groups
Mercer and Scout in a comprehensive (as yet unpublished) survey of white school popu-
lation changes in California districts between 1966 and 1973 found no relation between
population changes and the amount of desegregation undergone in the district. Charles
Clotfelter (1975), in contrast, shows that desegregation in Mississippi had a significant
effect on private school enrollment, an effect that increased with increasing proportions
of blacks in the schools. Reynolds Farley (1975) used the same OCR data used in our
analysis, but only up to 1972. He found no relation of school integration to white popu-
lation loss for 125 cities with 100,000 or more population and at least 3 percent blacks,
and also for the largest northern and southern cities. His methods differ, however, from
our own in several respects, particularly in our year-by-year examination contrasted to
his 5-year examination.
3 Fertility changes among whites also affect the change in numbers of white children
in the schools. Fertility of whites in the years preceding this period was declining, which
leads to a general decline in white student populations. This affects the constant term
in the regression equations, but not the indicated effects of desegregation, unless the
decline in white fertility was by some chance greater in those cities that desegregated.
The covariance analysis even controls for that possibility (see p. 71 of James S.
Coleman, Sara D. Kelly, and John A. Moore, "Trends in School Segregation,
1968-1973," Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1975).
4 Schools are not identified each year in a way that makes possible tracing changes
in individual schools.102
because of the indications that response to desegregation differs con-
siderably in very large cities from the response in smaller ones: (1)21
of the 23 largest districts in the country classified as central-city
districts;
5 (2) 46 of the next 47 largest central-city districts.
6
These cities are divided into two groups because the response to
desegregation appears, as indicated above, different in the largest cities
from smaller ones. In analyzing the question of how loss of white stu-
dents is related to desegregation, we will first examine the loss that is
related to reduction in segregation in the same year. The measure of
segregation used is the standardized measure ru presented in earlier
sections.
7
In this analysis, all years are taken together (that is, Ary in 1968-69
is related to change in whites in 1968-69, Ary in 1969-70 is related
to change in whites in 1969-70, etc.) in an equation as follows:
(4) wt - wM / wM =a + bx Ar,,M 4- b2 pw_, + b3 1 n NM where:
wt is the number of white students in year t
rt is the standardized measure of segregation in year t
Pbt.i is the proportion black in the system in year t-\
Nt.i is the number of students in the system in year t-\
The analysis is carried out for t _ 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973.
They are taken together to obtain an average effect over the 5 years,
because among the 22 cities, massive desegregation in any one year
in one city can distort results for that year. The two additional varia-
bles of proportion black in the system and number of students are in-
cluded because these variables appear to be related to loss of whites
from the system independently of the change in segregation.
5 Washington, D.C., which has only about 3 percent white, is excluded because it is
already racially homogeneous. Albuquerque, the 22nd largest central-city district, was
excluded because the city of Albuquerque is not among the first 50 in population. Size
of central-city district corresponds reasonably well to size of city, but there are some
discrepancies. This set of districts included '-9 of the largest 2! cities in the country by
the 1970 census (excluding only San Antonio and Phoenix). In addition, it includes
Denver (the 25th largest), Atlanta (the 27th largest), and Tampa (the 50th largest). The
latter is a county-wide school district, which accounts for the large district size relative
to city size. In preliminary analyses, only the largest 20 central-city districts were in-
cluded, excluding Denver and San Francisco. However, because Denver and San Fran-
cisco were two of the few northern cities to undergo extensive desegregation during the
period 1968-73, they have been included.
6 Richmond, Va., which annexed some suburban districts in the same year it un-
derwent extensive desegregation, was excluded. It was not possible to tell from
Richmond the exact size of white loss from the original district, although the loss in
years subsequent to the annexation shows that it was substantial. Memphis also had an-
nexation, but its size was affected only slightly, so it was not excluded.
7 It seems likely that the tendency of white families to leave the system is related not
to a change in the "index of segregation," but to a change in the proportion of blacks103
Note that the independent variable measuring change in segregation,
Aru.j, is just that. It is not a measure of a particular form of change
in segregation, such as busing, or even of a desegregation policy.
Change in r can occur through individual movement of black or white
students; and certainly the slight upward movement of segregation (as
measured by r) in some northern cities is just that. However, these in-
dividual movements make only small differences in r over any year.
Large negative values for Ar are due to desegregation policies in-
stituted in that city. Although the term "desegregation" to a civil rights
lawyer may mean only the move to full racial balance in all schools,
it is important to remember that the desegregation variable used in this
analysis refers to a reduction of any size in the index of segregation.
The results of the analysis are presented in table 4. The table
presents the coefficients to the above equation for the largest 21 cen-
tral-city systems and the next 46, along with standard errors of the
coefficients and amount of variance accounted for. To gain some sense
of the magnitude of the effects represented by these coefficients, we
can express what the expected yearly rates of loss of white students
would be in various circumstances. It is important to remember that
these are average effects, which differ from city to city, as will become
apparent in subsequent analysis.
1. For a city with the average number of students, with no blacks
and no reduction in segregation, the expected loss per year is:
a) Largest 21: (gain of) 0.9 percent of whites present at beginning
of year (average number of students is 169,000)
b) Next 46: 1.2 percent of whites present at beginning of year
(average number of students is 58,000)
2. Additional expected loss if the city is 50 percent black:
a) Largest 21: 6.8 percent of whites present at beginning of year
b) Next 46: 4.5 percent of whites present at beginning of year
3. Additional expected loss if the city experiences a decrease of .2
in the index of segregation in that year:
8
in their child's school. Thus a change in the unstandardized measure of earlier sections,
5(j (the proportion of black children in the average white child's school), should be more
directly related to the loss of whites than is r0. However, the unstandardized measure
is affected by the number of white children in the system, and thus any analysis includ-
ing it must relate the change in s0 in the previous year to the loss of whites in a given
year. A discussion in appendix 3, however, indicates how one might use the change in
50 as a determinant of loss of whites in the same year. The relation between the size
of a change in su and the corresponding change in r0 depends on the proportion of
blacks in the system. When it is .5, which is about average for the largest 22 central-
city districts, then the change in r0 is twice the change in s0 (since r0 = (pj — su)lpj ). It is because both the numerator and denominator of the formula for ru are affected
by loss of whites to the system that r0 in a given year is approximately independent of
loss of whites in that year.
8 A decrease of .2 in the index of segregation is approximately equal to an increase
of 10 percent in the black schoolmates of the average white in the system if the propor-
tion is .50.104
Table 4
Regression Coefficients for Analyses of
White Student Loss to Central Cities
Equation 1 Largest 21 Next 46
AR
Prop, black
n N
Constant
R
!
Number of
Observations
.279 (.062)
-.133 (.023)
.000 (.008)
.013
.29
(105)
.056 (.026)
-.090 (.014)
-.042 (.010)
.452
.26
Including interdistrict segregation in SMSA, and interaction
of desegregation with South:
Equation 2
AR
Prop, black
n N
R SMSA
AR x S
Constant
R'
.199 (.156)
,044 (.039)
.066 (.008)
.165 (.050)
.143 (.170)
.059
.36
-.148 (.137)
-.035 (.016)
-.041 (.010)
-.110 (.021)
.242 (.137)
.4
.35
Equation 3
Including interactions of desegregation with proportion
black and interdistrict segregation, and also including South
as a dummy variable:
AR
Prop, black
n N
R SMSA
AR x South
AR x Prop, black
AR x R SMSA
South
Constant
R
!
-.459
.051
.003
-.210
.148
1.770
.561
-.006
-.039
.60
(.184)
(.037)
(.006)
(.044)
(.198)
(.307)
(.494)
(.010)
-.349 (.151)
-.026 (.019)
-.039 (.009)
-.102 (.025)
.244 (.145)
.511 (.215)
.894 (.314)
-.002 (.006)
.414
.40105
a) Largest 21: 5.5 percent of whites at beginning of year
b) Next 46: 1.1 percent of whites at beginning of year
4. Additional expected loss if a city was twice its size:
a) Largest 21:0 percent of whites present at beginning of year
b) Next 46: 2.9 percent of whites present at beginning of year
Taking the first three losses together, the expected loss of whites
from a city system with 50 percent blacks would be:
For the largest 21:
with reduction of .2 in segregation: (-)0.9% + 6.8% + 5.6% =
11.5%
with no change in segregation: (-)0.9% + 6.8% = 5.9%
For the next 46:
with reduction of .2 in segregation: 1.2% 4- 4.5% + 1.1% = 6.8%
with no change in segregation: 1.2% 4- 4.5% = 5.7%
These results suggest that the impact of desegregation is quite large
for the largest 21 districts, of the same order of magnitude as other
effects; but that for the next 46 cities, the impact is much less, con-
siderably smaller than that due to other factors. (The average loss of
whites per year in the largest 21 cities was 5.6 percent of those present
at the beginning of the year, and in the next 46, 3.7 percent.) It should
be remembered also that this is an effect for the year of desegregation
only; we do not yet know about subsequent effects.
But how does a decrease of .2 in the segregation index compare to
the actual declines that occurred in segregation in these cities in any
single year? One way to get a sense of this is, as stated earlier, from
the fact that in a city with .5 blacks in the schools, an increase of 10
percent blacks in the average white child's school is equivalent to a
decrease of .2 in the segregation measure. To give another sense of
the magnitude of a change of .20, the cities among the 21 largest dis-
tricts are listed in table 5 in which a reduction in segregation of .10
or more occurred in any single year, together with the year it oc-
curred.
Eight of the 21 cities underwent a reduction in segregation of .1 or
more in any single year, and 3, a reduction of .2 or more (and 7 of
them underwent a reduction of .2 or more over the total period
1968-73). Among the next 46, 13 underwent a reduction of .2 or
more over the whole period, and 10 of these a reduction of .4 or
more. Many cities, of course, underwent no desegregation at all, and
their segregation indices remained approximately constant, or in-
creased.
A next step which can be taken (or two steps at once) is to attempt
to consider two more factors which differ among cities which have ex-
perienced desegregation, factors which may affect the rate of loss of106
Table 5
Reduction in
City Year segregation
Houston 69-70 .11
Dallas 70-71 .19
Memphis 72-73 .48
Tampa 70-71 .52
Indianapolis 72-73 .18
Atlanta 69-70 .11
72-73 .15
Denver 68-69 .22
San Francisco 70-71 .16
Table 6
Estimated increase in loss of whites in 1 year as
a function of 50% black in city school districts
and between-district segregation of .4
Between-district
50% black segregation of . 4
Largest 21 2.2% 6.6%
Next 46 1.7% 4.4%
Table 7
Between-district Largest 21 Next 46
segregation proportion black proportion black
.25 .50 .75 .25 .5 .7
0 2 10 17 3 6 9
.2 9 16 24 8 11 15
.4 15 23 30 14 17 20107
whites. One is location in the South or North. This factor we do not
expect to affect the general loss of whites, but only their loss when
desegregation occurs. Thus we can ask what is the effect of desegrega-
tion of .2 for southern cities, and what is the effect for northern cities?
Second, cities differ in the degree to which a suburban alternative is
available. Some cities, either because the school district encompasses
all or most of the metropolitan area, or because the rest of the
metropolitan area is about the same racial composition as the central
city, have no such available havens. Thus we can ask how the loss of
whites is affected by the racial disparity between city and suburbs, or
what we have called in an earlier section, the between-district segrega-
tion.
A regression equation which includes these two variables gives
results as indicated in table 4, which allow the following estimated in-
crease in loss of whites in 1 year as a function of reduction of .2 in
index of segregation: for the largest 21, in the South, 6.8 percent, and
in the North, 4.0 percent; for the next 46, in the South, 1.9 percent.
9
These results show that indeed there has been a greater loss of
whites when desegregation has taken place in large southern cities than
when it has taken place in large northern cities, with the estimate
nearly twice for the southern cities what it is for northern ones. For
the smaller cities, there is a smaller loss for the southern cities though
no effect can be estimated for the North in these smaller cities.
For this analysis with the two additional variables, we can also ask
what differences in loss of whites are associated with a difference
between 0 and 50 percent black in the city schools and a difference
between 0 between-district segregation and .4 between-district segrega-
tion. The estimates in table 6 show that the loss which was earlier seen
as resulting from the proportion black in the city can in fact in con-
siderable part be accounted for by the between-district segregation,
which is a function of the difference between proportion black in the
city and that in the suburbs. Thus the frequent observation that the
loss of whites from central-city school systems depends on the ex-
istence of suburban systems with high proportions of whites is certainly
confirmed by these data. Note, however, that this is a generally greater
loss of whites under such conditions, not related to the period of
desegregation. The question of whether there is additional loss at the
time of desegregation can be answered by a further analysis, to which
we now turn.
In this analysis, we include not only the possibilities that have al-
ready been examined, but three others as well:
9 No reliable estimate for the North can be made since the correlation between Ar
and Arx South is .983 (i.e., nearly all changes in segregation occured in the South in
these 46 cities). See note 10 for further discussion.108
(a) The possibility that there is a generally different loss rate of
whites from central cities in the South than in the North, in the
absence of desegregation
(b) the possibility that desegregation produces different rates of loss
when the proportion black in the city differs (interaction between
proportion black and change in segregation)
(c) the possibility that desegregation produces different rates of loss
when the interdistrict segregation differs
The estimates of these effects can best be expressed as the total esti-
mated loss rates under different illustrative conditions.
1
0 We will con-
sider what the loss rates would be for the average-size district in the
South for each group of cities where the reduction in segregation is
.2, as in earlier illustrations. Estimates are given for various combina-
tions of proportion black in the central-city district, ranging from .25
to .75 and between-district segregation ranging from 0 to .4. Table 7
shows the estimated loss rates under these various illustrative condi-
tions.
These estimates are for a city in the South. In the North the losses
at the time of reduction in segregation are estimated to be 3.0 percent
less in the largest 21 cities, with no reliable estimate possible in the
next 46. However, it should be recalled that more desegregation took
place in the South, so that the estimates are less reliable for northern
cities. It should also be noted that some combinations of proportion
black and between-district segregation are impossible or quite unlikely,
such as .25 proportion black and .4 between-district segregation, or
.75 black and 0 between-district segregation.
The most striking from these illustrative estimates are two effects.
One is the large increase in the effect of desegregation on rate of white
loss as the proportion black in the district increases. This effect exists
in both sizes of cities, though it is more pronounced in the largest 21.
There is a similarly large increase in the effect of desegregation on
white loss if there are suburban alternatives, as measured by a high
value for between-district segregation. In this case, the estimated aug-
mentation effect is high both for the smaller cities and for the large
ones.
The analysis above does not, however, answer certain other
questions, such as the losses of whites in subsequent years. To examine
this question, we can slightly modify equation (4), and examine the
loss in a given year as a function of the desegregation not only in that
year, but in preceding years:
wt — WM /
 wt = a + bl{ Ar<>M 4- b12 krt_ut_2 + b2 ph + b3 1 n N (5)
1
0 The individual coefficients from table 4 if interpreted alone without combining both
the interaction terms and the main effects are not meaningful. Thus the negative sign
on the coefficient for Ar is not itself interprctable, without the compensating positive109
and two more equations, including respectively b13 Ar(.2,,.3 , b13 A/v2/.
3 + bl4 ArM>M , and b13 Art.2,,.3 + bXA ArMiM + bl5 ArM>(_5 .
The last of the equations, which examines effects of desegregation over
the preceding 5 years, is the most complete, but gives the least accu-
rate estimates, since it is based only on the loss in 1972-73, and in-
cludes only 21 observations. Thus, only the first four equations will be
used and only the first three coefficients, for which there are multiple
estimates, will be calculated by averaging over the equations. These
results will give an indication of the time pattern of white loss follow-
ing desegregation.
1
1 The indication must be preliminary, because ask-
ing as detailed a question as this of data which consist of a limited
number of desegregation experiences, some of which occurred only in
1971-72 or 1972-73, cannot provide a conclusive answer. Neverthe-
less, it is useful to attempt to obtain even a preliminary answer to the
question. Table 8 shows for successively greater numbers of terms, up
to three, the estimates for coefficients. When these coefficients are
averaged as described earlier to attempt to estimate the succeeding ef-
fects of integration, the results are not very satisfactory, nor even
highly consistent, except for the first term (the year in which integra-
tion took place). The second year shows essentially no effect while the
third year shows an improbably large positive effect.
1
2 Thus, this at-
tempt must be regarded as unsuccessful for statistical reasons
(probably the particular years of desegregation associated with esti-
mates for particular lags). The most that can be said is that there is
coefficient of &rx proportion black. Even so, particular combinations of values for the
variables would show results that would seem unlikely on their face (for example, in-
tegration at very low proportions black apparently bringing about a small gain in propor-
tion of whites in city schools, rather than a loss, or increased proportion black ap-
parently bringing about a small gain as well). This is probably due to misspecification
of the equation—for example, some nonlinearity in effect of proportion black, not al-
lowed by the equation as specified, or to a tendency of two highly correlated variables
to have coefficients that polarize, due to minor sampling fluctuations. (See "Instabilities
of Regression Estimates Relating Air Pollution to Mortality," Gary C. McDonald and
Richard C. Schwing, Technometrics, Vol. 15, No. 3, Aug. 1973.) Finally, there is the
fact that some coefficients would give meaningless values of rate of loss (e.g., over 100)
percent for extreme values of the independent variables (e.g., Ar = 1 and the proportion
black = 1.0). This is due to a deliberate misspecification of the equation. The ap-
propriate dependent variable would have been logarithm of (whites in year ^/whites in
year t-\), rather than (whites in r-whites in r-l)/(whites in f-1). The latter was used
because it gives almost the same results as the former, and the coefficients are more
directly expressible as additions to a given rate of loss.
1
1 The possible indirect accelerating effects of desegregation on white loss through its
effect on increasing the proportion black [pb in equation (5)] is not reflected in the
coefficients blx through blb. That effect can be calculated to determine, for example, the
effect in year 2 through Ar,,,., in Apb and then the product b2 Ap6. 1
2 One reason for suspecting estimates of Ar,.2 is that they are heavily dependent on
changes in segregation that took place in 1971-72, and among the 21 cities, there were
no large changes during that year.110
no evidence for a return to city schools in the second or third year
after desegregation nor any strong evidence for a delayed loss in the
second and third years after desegregation. (There is, however, an in-
direct effect in subsequent years through the increase in proportion
black that occurs during the first year.)
There is another more stringent test of segregating effects of school
desegregation than those we have examined so far. Each city—with its
own particular housing patterns, suburban configurations, crime levels,
distribution of racial prejudices, industrial growth or decline, and other
factors—has rates of white loss that are specific to it. A rough test of
this sort can be carried out for the largest cities by using the white
student loss that occurred in each city in 1968-69, before much
desegregation occurred in any of these cities (except for Denver), and
observing what occurred from 1969 to 1973. For the 12 districts of
the 22 which did not experience a reduction of at least 0.1 in segrega-
tion over the period 1968-73 (and on the average experienced no
change at all), loss of white students expected between 1969 and
1973, based on their 1968-69 losses, was 17 percent of the white stu-
dents present in 1969. The actual loss during this period was 20 per-
cent, only slightly greater than expected. For the 10 districts which did
experience desegregation of 0.1 or more, their expected loss between
1969 and 1973, based on the 1968-69 before desegregation losses, was
only 10 percent. But their actual 1969-73 losses averaged 26 percent
of the white students present in 1969. Table 9 shows these figures for
each city separately.
A more careful statistical examination of this sort may be made by
introducing into the regression equation a dummy variable for each
city. Since in equation (4) there are five observations for each city,
the degrees of freedom in the equation are 5n - n - 3.
This analysis makes a somewhat different comparison than the previ-
ous ones. In those analyses, districts which have desegregated are com-
pared with those that have not, to discover the effect of desegregation
on loss of white students to the system. In this analysis, by contrast,
we compare districts that have desegregated with their own expected
rates of loss in the absence of desegregation, to discover any additional
loss of whites due to desegregation. This is obviously a much more
stringent test because it controls for the general characteristics of each
city. The equations used in the analysis include proportion black,
logarithm of number of students, and between-district segregation, with
the addition of a dummy variable for each city. The results of the anal-
ysis give coefficients for Ar of .262 (.057) for the largest 21 city dis-111
Table 8
Further Analysis Results (Equations include pro-
portion black and interdistrict segregation)
Large 21
Years of
desegregation
69-73
70-73
71-73
72-73
Next 46
69-73
70-73
71-73
72-73
.320 (.060)
.330 (.069)
.279 (.065)
.603 (.096)
.089 (.025)
.076 (.026)
.102 (.032)
.130 (.050)
A/?
t-1
.009 (.080)
-.035 (.078)
-.082 (.068)
.034 (.026)
.024 (.025)
.051 (.033)
A^
t-2
-.022 (.075)
-.048 (.070)
-.024 (.027)
-.045 (.029)
.35
.35
.43
.71
.34
.31
.42
.40
Estimated added losses of whites due to desegregation in first year of desegregation, in
second year, and third year, assuming reduction of .2 in segregation index.*
First Second Third
year year year
Large 21 7.7% 0.7% (gain) .07% (gain)
Next 46 2.0% 0.7% .07% (gain)
•"Unweighted averages of above estimates were used because standard errors were nearly
alike.112
Table 9
Reduction in Segregation 1968-1973, Expected and Actual Loss of White
Students 1969-1973, 22 Largest Central City Districts
District
1. New York
2. Los Angeles
3. Chicago
4. Philadelphia
5. Detroit
6. Houston**
7. Baltimore
8. Dallas**
9. Cleveland
10. Washington
11. Memphis**
12. Milwaukee
13. San Diego**
14. Columbus, Ohio
15. Tampa**
16. St. Louis
17. New Orleans**
18. Indianapolis**
19. Boston
20. Atlanta**
21. Denver**
22. San Francisco**
Reduction in
Segregation
( + ) .03
.07
( + ) 02
( + ) .08
.04
.17
.02
.22
( + ) -02
.04
.62
.03
.12
.04
.74
( + ) .03
.15
.28
( + ) .03
.37
.38
.31
Proportion of Whites
in 1969 Lost by
Expected (based on
city's 1968-69 loss*)
.12
.10
.16
.13
.33
.19
.09
.06
.22
.36
( + ) 10
.07
.00
.05
( + ) -09
.17
.13
.10
.11
.27
.09
.39
Present
1973
Actual
.16
.21
.25
.13
.30
.29
.17
.25
.12
.42
.37
.16
.08
.12
( + ) -11
.25
.38
.24
.14
.59
.19
.33
Average for 12 cities which had
less than 0.1 reduction in segregation
••Average for 10 cities which had 0.1
or more reduction in segregation
.16
.10
.20
.26
"Expected loss equals 1 - (1-x)
4, where x equals the proportion while students lost in 1968-69113
tricts, and .098 (.025) for the smaller cities.
1
3 These coefficients cor-
respond closely to those found in earlier equations, indicating that the
estimate of the average additional loss rate during desegregation is a
stable one, and not due to uncontrolled characteristics of the cities.
Finally, it is possible to carry out a full analysis of covariance, in
which we can not only control for the characteristics of the individual
cities, but also estimate the loss rate under desegregation for each city
which underwent substantial desegregation.
1
4 These estimates are
probably as close as we can obtain to the actual effects of desegrega-
tion on white loss in the year of desegregation. They show that the
estimated white loss does vary considerably from city to city, and that
the average loss rate specified earlier obscures very different loss rates
in different cities. Table 10 shows the estimated loss rate in the year
of desegregation if Ar were .2, for all cities listed earlier which un-
derwent desegregation of .1 or more in a single year. These rates must
still be regarded as only estimates because there are other things vary-
ing concurrently with desegregation. For three of these, proportion
black, between-district segregation, and size of district, the equation
has controlled the general effects; but the specific effects of each of
these variables (as well as others) may differ from city to city.
Nevertheless, these figures do indicate where the losses due to segrega-
tion are especially great, and where they are small.
Now that we have some sense of the magnitude of the losses of
whites in the year in which desegregation occurs, and how that mag-
nitude varies among different cities, it is useful to ask just how much
difference this makes in the long run in the city's population composi-
tion. For insofar as we can determine, the effect of desegregation is
a one-time effect. The present data give no good evidence that there
is a continuing increased loss of whites from city schools after
desegregation has taken place. On the other hand, there are secondary
impacts of the initial loss: it increases the proportion of blacks in the
schools, which itself increases the rate of loss. And it increases the ra-
cial disparity between suburbs and city, also increasing the rate of loss.
Yet these are second-order effects and their overall impact is not
clear.
One way of gaining a sense of the difference that sharp desegrega-
tion makes in the racial composition of a city in subsequent years is
1
3 R
2 in these equations are .65 and .60 respectively.
1
4 This analysis is carried out by an equation with Ar (change in segregation), dummy
variables for each city, and interactions between the city dummy variable and Ar. The
coefficient for each city is the same as the sum of the coefficients for Ar and the interac-
tion term.114
Table 10
Estimated Additional Loss of
White Students in Specified Cities
(Loss during desegregation in cities which had a
r in one year of -.1, beyond general loss of whites
in those cities. Desegregation assumed is r — -.21)
City
Estimated loss as a percent
of students present
at beginning of year
Houston
Dallas
Memphis
Tampa
Indianapolis
Atlanta
Denver
San Francisco
Average
(gain)
(gain)
9.1%
7.9
15.6
2.6
6.7
16.7
4.0
5.1
5.2
NOTE: Professor Reynolds Farley (personal communication 10 September, 1975) has
pointed out to us that Houston, Dallas, Memphis, and Denver annexed substantial amounts
of territory during the period 1970-73, so that the losses for those cities may be
underestimated due to an undetermined number of white children added through
annexation. Thus the apparent gains for Houston and Denver may well be due to annexation.115
to consider a hypothetical city with particular characteristics, and
apply the coefficients of the equations to the changing population
composition of the city, year by year, under two conditions: with sharp
desegregation in the first year, and without any change in segregation.
We will do this with two of the equations for the large cities: the
simple equation including only Ar, proportion black, and logarithm of
student population (equation 1 in table 4); and the most complex
equation, including three interaction terms (equation 3 in table 4).
Assumed characteristics of the district in year 0:
1. Proportion black = 0.50
2. Proportion white = 0.50
3. Average size student body for the largest 21 (169,000)
*4. Suburban ring equal in size to central city, and all white (this
means that initial between-district segregation for SMS A is .33).
*5. Located in North.
*6. No overall change in student populations in SMSA; white losses
from central city appear in suburbs.
*7. No movement of blacks to suburbs.
(Starred items are relevant only to equation 3 in table 4.)
The population compositions of the cities will be projected under
two assumptions: first, that there is no change in segregation (Ar = 0);
and second, that in year 0, there is a drop of .4 in r. This would not
be total desegregation in most large cities (see, for example, table 3),
but it would reduce the segregation by about half, and in some cases
more, and be very substantial desegregation.
Equation 1, including only Ar, proportion black, and logarithm of
size, certainly does not include all the ways in which desegregation can
have an impact on white student loss. On the other hand, equation 3
may overstate the initial loss upon desegregation through the mag-
nitude of the interaction terms and may understate the losses after
desegregation. As noted in table 11, the two equations show, however,
something about the range of effects that might be expected for a city
with these characteristics.
We should emphasize that these projections are not intended as pre-
dictions for any city. They are intended rather to give a better perspec-
tive on what these equations imply for the impact of desegregation on
the city's population composition.
The equations give considerably different projections, but perhaps
the most important point is that the impact of desegregation, as a one-
time impact, matters less in the overall population composition of the
central city than does the continuing loss of whites with or without
desegregation. According to equation 3 from table 4, there would be
a 10 percent difference in the proportion black in the city at the end
of 10 years due to desegregation; but even without desegregation, the116
Table 11
Predicted Portion Black in Year
Year: 0 12 3 4 5 6 7 9 10
Equation 1
with desegre-
gation (.4)
without dese-
gregation
Equation 3
with desegre-
gation (.4)
without dese-
gregation
.5 .54 .56 .58 .60 .61 .63 .65 .67 .69 .70
.5 .51 .53 .55 .56 .58 .60 .61 .63 .65 .67
.5 .58 .60 .62 .63 .65 .67 .69 .71 .73 .75
.5 .51 .52 .54 .55 .56 .58 .59 .61 .63 .65
Table 12
White schoolmates
for average black
Black schoolmates
for average black
Year 0 Year 10 Year 0 Year 10
Equation 1
with desegregation
without desegregation
Equation 3
with desegregation
without desegregation
.30
.10
.30
.10
.18
.07
.15
.07
.15
.05
.15
.05
.09
.03
.08
.04117
proportion would have increased from .5 to .65. And according to
equation 1 from table 4, the difference due to desegregation would be
only 3 percent at the end of the 10 years, but with about the same
general increase in proportion black.
It is useful also to see the projected proportion of white schoolmates
for the average black child under these conditions, and the proportion
of black schoolmates for the average white in the metropolitan area.
These are given in table 12, assuming an initial segregation of .8,
reduced to .4 under desegregation. These projections show that under
all conditions, there is an extensive decline in interracial contact over
the 10 years. The interracial contact under desegregation is projected
to remain higher after 10 years than it was in year 0 under no
desegregation; but the projected erosion is great, and especially so
under desegregation. Most of the intended benefits of desegregation
will have been lost at the end of 10 years—in part to the loss of white
students upon desegregation, but due even more to the general loss of
white students from city schools, with or without desegregation.
Nothing here can be said, of course, about the quality of interracial
contact in the two situations.
It is important again to emphasize that these are projections for a
hypothetical city with the given characteristics; as is evident in the
earlier analysis, the estimated impact of changes in segregation differs
from city to city, and in some cities is estimated to be absent.
Altogether, these projections emphasize what data from earlier pro-
jections have shown: that the emerging patterns of segregation are
those between large cities which are becoming increasingly black, and
everywhere else, which is becoming increasingly white. Desegregation
in central cities hastens this process of residential segregation but not
by a great deal under the conditions specified in the example. It pro-
vides a temporary, but fast eroding, increase in interracial contact
among children within the central city. In districts with certain charac-
teristics, however (such as about 75 percent black and about .4
between-district segregation, as in Detroit, Baltimore, Philadelphia, or
Chicago), the impact of full-scale desegregation would be very large,
1
5
moving the city's schools to nearly all black in a single year. What
would happen in a particular city is unknown; the point here is that
the white loss depends very much on the extent of desegregation, the
proportion black in the central city and the black-white differential
between central city and suburb.
Altogether then, what does this analysis of effects of desegregation
in cities indicate? Several results can be specified with some assurance:
1
5 See estimates on page 65 of James S. Coleman, Sara D. Kelly, and John A. Moore,
"Trends in School Segregation, 1968-73," Washington, D. C: The Urban Institute,
1975.118
1. In the large cities (among the largest 22 central-city school dis-
tricts) there is a sizable loss of whites when desegregation takes
place.
2. There is a loss, but less than half as large, from small cities. These
differences due to city size continue to hold when the reduced op-
portunity of white flight into surrounding school districts in the
smaller cities is taken into account.
3. The estimated loss is less in northern cities which have undergone
desegregation than in southern ones.
4. In addition to effects of desegregation on white loss, both the ab-
solute proportion of blacks in the central city and their proportion
relative to those in the surrounding metropolitan areas have strong
effects on loss of whites from the central-city district.
5. Apart from their general effect on white loss, a high absolute pro-
portion of blacks in the central city and a high difference in racial
composition between the central-city district and the remaining
metropolitan area both intensify the effects of desegregation on rates
of white loss.
6. When general rates of white loss for individual cities are taken
into account, the desegregation effects still hold to about the same
degree as estimated from comparisons among cities.
7. No conclusive results have been obtained concerning the direct
effect of desegregation in subsequent years after the first. The in-
direct effect, however, through increasing the proportion black in
the city and the segregation between the city district and suburban
ones, is to accelerate the loss of whites.
8. The effect of desegregation on white loss has been widely dif-
ferent among different cities where desegregation has taken place.
9. Because, insofar as we can estimate, the loss of whites upon
desegregation is a one-time loss, the long-term impact of desegrega-
tion is considerably less than that of other continuing factors. The
continuing white losses produce an extensive erosion of the interra-
cial contact that desegregation of city schools brings about.
All this leads to general conclusions consistent with those from earli-
er sections of this examination: that the emerging problem with regard
to school desegregation is the problem of segregation between central
city and suburbs; and in addition, that current means by which schools
are being desegregated are intensifying that problem, rather than
reducing it. The emerging problem of school segregation in large cities
is a problem of metropolitan area residential segregation, black central
cities and white suburbs, brought about by a loss of whites from the
central cities. This loss is intensified by extensive school desegregation119
in those central cities, but in cities with high proportions of blacks and
predominantly white suburbs, it proceeds at a relatively rapid rate with
or without desegregation.
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CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Thank you very much, Dr. Coleman.
We are now very happy to have the opportunity of listening to a
presentation by Dr. Robert L. Green, who is Dean of the College of
Urban Development at Michigan State University. Dr. Green.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. GREEN, DEAN OF THE COLLEGE
OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY.
DR. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank Tom Pettigrew of Harvard University very much for
working with me in developing the presentation. He could not be here
today. Also assisting me in the preparation were three of my col-
leagues from Michigan State University: Robert Griffore, a doctoral
student in the College of Education; John Schweitzer, associate profes-
sor in the College of Urban Development; and Joseph Wisenbaker, in-
structor in the College of Urban Development.
In the past year James S. Coleman of the University of Chicago has
made a number of statements opposing the use of court-ordered busing
to promote desegregation of public schools. Indeed, he has taken the
position that such desegregation attempts may, in fact, simply exacer-
bate the situation by encouraging the departure of white families from
central cities to suburban areas. He has even stated that the courts
may be the very worst instrument for social change. While we find
ourselves philosophically opposed to such a set of positions, we join
with Voltaire in supporting Professor Coleman's right to not only hold
to such beliefs but to make them public as well.
Our primary opposition to such public statements rests with Profes-
sor Coleman's claim that they are supported by research which he has
carried out. What follows below represents, first, a brief review of120
Professor Coleman's analyses; second, a brief statement as to some of
the problems associated with Coleman's analyses; third, a review of
several studies addressing the same basic question (some of which used
the same data source as did Professor Coleman); fourth, the presenta-
tion of a new set of analyses carried out by Thomas Pettigrew of Har-
vard University; fifth and finally, a set of conclusions and points relat-
ing to what we see as a much broader issue, the relationship between
the social scientist and the press, and between social science and
public policy.
Coleman's Analyses
Since April of 1975, Professor Coleman has produced a series of
analyses, all purportedly dealing with the relationship between school
desegregation and the loss of white public school students. It is par-
ticularly important to note that, while each of these analyses has em-
ployed a different method, addressed subtly different questions, and
produced a wide range of estimates for the effect of school desegrega-
tion on the loss of white students, Professor Coleman has been quite
consistent in issuing public statements allegedly related to his analyses.
He has held fast to the belief that court-ordered school desegregation
within a district leads to the loss of white students, particularly in the
year following desegregation. This constancy of opinion is especially
disturbing since close scrutiny of the analyses leads one to the conclu-
sion that Coleman does not report analyses dealing with court-ordered
desegregation per se. The following review of the analyses serves to
substantiate this statement.
The chain of events began on April 2, 1975, with the delivery of
"Recent Trends in School Integration" by James S. Coleman, S. Kelly,
and J. Moore to the American Educational Research Association an-
nual meeting in Washington, D.C. This presentation focused on three
major variables which the authors attempted to relate to "white
flight": school district size, the district's proportion of black students
in 1970, and the increase in school desegregation from 1968 to 1970.
Among the points made in this first paper was that for the 19
"largest," but unspecified, central-city districts both the proportion of
black students and the pace of desegregation are positively related to
the loss of white children from the public schools. For the next 50 lar-
gest central-city districts, however, the results were sharply different.
They reported that, among these more typical cities, white pupil losses
are positively related to district size and the proportion of black enroll-
ment but not to the pace of desegregation.
Based on these results were the two major conclusions: Integration
does not promote achievement in black children and courts should not121
be an instrument of social policy. These conclusions were reached in
spite of the fact that neither achievement nor court-ordered desegrega-
tion were explicitly studied.
When the first analysis was called in question, Coleman and his col-
leagues at the Urban Institute undertook a second, more sophisticated,
and sharply different analysis in a second, 67-page document dated
July 28, 1975, and entitled, "Trends in School Segregation, 1968-73."
This second paper was distributed to a small number of social
scientists who were invited to attend a 1-day discussion with Coleman
at the Urban Institute on August 4, 1975.
The new analysis attempted to ascertain the average effect of
desegregation upon the loss of white students between each of the six
school years from 1968 to 1973. In other words, unlike his initial anal-
ysis which looked at white student loss during 1970-73 after
desegregation in 1968-70, Coleman now looked for the concurrent ef-
fect of desegregation in the same year. Thus, reductions in desegrega-
tion in 1968-69 were related to white student losses in 1968-69, and
so on for each of the six years across the 69 central cities. Once again
the sample was somewhat arbitrarily split into two on the basis of
system size.
In this study, Coleman actually carried out several different analyses,
in an attempt to relate a number of different predictors to changes in
the proportion of white students. In the first analysis he found that the
combined effects of the number of students enrolled in the district, the
proportion of black students, and the annual changes in public school
desegregation account for only modest differences in changes in the
number of white students. It is only when five additional factors are
added that much of the effect of changes in numbers of white students
can be accounted for. But here again, the most obvious point is that
the single variable that Coleman has consistently discussed in his pol-
icy statements to the media, court-ordered desegregation, has not been
accurately identified in his selected cities, nor has it been associated
with what Coleman calls "white flight." Furthermore, it is in this anal-
ysis that we can clearly see the unusually strong contribution of Atlan-
ta and Memphis. The average estimated white loss due to desegrega-
tion for the eight cities experiencing substantial desegregation is only
5.2 percent. But without Memphis and Atlanta, the average is only 1.5
percent. Coleman's conclusion was that "***the estimated white loss
rate specified earlier obscures very different loss rates in different ci-
ties." Unfortunately, Coleman has consistently failed to make this
point forcefully in his Boston television appearance, his court af-
fidavits, and his many public interviews.122
Coleman's first study was abandoned in July, not long after it was
completed. The second study met with such a high degree of critical
reaction (which we will examine later) that Coleman apparently felt
a third study was necessary. Even Professor Coleman characterizes this
third analysis as a "rough test."
Performed on various subsets of what Coleman continued to call
"the largest" central-city school districts, this analysis developed esti-
mated losses of white students for the years 1969-73 by projecting for-
ward the actual losses during the single year 1968-69.
What this analysis shows is that, for the largest 22 central-city dis-
tricts, 10 cities showing a reduction in the segregation index of .1 or
more had a projected white loss of 10 percent between 1969 and 1973
and an observed loss of 26 percent. The other 12 cities had a pro-
jected white loss of 17 percent and an observed loss of 20 percent.
From those projected and observed estimates Coleman comes to the
conclusion that the impact of desegregation results in more than twice
the expected loss of whites as compared to the situation in which
desegregation did not occur.
Interestingly enough, of the 10 districts subject to large-scale
desegregation, 3 provide most of the effect, all of which are in the
Deep South. When Memphis, Atlanta, and New Orleans are removed
from this analysis, the remaining 7 desegregating districts present a
much different picture. Average projected white losses for these dis-
tricts are now 11 percent while the observed losses average but 18 per-
cent—clearly a greatly attenuated estimate of white loss attributable to
school desegregation. Given the instability of projections based on but
a single pair of years, the obtained discrepancy dwindles to insig-
nificance.
Problems with the Analyses
When we ask whether Professor Coleman has really demonstrated
that desegregation per se produces white flight, the answer is a definite
"No." If we look at Coleman's research systematically, it becomes ap-
parent that it has several major problems. From the very beginning,
with his selection of data for his studies, we see certain limits. In at-
tempting to explain the phenomenon of "white flight," he considers
only a small proportion of all the variables which do in fact relate to
the movement of whites from central city to suburban areas.
Coleman's chief variable is degree of school desegregation, although
he considers the proportion of black school enrollment, school district
size, the effect of the South as a region, and some ways in which these
variables operate together to influence "white flight." Coleman's varia-
bles seem to be offered as the most powerful influences on "white123
flight," yet it is clear that the phenomenon has been widely recognized
since the beginning of this century, and certainly not as a consequence
of school desegregation. Whites have been interested in leaving the
central-city areas for a wide variety of reasons, as Peter Rossi pointed
out some years ago. He noted that customarily educational factors
rank sixth in order of influence on movement of whites. And while ra-
cial and ethnic prejudice, pollution, disasters, construction of urban
areas, and crime are all influential factors, additional closet space was
reported as the strongest factor of all.
The degree to which Coleman failed to consider and control for
other variables in his analyses has been quite effectively revealed by
Gregg Jackson, of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Jackson has
demonstrated that if either population density or per pupil expenditure
is controlled the desegregation effect Coleman seeks to demonstrate
disappears.
Basically, Coleman has not studied trends in school integration or
the effects of these trends. His failure to deal with the complexity of
the whole desegregation and white flight relationship extends to his use
of only data for 1968 to 1973. If he had really looked at trends, he
would have probably recognized the influence of the several variables
noted by Rossi.
Nor has Coleman reported instances of inconsistent evidence, such
as that from Detroit, where between 1965 and 1970 Detroit schools
lost 30,240 white students, even though the schools were highly ra-
cially segregated and the city was not under court-ordered or voluntary
desegregation.
In addition to the limited data Coleman employs, his selection of ci-
ties is also highly questionable. Large- and middle-sized school districts
were selected on the basis of ill-defined and somewhat inconsistent
criteria. Partitioning of the cities into the larger group showing a
desegregation effect and another group not showing this effect seems
to have been heavily influenced by Dr. Coleman's desire to demon-
strate a strong desegregation effect. As will be demonstrated later, it
is only through including a few particular cities among the largest 19
that Coleman was able to show such an effect. Atlanta and Memphis
are unusually strong in their contributions toward strengthening this ef-
fect.
Problems with White Flight and Measures of Desegregation
It is obvious that little of significance can emerge from a line of
research for which the dependent variable can be called into question.
Yet, with "white flight" (the dependent variable in this case), we seem
to have Coleman's characterization of a foregone conclusion. The term124
itself suggests that whites are taking independent individual action in
escaping from aversive conditions. Official policies taken to bring
about urban segregation, both obvious and "hidden policies," are
simply not recognized by Coleman. Individual actions are more often
than not related to the actions of authorities, such as school adminis-
trators and realtors who practice housing discrimination.
Another important question is whether Coleman's measure of
changes in white school enrollment really gets at the effect at all. This
measure of percentage change in the absolute number of white stu-
dents is obviously inadequate when contrasted with Dr. Rossell's mea-
sure of the change in the proportion of white students. Rossell's mea-
sure takes into account the relative numbers of black and white stu-
dents as it relates to flight. But it is characteristic of Coleman's
analyses, as well as his public statements, to consider this entire issue
from the standpoint of whites more than from the perspective of both
blacks and whites.
In general, it appears that the measure Coleman chose serves to
magnify the strength of the association purportedly found between
desegregation and white flight.
Coleman's means of selecting his major independent variable, school
desegregation, further renders his conclusions questionable. First of all,
there are several ways to take a measure of desegregation. Gregg
Jackson has pointed out that Coleman himself used two different in-
dicators of desegregation. One indicates racial proximity and is defined
as the proportion of blacks in the average white pupil's school. The
other is a measure of segregation. It is calculated as the ratio of the
proportion of blacks in the average white pupil's school to the propor-
tion of blacks in the whole school district. Jackson reports that
Coleman carried out separate analyses for each of these indicators.
While the index of racial proximity is not a good indicator of segrega-
tion, Coleman reports it in his findings despite the fact that the index
of segregation yielded evidence for a much smaller "white flight" ef-
fect. This apparent practice of specific selection of an indicator in
order to highlight the effect of interest seems related to the selection
of certain cities, including Atlanta and Memphis.
Research with Results Contradicting Those of Coleman
We have argued that at every step in the sequence of conducting
research, from the collection of data to its final analysis, Coleman has
failed to recognize several relevant aspects of this very complex situa-
tion. Commission of such errors would be expected to lead to errone-
ous conclusions, and this is precisely what several other studies sug-
gest. We will discuss these studies whose conclusions are not in agree-125
ment with those of Coleman, and then describe a recent analysis con-
ducted by Dr. Pettigrew.
First, a study by Jane Mercer and Terrence Scout, of the University
of California at Riverside, was not able to demonstrate demographic
differences between 23 desegregating school districts and 67 non-
desegregating districts in California.
More perplexing than the Mercer-Scout failure to replicate
Coleman's basic finding on a set of districts limited to California are
the similarly negative results reported by Reynolds Farley using na-
tional data from the same source as used by Coleman. Farley failed
to uncover a significant relationship between the variables of "white
flight" and desegregation in cities of either the South or the North.
Farley's research, however, differed from that of Coleman's in
several ways. (1) Farley used a larger sample of cities, 50 in the South
and 75 in the North. Rather than limiting his sample, he considered
all cities with a 1970 population of 100,000 or more and at least 3
percent of their public school enrollments black. He also ran analyses
with just the 20 largest cities of each region. (2) Farley investigated
the 1967 to 1972 period rather than Coleman's 1968 to 1973. (3)
Rather than relate annual changes in the variables to each other, as
in Coleman's second analysis, Farley related the variables across the
entire 5-year span. (4) Farley employed only elementary school data,
while Coleman employed data from all grades. This difference, how-
ever, should have been unimportant, since Coleman showed no dif-
ferences across the grades.
Farley was unable to show for either his extensive urban samples or
for his subsamples of the largest cities any systematic relationship
between white loss and school desegregation. He concluded:
To be sure when public schools are desegregated or when they
become predominantly black, some white parents—perhaps
many—hasten their move away from the central city. However,
whites are moving out of central cities for many other reasons. We
have shown that cities whose schools were integrated between
1967 and 1972 did not lose white students at a higher rate than
cities whose schools remained segregated.
Why should the two studies with comparable data reach opposite
conclusions?
Farley offered two possible explanations for the diverse results. The
1-year effect that Coleman uncovered may well represent only a
hastening of some whites to leave the central city who were about to
do so in any event. Once a longer span of years is viewed, as in Far-
ley's analysis, this "hastening" effect disappears. Farley's second sug-126
gested answer involves again the special role played by Atlanta and
Memphis in Coleman's more limited sample.
Luther Munford, of the Law School of the University of Virginia,
presented the results from his study of 30 school districts in Mississippi
undergoing extensive school desegregation from 1968 to 1970. He at-
tacked the notion of an inevitable "tipping point," and demonstrated
that, for his sample, "white flight" was explained by the black/white
ratio in the population as a whole rather than just the ratio in the
schools. The black population proportion explained 88 percent of the
district variance in the loss of white enrollment across the 30 districts;
and three-fourths of even the majority-black schools in these districts
actually increased or maintained their white student percentage
between spring and fall of 1970 after segregationist resistance had sub-
sided.
Another paper, by Gary Orfield, a political scientist at Brookings,
provides a political analysis of "white flight research." "Too often," he
warned, "selective, half-digested reports of preliminary research
findings are disseminated by the media and become weapons in the in-
tense political and legal battle being fought in major cities." He
emphasized the complexities involved in sorting out the various forces
working toward accelerated suburbanization. "It is impossible now,"
he concluded, "to demonstrate that school integration, in itself, causes
substantial white flight." Orfield described the severe long-term
problem of "flight" from the central city as not caused by desegrega-
tion but as often undermining the viability of the process. The inner
suburbs will soon face the same demographic trend. The problem,
then, does not simply translate into the need for housing integration
alone. Indeed, he argues, "It is hard to imagine how stable housing in-
tegration, involving large numbers of blacks, could be achieved in any
reasonable period of time without a framework of area-wide integrated
schools." His conclusion echoes a widespread consensus among race
relations specialists:
There is no evidence that stopping school desegregation would
stabilize central city racial patterns. If those patterns are to be sig-
nificantly modified, positive, coordinated, and often metropolitan-
wide desegregation efforts will probably be required.
Christine H. Rossell, in a paper presented at the annual meeting of
the American Political Science Association earlier this year, presents
results conflicting strongly with those of Coleman. Her analyses were
carried out by examining year-by-year trends in white enrollment for
each city separately. For 35 cities identified as actually reassigning pu-
pils for desegregation purposes, only 5 showed pre-post desegregation127
trend differences in the loss of white students, and only 3 showed a
different rate of white student loss in the year immediately following
desegregation efforts (1 of which was in a direction opposite to that
predicted based on Coleman's major conclusions). While the cities
used by Rossell differ slightly from those used by Coleman, there was
still a great deal of overlap.
Of the eight cities whose desegregation efforts were prompted by
court order, only two had significantly different pre-post desegregation
trends in the loss of white students and a greater rate of white student
loss in the year following implementation of the desegregation plan
(Pasadena and Pontiac). Two districts located with Pasadena in the
San Gabriel Valley and unaffected by desegregation experienced
greater loss of whites during these years than did Pasadena itself. As
with Farley's results, the question arises: Why do Rossell and Coleman
reach such different conclusions? Again we must consider the dif-
ferences in their approaches and data.
Though both investigators based their work on the HEW data, Ros-
sell expanded her data base considerably. In addition to HEW's
1968-72 data, she utilized the agency's 1967 data which Coleman
failed to use. She also obtained as much information as is available
from before 1967. This expansion of her data base farther back into
the 1960s allowed Rossell to develop more accurate and reliable
predesegregation racial enrollment trends. Coleman, we noted earlier,
in his third analysis based his calculations on the single base year of
1968.
A New Analysis
Tom Pettigrew recently completed a fourth analysis to lend, hope-
fully, some clarification to this complicated analytic puzzle. His point
is a simple one that was alluded to earlier. Much of Coleman's effect
may be a function of the particular subsets of large urban systems
chosen for analysis and emphasis. The exclusion and inclusion of par-
ticular cities into the critical final subset of the "largest" urban school
districts, then, may well enhance the effect at issue.
Pettigrew tested this additional explanation for the contradiction
between the three studies for two interrelated reasons. As noted earli-
er, Coleman's choice of the "largest" urban school districts seems
somewhat arbitrary on its face. Second, the scatter diagram in figure
1 suggests that the particular subsets of cities he chose to analyze did
in fact maximize the probability of his obtaining an association
between the loss of white students and desegregation. Let us further
explore these two points.128
Recall that Coleman did not list the urban districts in his sample in
his first paper. Only 3 months later was the list of the 20 "largest"
urban school districts revealed. Washington was immediately dropped
for its lack of white students, leaving only 19 in this crucial subset of
urban districts. We would not question the decision to drop Washing-
ton because of its tiny percentage of white pupils, but we wonder why
a comparable cutoff was not also employed for districts with tiny per-
centages of black students. Coleman analyzed Garden Grove,
Anaheim, and San Jose, all in California, though they each had less
than 2 percent black school enrollment.
But these are not the largest 19 urban school districts in the United
States. Omitted and never mentioned in any of the four versions of
Coleman's paper are Miami-Dade, Jacksonville-Duval, and Ft. Lau-
derdale-Broward, all county-wide urban systems in Florida. On what-
ever grounds they were excluded, it did not involve the fact that they
are metropolitan districts in Florida; Tampa-Hillsborough is also a
metropolitan district in Florida, yet it was included in spite of being
smaller than the three missing districts. Like Tampa, Miami and
Jacksonville experienced widespread court-ordered desegregation
without a significant decline in their white enrollment. Ft. Lauderdale
actually experienced a 39.2 percent increase in white students from
1968 to 1972 while engaged in an extensive desegregation program.
Thus, the unexplained exclusion of these three huge districts from
Coleman's analysis may have contributed to his finding an effect of
desegregation upon "white flight" where Farley's more inclusive sam-
ple did not.
Further complications were created when, for his second analysis,
Coleman constructed his subset of "largest" urban districts to include
Denver and San Francisco. These two additions, raising the number of
cases from 19 to 21, were made because they "were two of the few
northern cities to undergo extensive desegregation during the period
1968-72***." Albuquerque, whose system is larger than that of San
Francisco, was excluded by invoking a new criterion: It "is not among
the first 50 in population." No mention is made, however, of Nash-
ville-Davidson, a system larger than San Francisco in an area ranking
30th in population, which had more court-ordered desegregation dur-
ing these years than either Denver or San Francisco.
Nor is a rationale provided for why the line was drawn after San
Francisco. This cutoff is particularly perplexing considering the fact
that the next urban school system in size is that of Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg, North Carolina. This is the district involved in the critical Swann
opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court that Coleman attacked as too
sweeping in his Boston television appearance. Under court orders, this129
metropolitan district achieved a larger drop in Coleman's segregation
index than any in his big-city sample except Tampa.
A less arbitrary cutoff could have been achieved by following Far-
ley's procedure of choosing all urban school districts which had over
a certain number of students in a given year. Employing Coleman's
own rankings by 1972 enrollment, a cutoff of all urban districts with
more than 75,000 students would not only have included Miami,
Jacksonville, Ft. Lauderdale, Denver, Nashville, Albuquerque, and San
Francisco, but also Charlotte, Newark (New Jersey), Cincinnati, and
Seattle. All of these additional cities are among the Nation's 50 largest
cities except Albuquerque, Ft. Lauderdale, and Charlotte.
To test the effects of these various selections of urban school dis-
tricts, Coleman's time period (1968-1973), his definitions of "white
flight" and desegregation, and even his data as provided in appendix
3 of the fourth version of his paper were employed. The two principal
control variables that Coleman used in both his initial and later
analyses—the black student proportion and the size of each school
system—were also employed. However, in order to avoid the error in-
troduced by residential transition, Pettigrew used Farley's over-time
method of comparing 1968 data with those of 1973 rather than
Coleman's year-by-year procedure.
Figure 1 presents the basic data in simplest form. The unmarked
points on the graph are the original 19 of Coleman's big-city analysis;
the two circled points denote Denver and San Francisco that were
later added by Coleman for his final big-city sample of 21; the four
points in triangles denote Miami, Jacksonville, Ft. Lauderdale, and
Nashville, that should have been included in the sample of the
country's "largest" urban school districts; and the five points in boxes
denote Albuquerque, Charlotte, Newark, Cincinnati, and Seattle, that
would be included if a standard cutoff of 75,000 students in 1972 were
applied.
Figure 1 indicates the relationship between the amount of desegrega-
tion from 1968 to 1973 across the abscissa and the percentage change
in white enrollment over these same years down the ordinate. The
graph is further subdivided at the medians into four quadrants: high
desegregation and low loss of white students; high desegregation and
high loss; low desegregation and low loss; and low desegregation and
high loss. The relationship at issue requires a strong tendency for these
30 cities to lie in a lower-left to upper-right diagonal; that is, they
should fall predominantly in the high desegregation-high loss and the
low desegregation-low loss.
The first thing to notice about figure 1 is that the heralded positive
association does not exist. Only a minority of the 30 cities fall in the130
two predicted quadrants. The correlation is -.30. This replicates Far-
ley's results. The second thing to notice is how important the two ex-
treme points in the lower left are for Coleman's argument. Not surpris-
ingly, these points denote Memphis and Atlanta. Throughout our
discussion we have emphasized how critical these two cities are in
Coleman's statistics; figure 1 shows how unique they are among the
Nation's 30 largest urban school systems. Next notice that Denver and
especially San Francisco are in the high desegregation and high loss
quadrant; recall these are the two districts added as an afterthought
for Coleman's second analysis.
Now check where the points are that denote the nine cities that
should have been included in the big-city sample. Six of the nine are
located in the high desegregation and low loss quadrant, including all
four of the districts larger than that of San Francisco. The remaining
three, Cincinnati, Newark, and Seattle, are located in the low
desegregation and high loss quadrant.
This third failure to replicate Coleman's "white flight" results, con-
sistent with the findings of both Farley and Rossell, demonstrates the
critical importance to Coleman's study of the rather special and ar-
bitrary subset of "largest" urban school districts which he chose to
analyze and emphasize.
Summary
We believe that taken all together the research on desegregation and
"white flight" permits only a few conclusions. The following are the
most important of these:
1. Desegregation and "white flight" are not related in the smaller ci-
ties. Even Coleman admits this.
2. There is little or no effect of desegregation on the "white flight"
of students in metropolitan-wide districts.
3. Desegregation required by Federal court orders has not had different
effects on "white flight" from other desegregation of equal magnitude.
4. The loss of whiie and black students from large urban school
systems is significantly related to the proportion of black students in the
systems.
5 Extensive school desegregation in the largest, nonmetropolitan school
districts, particularly in the South, may hasten the "white flight" of stu-
dents in the first year of the process; but at least part of this effect may
be compensated for in later years. Coleman showed only a 1-year effect,
part of which reflected neighborhood transition. Rossell also showed
this effect in the first year for rapidly desegregating urban districts in
the North. But she showed, too, that by the second and third years
these same districts have an average rate of reduction in their white131
proportions below both their own predesegregation rate and those of
other districts.
Social Science and Public Policy
Studying Coleman's position is a confusing and disturbing endeavor.
The information necessary to evaluate Coleman's much-publicized
research has been consistently difficult to obtain. Throughout the furor
there has been confusion between his limited research and his sweep-
ing views against court-ordered desegregation. We believe that the
whole episode goes far beyond Professor Coleman's research and even
the racial issues involved, in that it raises painful questions of how so-
cial science should relate responsibly to public policy and the ethics
involved in this relationship. This extensive campaign to alter public
policy by such a prominent social scientist highlights the thorniest
aspects of this problem that must be faced.
From April until August, the social science community was not pro-
vided with the analysis upon which Coleman's widely-publicized
opinions were reportedly based. The details of the first analysis that
began the campaign were never released. The second draft of the
paper presented an entirely new analysis with a different research
design. Indeed, a third entirely different analysis was introduced in
September. All told, there have been three contrasting analyses, and
four editions plus a 39-page erratum edition of the paper extending
over a 7-month period. The views did not change, but the research
upon which they were said to be based was constantly changing.
Telephone calls to the Urban Institute in June requesting methodologi-
cal detail were summarily rejected on the grounds that the analysis was
"still in progress." Yet this was after 2 months of nationwide publicity
of policy recommendations that were said to flow from this "still-in-
progress" research.
What made the 4-month delay even more "unfortunate" was the
consistent confusion between Coleman's personal opinions and his
research findings. Most of the hundreds of articles and editorials that
have been written about the episode advanced Coleman's views as if
they were the results of a new and massive study of urban desegrega-
tion. Yet the connection between Coleman's views and Coleman's
research data is tenuous at best and quite conflicting. While he is cau-
tious before scholars, before the media he is expansive, loose,
opinionated, and speculative.
Every social scientist, like any other citizen, has a right to express
his full political views on any subject without the support of research
results. Ethical problems arise, it seems to us, when the social
scientist's views are put forward not as political opinions at all but as132
results of his own extensive scientific investigation, as "new insights
from recent research."
Further problems arise when strongly-worded, ad hominem attacks
enter the controversy. Some critics have employed such attacks upon
Coleman; and we have seen how Coleman has consistently employed
similar attacks upon virtually all of his critics regardless of the modera-
tion of their opposition. We regret such ad hominem remarks deeply.
They make "good copy" for the mass media, perhaps, but they lower
the public's respect for social science, and divert public attention away
from the real issues.
Coleman's statements and appearances at antibusing rallies suggest
that he is thoroughly and unquestioningly certain that his views are
correct. Those who dare disagree with him must suffer from
"motivated blindness," must be part of "a kind of conspiracy of
silence," must mistake race riot fires for "an extraordinary display of
the Northern lights," or must be "a lot of old people who would rather
pursue a common path and attempt to ignore the fact that this
[desegregation] may be having unintended and undesired con-
sequences." Agreeing with conventional wisdom on the subject, he
sees massive "white flight" in major cities as a consequence of court-
ordered desegregation to be so completely obvious that his many
critics must have forsaken their social science training for their un-
realistic political hopes. We all believe in our own ideas; but, when
dealing publicly with issues of enormous policy significance, we have
a special obligation to at least entertain the hypothesis that we may
be wrong whatever "our fond hopes about it."
We firmly believe that social science can and should responsibly in-
fluence public policy on issues in which it can competently bring
research and theory to bear. Perhaps, specialized groups of social
scientists, checked in part by peer review, can perform this task best.
Individual social scientists can also carry out this function responsibly
by basing their views on published and widely available material in
situations, such as courtrooms and legislative committee hearings,
where they subject themselves to formal cross-examination or at least
informed questioning. But intensive campaigns through the mass media
present a hazardous means of injecting social science input into the
political debates on policy.
In time, the public might understandably conclude from the
seemingly "conflicting research results" that social scientists have
nothing to contribute to policy debates except their own highly
politicized opinions.
Coleman has consistently argued that "white flight" is the product
of individual decisions and action. But he fails to recognize or admit133
that there is a very large element of what may be called "hidden pol-
icy" in the causes of segregation. Such practices as planned segrega-
tion by realtors and "blockbusting" are the real reasons for residential
segregation. And of course the latter are not caused by school
desegregation.
Coleman has sought to show that school desegregation in the central
cities leads to white flight to the suburban areas. While it is quite clear
he has made an inadequate demonstration of this hypothesis, even if
we were to assume he was correct, this would be an excellent justifica-
tion for metropolitan desegregation. This would not mean the reor-
ganization of several districts into a huge and unwieldy one. Rather,
it might only mean that present urban boundaries would not be al-
lowed to act as racial "Berlin walls."
One reason why Coleman's data are not sound is his entrapment in
the ecological fallacy of inferring individual motivations from ag-
gregate data. He has inferred that school desegregation causes "white
flight." He has not asked one single individual about personal motiva-
tions.
For example, aggregate data from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, may be
used to infer that white movement was caused by school desegrega-
tion. But it would be at least equally plausible that the recent flood
in that city caused this white relocation during the year of court-or-
dered desegregation.
Another example is Riverside, California, where aggregate data may
lead one to conclude that school desegregation caused "white flight."
But when the matter is studied more closely, it is quite obvious that
the new freeway constructed there caused substantial white relocation.
Coleman argues that individuals should be free to choose the loca-
tions of their residence and the schools their children attend. For some
individuals, there are real options. But severe restrictions on travel and
housing are precisely what black people have been fighting for years.
Although on one level it would seem that Coleman supports this black
quest for equal housing and education, it appears that in reality he is
arguing more for the rights of the majority.
According to Coleman, courts are the worst instruments of social
change. It would even seem that he is concerned about the possibility
that the courts will remove citizen's individual rights. This position is
quite different from the one popular 10 years ago, which admonished
blacks to get off the streets and into the courts. We take issue with
Coleman's position on this issue and suggest also that he should recon-
sider his belief that desegregation must flow from the will of the com-
munity. It appears that the community he refers to is the white com-
munity. His suggestion that local communities should be able to decide134
on the amount of desegregation they want is a dangerous one. What
it clearly means, in effect, is that local decisions might be accorded
more power than basic constitutional rights. And we should never
abandon constitutional protections in favor of shifting local whims.
One of Coleman's basic tactics has been to take an advocacy posi-
tion against school desegregation. He has only tenuous data for this,
but this does not hamper his making unsupported public statements.
Like a premature tryout of an ineffective and potentially dangerous
new cure for cancer, the advocacy of an unsupported position by a
recognized expert is a dangerous policy. Coleman should have recog-
nized this, as well as the fact that once a reputed scholar takes an ad-
vocacy position, even his subsequent citation of contradictory evidence
may not be given much public attention.
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[The complete paper follows.]
PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND
WHITE FLIGHT: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR
COLEMAN
By Robert L. Green and Thomas F. Pettigrew*
In recent months, the media have accorded much attention to James
S. Coleman for his position concerning the relationship between
desegregation and "white flight." Coleman has been erroneously
described as having changed his position on busing. It is suggested that
he has revised his original position of support for busing. The National
Observer headline of June 7, 1975, declared "A Scholar Who Inspired
It Says Busing Backfired." Lansing, Michigan's, State Journal of June
1, 1975, claimed "Court-Ordered Integration Rapped by Sociologist
Who Started It All."
Of course, Coleman cannot take the responsibility for having started
the busing phenomenon. Indeed he has never claimed such credit.
Since Coleman is a highly regarded sociologist, his research and his
recent and numerous public statements merit both attention and close
* Robert L. Green is dean of the College of Urban Development and professor of
educational psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan. Thomas F.
Pettigrew is professor of social psychology and sociology at Harvard University and is
currently on leave, serving as a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the
Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California. A fuller version of this article appears in the
Winter 1976 Harvard Educational Review. Copyright by the President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Permission to print this version here granted to the authors.136
scrutiny. In what follows, an attempt will be first made to trace the
development of Coleman's research reports and his public statements.
Several critical evaluations of this work will then be reviewed, includ-
ing one the present authors have carried out. Finally, attention will be
given to several basic issues in the conduct of social science research
and the reporting of data.
Coleman's First Paper
The episode began on April 2, 1975, with Coleman's delivery of
"Recent Trends in School Integration," by J. S. Coleman, S. Kelly, and
J. Moore, to the American Education Research Association meeting in
Washington, D.C. This presentation focused on three major variables
that the authors indicated related to "white flight": (1) the natural log
of district size; (2) the district's 1970 black proportion; and (3) the
increase in school desegregation from 1968 to 1970.
Among the points made in this first paper is Coleman's contention
that for the 19 "largest," but unidentified, central-city districts both
the proportion of black enrollment (variable 2) and the pace of
desegregation (variable 3) are positively related to the number of
white children leaving the public schools. For the next 50 largest cen-
tral-city districts, however, the results are sharply different. Among
these more typical cities, losses of white pupils are related positively
to the district's size (variable 1) and the proportion of black enroll-
ment (variable 2) but not to desegregation (variable 3).
Coleman derives from these findings his two major conclusions that
integration does not promote achievement in black children and that
the courts should not be an instrument of social policy.
Coleman's Later Interviews
While, as with most academically oriented papers, the mass media
gave the paper only rninui coverage and comment, Coleman
proceeded to grant numerous interviews to reporters. And in contrast
to the caution of the initial paper, he was now blunt and far-ranging
in his opposition to Federal court orders that required extensive urban
desegregation. To Muriel Cohen of the Boston Globe (May 18, 1975),
he argued that: "A whole generation of young legal talent thinks it can
transform the society by winning court cases. That's enormously sub-
versive of the whole political process in the United States." At another
point, he added, "I don't know what judges are thinking."
To Bryce Nelson of The Los Angeles Times (May 29, 1975), a few
weeks later, Coleman continued his attack. In addition, he told Larry137
Ingrassia of the Chicago Sun-Times that "when the will for integration
does not exist, the imposition of it by the courts doesn't make it suc-
cessful."
Perhaps the most influential interview appeared in the National Ob-
server (June 7, 1975). After summarizing his research results, he called
the courts "the worst of all possible instruments for carrying out a very
sensitive activity like integrating schools." Moreover, he contended
that the courts were wrong to consider the [Coleman] report in any
way. And they were also wrong when they attempted to eliminate all
of the racial segregation in a school system. He proposed that the
courts constitutionally should limit their actions to undoing the effects
of official discrimination. He maintained that a very large proportion
of school segregation by race and by social class is due to individual
actions with which the courts should not interfere.
Coleman also "speculated" on the social psychological difficulties of
big city schools. Desegregation seemed to cause "white flight" in only
the largest central-city districts, he advanced, due to a much greater
feeling of inability to have any impact on the schools, and because the
schools cannot maintain order or protect children. He even voiced the
opinion that this feeling stems from the failure of big city schools "to
control lower class black children."
When pressed for policy recommendations, Coleman advocated ac-
tivities that encourage racial intermarriage.
All this was big news. Almost at once, newspapers throughout the
Nation ran "Coleman" stories; and conservative editorialists had a
field day. Educational writers on additional newspapers and news
magazines began to seek their own interviews with Coleman. Rarely,
if ever, has a sociologist been so sought out by the media for his
opinions. While he had earlier been reluctant to deal with the media,
soon he granted a dozen or more separate interviews, many of them
by phone.
In July, Coleman flew to troubled Boston and participated in an
hour-long question-and-answer commercial television program entitled
"Another Look at Busing," on WNAC-TV. He began by admitting
that his "very appearance may be mischievous" in Boston, since the
court ruling had already been handed down, but he continued to at-
tack the Federal courts for moving against the segregation caused by
what he saw as "individual action."
The New Analysis and the Second Coleman Report
As the questioning of his initial analysis grew more widespread,
Coleman and his colleagues at the Urban Institute undertook a second,138
more sophisticated, and sharply different analysis in a second, 67-page
document dated July 28, 1975, and entitled, "Trends in School
Segregation, 1968—73."
x This second paper was distributed to a small
number of social scientists who were invited to attend a 1-day discus-
sion with Coleman at the Urban Institute on August 4.
The new analysis attempted to ascertain the average effect of
desegregation upon the loss of white students between each of the 6
school years from 1968 to 1973. In other words, unlike his initial anal-
ysis which looked at white student loss during 1970-73 after
desegregation in 1968-70, Coleman now looked for the concurrent ef-
fect of desegregation in the same year. Thus, reductions in desegrega-
tion in 1968-69 were related to white student losses in 1968-69, and
so on for each of the 6 years across the 69 central cities. Once again
the sample was somewhat arbitrarily split into two on the basis of
system size.
The results, which were not made available until October, are ob-
tained through use of a set of prediction equations and consist of the
regression coefficients together with their standard errors in
parentheses and the variance accounted for by the predictors (see
table la). In several cases the standard errors are larger than the coef-
ficients implying that many of the variables contribute little to the pre-
diction. The two equation l's use only three variables to predict white
student loss: annual changes in public school desegregation (AR), the
proportion of black student enrollment (Prop, black), and the natural
log number of total students (In N). About 29 percent of the variance
in white student changes among the largest cities and about 26 percent
of the variance for the medium-sized cities are explained by these
three variables.
The second set of equations do not substantially improve the predic-
tion. They add two more predictors—the degree of interdistrict school
segregation in the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (R SMS A)
and the interaction of desegregation with the South (AR X SOUTH).
About 36 percent and 35 percent, respectively, of the variance of an-
nual white student change are accounted for by this array of five pre-
dictors.
The interesting and dramatic increase in predictive power for the
largest cities occurs in equation 3. Here three more predictors have
1 J. S. Coleman, S. D. Kelly, and J. Moore, "Trends in School Segregation, 1968-73."
(Unpublished second version, July 28, 1975) Urban Institute, Washington, D.C.
(hereafter referred to as Coleman Two). Note that the hardening of Coleman's political
position is reflected in the shift of the title from "school integration" in the first version
to "school segregation" in all later versions.1
3
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TABLE 1
Prediction of White Enrollment Changes (1968-73)
for Various Subsets of Large School Districts
First-Order Correlations Partial Correlations
A. Prop, of B. Desegregation C. Natural Log D. 3 Variable E. Prop. Black F. Desegregation
Blacks, 1968-73 System Size, Multiple with Size and with Size and
1968 1972 Correlation Desegregation Prop. Black
Held Constant Held Constant
A. Original 19 +.610 -.062 +.003 .612 +.610 +.059
Districts
B. Original Districts +.522 -.026 -.048 .535 +.531 +.087
Plus Denver and
San Francisco
C. 27 Districts Whose +.577 -.174 -.081 .583 +.556 +.023
Cities Rank in 50
Largest
D. 21 Districts of B. +.516 -.256 +.034 .525 +.470 -.108
Plus Miami, Jackson-
ville, Nashville, and
Ft. Lauderdale
E. Full 30 Districts +.574 -.298 +.020 .584 +.523 -.123
Data Sources: For the original 19 "largest" school districts plus those of Denver, San Francisco, Albuquerque, Newark, Charlotte, Cincinnati,
and Seattle, the data for these analyses are taken from J. S. Coleman, S. D. Kelly, J. A. Moore, "Trends in school segregation, 1968-73." The
Urban Institute, Washington, D. C, August 1975; Appendix 3. For the four cities omitted from Coleman's analyses and Appendix 3 (Miami,
Ft. Lauderdale, Jacksonville, and Nashville), enrollment data are from the same HEW source utilized by Coleman; and the desegregation
estimates are taken from Farley's index for elementary desegregation, 1967-72, which for other districts closely approximate those of Coleman's
index for all grade levels, 1968-73.140
TABLE la
Coleman's Basic Regression Coefficients for Analyses
of White Student Loss to Central Cities
Equation 1 "Largest" 21 Next 46
AR (desegregation) .279 (.062) .056 (.026)
Prop, black students -.133 (.028) -.090 (.014)
In N (system size) .000 (.008) -.042 (.010)
Constant .013 .452
R
2 .29 .26
Number of
Observations (105) (226)
Including interdistrict segregation in SMSA, and
interaction of desegregation with South:
Equation 2
AR (desegregation) .199 (.156) -.148 (.137)
Prop, black students -.044 (.039) -.035 (.016)
In N (system size) .066 (.008) -.041 (.010)
R SMSA -.165 (.050) -.110 (.021)
AR x S .143 (.170) .242 (.137)
Constant -.059 .438
R
2 .36 .35
Including interactions of desegregation with proportion
black and interdistrict segregation, and also including
South as a dummy variable:
Equation 3
AR (desegregation) -.459 (.184) -.349 (.151)
Prop, black students .051 (.037) -.026 (.019)
In N (system size) .003 (.006) -.039 (.009)
R SMSA -.210 (.044) -.102 (.025)
AR x South .148 (.198) .244 (.145)
AR x Prop, black 1.770 (.307) .511 (.215)
AR x R SMSA .561 (.494) .894 (.314)
South -.006 (.010) -.002 (.006)
Constant -.089 .414
R
2 .60 .40
Source: J. S. Coleman, S. D. Kelly, and J. A. Moore, "Insert for trends in school segregation,
1968-73." (Unpublished erratum, October 1975) Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., p. 37.141
been inserted: a dummy (dichotomous) variable for the South and the
interactions of change in desegregation with both interdistrict
metropolitan segregation (AR X R SMS A) and the black proportion
of students (AR X PROP. BLACK). Now 60 percent of the variance
is explained by this eight-variable prediction. But this improvement is
largely a function of the interaction between annual desegregation
changes in a school system and the system's proportion of black pupil
enrollment.
The predictive power of this interaction suggests that so-called
"white flight" is not so much a function of desegregation per se as it
is of the conditional relationship between desegregation in particular
situations related to the percentage of black children in a large central
city's public schools.
Coleman next attempted to determine if the loss of whites he at-
tributes to desegregation was largely confined to the first year of the
process or continued on into later years. Though his results on this
point are erratic, he concluded that the presumed effect of desegrega-
tion was concentrated in the first year. Then, in partial answer to his
critics who had stressed additional variables related to so-called "white
flight," Coleman tried to hold constant factors unique to each city by
introducing into the regression equations a dummy (dichotomous)
variable for each city. This effort at statistical control only slightly
reduced the equation 1 coefficient for desegregation in predicting
changes in the total number of white pupils in the large cities (from
+.277 to +.258); but it does not remove the need for more indepen-
dent variables.
2
Finally, Coleman carried out what he reported as a full analysis of
covariance that considered not only the rate of desegregation and
dummy variables for each city but also the statistical interactions
between them (see table lb). While of the large cities used in his anal-
ysis only eight actually had substantial desegregation, the public furor
was supposedly based on these analyses. Two of the estimates involve
actual gains in white students; four others have only modest estimated
losses in white students (from 2.6 percent to 7.9 percent): The only
estimates approaching a "massive" loss—as often cited in the
press—involve Memphis and Atlanta. Note, too, that the average esti-
mated loss for the eight cities is only 5.2 percent. And without Mem-
phis and Atlanta, the average is only 1.5 percent. Again we see what
2 The use by Coleman of dummy variables for each city is ingenious, but it includes
unmeasured variables only if they are constant over the entire period. Many of the addi-
tional variables that have been suggested probably do not possess such consistency.142
TABLE lb
Reduction in Segregation 1968-1973, Expected and Actual Loss
of White Students 1969-1973, 22 Largest Central City Districts
Proportion of Whites Present
in 1969 Lost by 1973
District
1. New York
2. Los Angeles
3. Chicago
4. Philadelphia
5. Detroit
6. Houston*
7. Baltimore
8. Dallas*
9. Cleveland
10. Washington
11. Memphis*
12. Milwaukee
13. San Diego*
14. Columbus, Ohio
15. Tampa*
16. St. Louis
17. New Orleans*
18. Indianapolis*
19. Boston
20. Atlanta*
21. Denver*
22. San Francisco*
Reduction in
Segregation
( + ) .03
.07
( + ) -02
( + ) .08
.04
.17
.02
.22
( + ) -02
.04
.61
.02
.13
.04
.74
( + ) -03
.15
.28
( + ) .03
.37
.38
.31
Expected (based on
city's 1968-69 loss)
.11
.15
.16
.13
.33
.19
.10
.05
.21
.36
( + ) 10
.07
.01
.07
( + ) 09
.17
.14
.10
.11
.26
.09
.39
Actual
.16
.20
- .25
.13
.30
.29
.16
.25
.12
.42
.37
.16
.08
.12
( + ) -11
.25
.38
.24
.15
.59
.20
.33
* Average for 10 cities which had 0.1
or more reduction in segregation
Average for 12 cities which had less
than 0.1 reduction in segregation
.10
.17
.26
.20
'Expected loss equals 1 -(l-x)\ where x equals the proportion white students lost in 1968-69.143
a crucial role just two atypical southern cities play in Coleman's public
argument against court-ordered urban school desegregation throughout
the United States. His own conclusion was less specific: "They show
that the estimated white loss does vary considerably from city to city,
and that the average loss rate specified earlier obscures very different
loss rates in different cities."
3 Unfortunately, Coleman has consistently
failed to make this point forcefully in his Boston television appearance,
his court affidavits, and his many public interviews.
The Urban Institute Meeting Response
The Urban Institute called a meeting at its offices in Washington on
August 4 to review in detail this second draft.
4 Coleman, his coauthor
Sara Kelly, and the president of the institute, William Gorham, chaired
the 1-day session. The attendees included Tom Pettigrew. The criti-
cisms and reservations concerning the second paper expressed by the
review panel centered on three domains: (1) the political context of
the study; (2) the demographic context of the study; and (3)
methodological issues.
The political context. Coleman opened the meeting by asking the
group to limit comments to the research paper under discussion rather
than to his opinions on the subject that had attracted so much public
attention. This request was politely rejected by many present on two
grounds. First, his opinions had been advanced in the mass media as
if they derived directly from this research. Second, both the design and
the interpretation of the study were heavily influenced by its author's
opinions. Separation of the research from Coleman's much-publicized
opinions was clearly unrealistic.
There was general agreement that the research did not involve many
of the subjects that the public thought it involved. Hence, the research
was not about achievement, classroom disruptions, and the behavior of
poor black children—all subjects about which Coleman had expressed
opinions in his interviews. It was not even about "busing" and court
orders. In fact, it was not strictly speaking even about "white flight,"
a label that prejudges the cause of the phenomenon. Rather it con-
cerned changes in white student enrollment in urban public school
systems as a function of school desegregation achieved by any means.
3 Coleman Two, p. 62; J.S. Coleman, S.D. Kelly, and J. Moore, "Trends in School
Segregation, 1968-73." (Unpublished paper, August 15, 1975) Urban Institute,
Washington, D.C., p. 62 (hereafter referred to as Coleman Three); and J.S. Coleman,
S.D. Kelly, and J. Moore, Trends in School Segregation, 1968-73 (fourth version).
Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, August 1975; pp. 71-72 (hereafter referred to as
Coleman Four).
4 A partial, edited transcript of this meeting is available from the Urban Institute
(2100 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20037).144
Even the design of the study reflected its political context. It had
been set up to test the narrow question of whether the racial
desegregation of urban schools leads to a greater loss of white stu-
dents. If one set out to formulate a complex causal model of changes
in white student enrollment, one would proceed quite differently, ask
far broader questions, and utilize a greater variety of predictor varia-
bles.
The demographic context. Precisely because the study had been
designed and interpreted so narrowly, the broader demographic con-
text of the problem was virtually ignored. The problem was being
viewed by Coleman, noted one demographer, in a "vacuum." The
growing concentration of whites in the suburbs and blacks in the cen-
tral cities has been a massive phenomenon over the past three decades.
Without a trend extending back before 1968 in which to view this re-
sidential segregation of the races within the Nation's metropolitan
areas, any study that considers only the 1968 to 1973 period will
necessarily be myopic and misleading.
As it stands, the study pays little attention to possible annexations
of white suburbs into central cities, confounds race with social class,
ignores differences across cities in residential segregation patterns, and
does not allow for differential birth rates by race. White student totals
declined during this period partly as a function of the rapidly falling
white birth rate in the 1960s, the failure of whites to move into the
central city in typical numbers, the changing white age structure, and
the rise in noneducational urban problems that drove both white and
black families out of the city.
Further, Coleman assumes that any loss of white students beyond
the "expected" number in the year of desegregation was necessarily
"white flight"—white families with schoolage children fleeing interra-
cial schools for white private and suburban schools. But this assump-
tion is only inferred from aggregate data; not one white family was ac-
tually asked about its motivations. There is a great danger, then, of
committing a classic ecological fallacy—incorrectly inferring individual
motives from only aggregate data.
5 This problem is heightened by the
fact that Coleman bases his entire policy argument upon "individual
action," yet he did not measure these actions directly. Enrollment data
from individual schools within systems would have narrowed this
problem, but such data are not readily available.
Methodological issues. The review panel criticized strongly the use of
average "effects" derived from the regression equations. And nu-
* See the discussion of the ecological fallacy by W.S. Robinson, H. Menzel, and H.
C. Selvin reprinted in: S.M. Lipset and N.J. Smelser (editors), Sociology: The Progress
of a Decade. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961; pp. 132-152.145
merous panel members expressed reservations about presenting any ef-
fect estimates when: (1) a third of the standard errors were larger than
their coefficients; and (2) many of the variables are predicting very lit-
tle. A misspecified model is particularly dangerous to use for predicted
"effects." Yet these questionable average "effect" estimates were
widely cited in interviews and discussions of Coleman's position.
The panel also focused upon the dependent variable. White pupil
changes in enrollment, after all, constitute a single net indicator of
gains as well as losses. The inability to decompose it into its many con-
stituent parts severely limits the interpretation of the findings.
Moreover, the causal sequence inferred from the correlation between
desegregation and white enrollment shifts, the panel noted, may often
be wrong. In Detroit, Birmingham (Alabama), Atlanta, and Memphis,
a large reduction in white students occurred first and was then fol-
lowed by desegregation. For example, Atlanta's major school
desegregation effort did not occur until 1972-73, but its public school
system had reached 62 percent black enrollment 4 years earlier.
Mention of Atlanta and Memphis raises again the recurrent theme
of the critical importance in Coleman's results of these two special
cases. In most of his interviews, Coleman cited both of these cities to
support his position against court-ordered desegregation in central ci-
ties. But these cities are extreme cases and disproportionately con-
tribute to his findings. Recall that his results are strongest for large ci-
ties in the South. It was suggested that if this study were to be taken
as a guideline to future national policy then the presumed effects of
urban desegregation should be demonstrated for the subset of large
central cities with Atlanta and Memphis removed from the analysis.
Perhaps the most serious question raised by the review panel con-
cerned the failure of earlier research to uncover Coleman's key result
linking reductions in school segregation with reductions in the numbers
of white pupils. Jane Mercer and Terrence Scout of the University of
California at Riverside, for instance, had earlier shown no demo-
graphic differences between 23 desegregating school districts and 67
nondesegregating California districts.
6
More perplexing than the Mercer-Scout failure to replicate
Coleman's basic finding on a set of districts limited to California are
the similarly negative results reported by Reynolds Farley using na-
tional data from the same source as used by Coleman.
7 Farley failed
to uncover a significant relationship between the two variables in cities
of either the South or the North.
6 J.R. Mercer and T.M. Scout, "The relationship between school desegregation and
changes in the racial composition of California school districts, 1963-73." (Unpublished
paper) Sociology Department, University of California, Riverside, 1974; p. 28.
7 R. Farley, "Racial Integration in the public schools, 1967 to 1972: Assessing the
effects of governmental policies," Sociological Focus, January 1975, 8(\), 3-26; and R.146
Farley's research, however, differed from that of Coleman's in five
ways. (1) Farley used a larger sample of cities, 50 in the South and
75 in the North. Rather than limiting his sample, he considered all ci-
ties with a 1970 population of 100,000 or more and at least 3 percent
of their public school enrollments black. He also ran analyses with just
the 20 largest cities of each region. (2) Farley investigated the 1967
to 1972 period rather than Coleman's 1968 to 1973. (3) Rather than
relate annual changes in the variables to each other, as in Coleman's
second analysis, Farley related the variables across the entire 5-year
span. (4) Farley employed only elementary school data, while
Coleman employed data from all grades. This difference, however,
should have been unimportant, since Coleman showed no differences
across the grades. (5) Farley used a dissimilarity index for his measure
of school segregation, which differs from the index used by Coleman.
These two indices both measure whether black and white students at-
tend the same schools and are independent of the school districts' ra-
cial compositions. For a sample of 2,400 school districts, it has been
shown that the two indices are correlated at +.88.
8
Farley was unable to show for either his extensive urban samples or
for his subsamples of the largest cities any systematic relationship
between white loss and school desegregation. He concluded:
To be sure when public schools are desegregated or when they
become predominantly black, some white parents—perhaps
many—hasten their move away from the central city. However,
whites are moving out of central cities for many other reasons. We
have shown that cities whose schools were integrated between
1967 and 1972 did not lose white students at a higher rate than
cities whose schools remained segregated.
9
Why should the two studies with comparable data reach opposite
conclusions?
Farley offered two possible explanations for the diverse results. The
1-year effect that Coleman uncovered may well represent oniy a
hastening of some whites to leave the central city who were about to
do so in any event. Once a longer span of years is viewed, as in Far-
ley's analysis, this "hastening" effect disappears. Farley's second sug-
Farley, "School integration and white flight." (Unpublished paper) University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, July 1975 (delivered at the Symposium of School
Desegration and White Flight held at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., Au-
gust 15,1975.
8 Barbara Zolotch, "An investigation of alternative measures of school segregation,"
Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers, University of Wisconsin, Madison,
Wisconsin, 1974.
9 Farley (July 1975), op. cit., p. 10147
gested answer involves again the special role played by Atlanta and
Memphis in Coleman's more limited sample.
The Interviews Continue
The media continued to devote attention to Coleman's views
throughout August and September. The New York Times Magazine of
August 24 printed yet another interview entitled "INTEGRATION,
YES: BUSING NO," in which Coleman repeated his now-familiar ar-
guments, including his "entitlement" idea for central-city children to
choose any school in their metropolitan area. Intermeshed with his
discussion of his research were renewed attacks upon "busing."
Coleman did, however, introduce two new pieces of data into his ar-
gument, both of which are questionable. He stated flatly that: "Surveys
indicate that a majority of blacks as well as whites oppose busing."
This conflicts with the results of a November 1974 Gallup survey,
which established that 75 percent of "nonwhite" respondents in a na-
tional sample favored "busing school children to achieve better racial
balance in schools."
1
0 He also presented his big-city data for the first
time in an unconventional fashion to indicate that desegregation causes
additional "white flight":
Eleven cities out of the first 19 experienced little or no desegrega-
tion at all between 1968 and 1973. Based on the white loss that
occurred in these 11 cities in 1968-69, they would have been ex-
pected to lose 15 percent of white students between 1969 and
1973; their actual loss was 18 percent, only slightly greater than
expected. Eight cities experienced some desegregation; some of
those experienced large desegregation, others not so large. Those
eight cities, based on their losses in 1968-69, before desegregation
occurred, would have been expected to lose only 7 percent of
white students between 1969 and 1973; they actually lost 26 per-
cent, nearly four times what would have been expected.
This misleading statement actually refers to a third analysis,
completely different from the two previously described. It makes no
use whatsoever of the earlier regressions and appeared for the first
time in the fourth version of Coleman's ever-changing study.
1
1 But
Coleman continued to dwell on this new analysis almost exclusively in
his second Boston court affidavit and later public statements. Con-
sequently, we shall later have to take a close look at this third analysis.
Many leading newspapers now began to run more critical
"Coleman" stories. Reservations about Coleman's research were now
expressed, and questions raised as to the validity of his often-quoted
1
0 Gallup Opinion Index Report 113. Princeton, N.J.: The American Institute of Public
Opinion, November 1974.
1
1 Coleman Four, pp. 69-70148
opinions. William Grant, the Detroit Free Press education writer
(August 19, 1975), contrasted the sociologist's cautious style when in
academic settings with his free-wheeling style when talking with repor-
ters. Grant emphasized how many of Coleman's views went "well
beyond" his research and how few desegregated cities were actually in-
volved in the study. John Matthews, a Washington Star staff writer
(September 4, 1975), provided a detailed description of the study
under the banner, "IS COURT-ORDERED DESEGREGATION SELF-
DEFEATING?" Unlike early stories, Matthews took pains to describe
the many cities, such as Fort Lauderdale, Tampa, and Charlotte, where
Coleman's predictions of massive "white flight" in the face of large-
scale educational desegregation had not proven true. He also cited
Farley's conflicting research at length. Likewise, Steve Twomey, the
education writer for The Philadelphia Inquirer, wrote an extensive arti-
cle that considered both Coleman's position and that of his critics.
Twomey stressed Coleman's novel metropolitan "entitlement" strategy.
He also quoted Coleman's description of his critics: "There are a lot
of old people who would rather pursue a common path and attempt
to ignore the fact that this [desegregation] may be having unintended
and undesired consequences."
1
2
Coleman continued these unfortunate ad hominem attacks upon his
critics in his second participation in the Boston school desegregation
case. On August 27, 1975, while attending the annual convention of
the American Sociological Association in San Francisco, he provided
an affidavit for the prosegregationist Boston Home and School As-
sociation. He predicted that "full-scale desegregation in Boston, occur-
ring this fall, will have substantial effects in bringing about an addi-
tional loss of whites." And he closed his affidavit with a personally-
directed blast at the present authors:
I cannot conclude without mentioning what seems to me an unfor-
tunate phenomenon in social science. On certain questions, there
appears to be a kind of conspiracy of silence, and then a rush to
the attack when anyone dares to break the silence. I have the im-
pression thai if Professors Green and Pettigrew saw the fires in the
sky during the riots of 1967, they would have attributed them to
an extraordinary display of the Northern Lights. I believe that it
does no one any good in the long run for us to blind ourselves
to reality, because it is reality, not our fond hopes about it, which
measures the effectiveness of government actions.
1
3
1
2 We question the phrase "a lot of old people." Most of his social science critics
(e.g., Farley, Gary Orfield, Christine Rossell, even the writers) are younger than
Coleman himself. In addition, surveys of the racial beliefs of white Americans con-
sistently show that Coleman's opinions are most shared among older respondents, most
opposed among younger respondents.
1
3 Reply Affidavit of James S. Coleman, Morgan et al. v. Kerrigan et al.. United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, August 28, 1975, pp. 1-2.149
Critical Review Continues
August and September witnessed further review of Coleman's work
by social scientists and lawyers. A 1-day "Symposium on School
Desegregation and White Flight" was held on August 15, 1975, at the
Brookings Institute in Washington, D.C. It was cosponsored by the
Center for National Policy Review of the Catholic University Law
School and the Center for Civil Rights of Notre Dame University.
Coleman produced for the occasion yet another draft of his paper.
While its preface thanked and listed by name the members of the earli-
er review panel, this third version was essentially the same as the
second draft and reflected little response to the panel's many criti-
cisms. But the final paragraph avoided the loaded term "white flight"
and revealed a slightly less dogmatic interpretation that the loss of
whites: "***is intensified by extensive school desegregation in those
central cities, but in cities with high proportion of blacks and predomi-
nantly white suburbs, it proceeds at a relatively rapid rate with or
without desegregation.
1
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The basic thrust of this conclusion would be agreed to by virtually
all specialists in the field. Indeed, the metropolitan character of the
problem has been obvious to many for several decades, which is why
legal cases seeking metropolitan relief for school segregation have
been in the courts for almost a dozen cities. What is at issue is whether
court-ordered desegregation entirely within central cities significantly
hastens the development of two racially separate Americas—black cen-
tral cities and white suburbs. This question is far different, and cer-
tainly has less policy relevance, than the simple "busing backfires" ar-
gument that Coleman's numerous press interviews had led the Nation
to focus upon.
A recent critical review of Coleman's latest revision carried out by
Joseph M. Wisenbaker of Michigan State University points to a
number of potentially important flaws in the methodology employed by
Coleman in his attempt to analyze the relationship between desegrega-
tion and the decline in the proportion of white students. In his review
Wisenbaker examined a number of points ranging from a very crucial
criticism of Coleman's unit of analysis all the way to specific averaging
techniques used on the regression coefficients themselves. For exam-
ple, Coleman's use of dummy variables is a rather ineffective attempt
to control for differences among cities unrelated to those of school at-
tendance. For them to be effective in this regard, Wisenbaker points
out that all other variables must be assumed to be constant over the
1
4 Coleman Three, pp. 68-69. This. conclusion was retained in the fourth version
(Coleman Four, pp. 79-80).150
6-year period—a very stringent and likely unjustifiable assumption. In-
deed, his conclusion based on the methodological shortcomings he sees
in Coleman's analyses questions the very usefulness of Coieman's
results from the standpoint of anyone trying to understand the relation-
ship between desegregation and "white flight."
1
5
If even Coleman's continued analyses reveal increasingly smaller ef-
fects, it is hardly surprising that other investigators at the symposium
reported results that contrast markedly with the much-heralded fears
of "white flight" caused by desegregation. For example, Michael Giles,
of Florida Atlantic University, reported on his detailed desegregation
research in seven diverse school districts in Florida.
1
6 Since these dis-
tricts were all county-wide, residential relocation was impractical and
private schools offered the only mechanism of "white flight." He re-
ported that the avoidance of desegregation among whites under these
conditions was unrelated to racial prejudice or to "busing," was
greatest among upper-status families, and was least for schools with
less than 30 percent black student bodies. He recommended
metropolitan solutions to problems of urban educational desegregation.
Luther Munford, of the Law School of the University of Virginia,
presented the results from his study of 30 school districts in Mississippi
undergoing extensive school desegregation from 1968 to 1970. He at-
tacked the notion of an inevitable "tipping point," and demonstrated
that, for his sample, "white flight" was explained by "the black/white
ratio in the population as a whole rather than just the ratio in the
schools.
1
7 The black population proportion explained 88 percent of the
district variance in the loss of white enrollment across the 30 districts;
and three-fourths of even the majority-black schools in these districts
actually increased or maintained their white student percentage
between spring and fall of 1970 after the segregationist resistance had
subsided.
'•' For a full description of this analysis, see "A Critique of 'Trends in School Segrega-
tion, 1968-73'," by Joseph M. Wisenbaker, College of Urban Development, Michigan
State University.
1
8 M.W. Giles, E.F. Cataldo, and D.S. Gatlin, "Desegregation and the Private School
Alternative." (Unpublished paper) Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, Florida
(delivered at the Symposium on School Desegregation and White Flight held at the
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, August 15, 1975). See also: E.F. Cataldo,
M.W. Giles, D.S. Gatlin, and D. Athos, "Desegregation and White Flight," Integrated
Education, January-February 1975. 13, pp. 3-5.
1
7 Luther Munford, "Schools that quit 'tipping' in Mississippi." (Unpublished paper
delivered at the Symposium on School Desegregation and White Flight held at the
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, August 15, 1975), p. 7. See also: Luther Mun-
ford, "White flight from desegregation in Mississippi," Integrated Education, May-June
1973, //.151
Another paper, by Gary Orfield, a political scientist at Brookings,
provided the symposium with a political analysis of "white flight
research." "Too often," he warned, "selective, half-digested reports of
preliminary research findings are disseminated by the media and
become weapons in the intense political and legal battle being fought
in major cities."
1
8 He emphasized the complexities involved in sorting
out the various forces working toward accelerated suburbanization. "It
is impossible now," he concluded, "to demonstrate that school integra-
tion, in itself, causes substantial white flight."
1
9 Orfield described the
severe long-term problem of "flight" from the central city as not
caused by desegregation but as often undermining the viability of the
process. The inner suburbs will soon face the same demographic trend.
The problem, then, does not simply translate into the need for housing
integration. Indeed, he argues, "It is hard to imagine how stable hous-
ing integration, involving large numbers of blacks, could be achieved
in any reasonable period of time without a framework of area-wide in-
tegrated schools."
2
0 His conclusion echoes a widespread consensus
among race relations specialists: "There is no evidence that stopping
school desegregation would stabilize central city racial patterns. If
those patterns are to be significantly modified, positive, coordinated,
and often metropolitan-wide desegregation efforts will probably be
required."
2
1
Christine Rossell, a political scientist at Boston University and a
former student of Coleman's at Johns Hopkins University, took issue
with Coleman at the annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association in San Francisco.
2
2 Rossell's paper provided evidence that
conflicted with both Coleman's opinions about the political process
surrounding desegregation as well as his findings about "white flight."
In part, Rossell directed her analyses to the question of "white
flight." She, like Farley and Coleman, made use of the school
desegregation data gathered by the Office for Civil Rights of the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. But she went further
by collecting directly from each district whenever possible data prior
1
8 Gary Orfield, "White flight research: Its importance, perplexities, and possible pol-
icy implications." (Unpublished paper) Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., August
1975 (delivered at the Symposium on School Desegregation and White Flight held at
the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, August 15, 1975), p. 1.
1
9 Ibid., p. 2.
2
0 Ibid., p. 16.
2
1 Ibid., p. 21.
2
2 Christine H. Rossell, "The Political and social impact of school desegregation pol-
icy: A preliminary report." (Unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the
American Political Science Association, September 4, 1975) San Francisco, CA; C.H.
Rossell, "The effect of s</"Ov' desegregation on white ~Mght," Political Science Quarterly,
Winter 1975, 92, in press.152
to 1967 and specific information behind its desegregation process. All
told, Rossell assembled data on 86 northern and western districts; 26
had no desegregation, while 60 had had varying degrees of desegrega-
tion but only 11 of these were actually under court orders (see table
lc). This closer look at the process allows Rossell to develop a
detailed slope analysis of the pre- and postdesegregation experience of
each district. Like Coleman, she also checked directly on racial enroll-
ments in the same year as major desegregation took place in the dis-
trict.
Rossell's data is summarized under five categories of districts: cities
with court-ordered desegregation; those that reassigned over 20 percent
of their pupils for desegregation (High Desegregation); those that reas-
signed between 5 and 20 percent (Medium Desegregation); those that
reassigned less than 5 percent (Low Desegregation); and, finally the
control group that reassigned no children whatsoever for desegregation.
There are no significant differences among any of these five classes of
districts between the pre- and postdesegregation years in the declining
white student percentages. The failure for the court-ordered districts
to reveal any special trend is especially noteworthy in light of
Coleman's repeated attacks upon the Federal judiciary and the alleged
unintended "white flight" consequences of their far-reaching orders.
Recall that Coleman, himself, has never checked specifically on those
urban districts that were under court orders.
Using an entirely different methodology from that of Farley, then,
Rossell reaches the same negative conclusion. In her extensive sample
of northern urban districts, there is no relationship between desegrega-
tion and "white flight." And, as with Farley's results, the question
arises: Why do Rossell and Coleman reach such different conclusions?
Again we must consider the differences in their approaches and data.
Though both investigators based their work on the HEW data, Ros-
sell expanded her data base considerably. In addition to HEW's
1968-72 data, she utilized the agency's 1967 data which Coleman in-
explicably ignored. She also obtained as much information as is availa-
ble from before 1967. This expansion of her data base further back
into the 1960's allowed Rossell to develop more accurate and reliable
predesegregation racial enrollment trends. Coleman, we noted earlier,
in his third analysis based his calculations on the single base year of
1968.
But the most fundamental differences between the Rossell and
Coleman studies are their contrasting operational definitions of the two
key concepts—"white flight" and "desegregation." Coleman defines
"white flight" as the percentage change in the absolute number of
white students. This definition meets some popular ideas about the1
5
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TABLE lc
CHANGES IN THE WHITE STUDENT PERCENTAGE BEFORE AND AFTER SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
I Change in % White Students Major Change in % White Students
Students Court -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 Plan +0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 Signif. Pre- Post- Total
School District Reassigned Ordered Years Years Years Years Years Years Year Date Years Year Years Years Years Years Years Years Level Slope Slope Deseg.
Pasadena,
Calif. 98.48 yes -2.7 -1.5 -1.9 -2.1 -2.0 -2.4 1970 -4.2 -4.5 -2.5* .01,.05 -2.0 -3.5 100.8
Pontiac,
Mich. 83.47 yes -1.3 -1.0 -3.0 -3.1* -1.7 -2.4* 1971 -5.4 -.4 .02,.02 -2.2 -.4 87.09
Berkeley,
Calif. 57.72 -2.2* -2.2 .7 -1.6 1968 -2.2 -.6 -.8 .2 .9 N.S. -2.2 -.4 66.32
Wichita,
Kan. 44.36 * -.8* -.4 -.4* -1.0* -1.0* 1971 -1.3 -1.4 N.S. -.7 -1.4 56.63
San Francisco,
Calif. 42.49 yes -2.9 -1.2 0 -4.1 -.2 1971 -3.0 -2.1* N.S. -1.6 -2.1 46.58
Ft. Wayne,
Ind. 34.60 -.4 -.5 -1.6 .2 -1.1 1971 -.8 -1.0 N.S. -.8 -1.0 34.00
Waukegan,
111.(el. schs) 31.72 yes -.13 -.35 -7.8 -1.1 1968 -1.8 -1.9 -1.1 -1.0 -1.9 N.S. -3.9 -1.4 31.72
Denver,
Colo. 24.64 yes -1.3 -1.4 -1.5 -.6 1969 -1.5 -2.4* -1.4 -2.0* N.S. -1.3 -1.9 29.77
Providence,
R.I. 24.10 1967 2.0 .2 -.2* -1.7* -1.0 a a a 36.00
Riverside,
Calif. 21.40 .7 -.6* 1966 -1.5 -1.2* .9 -2.2* -1.0 -1.4 -1.5 N.S. -.7 -1.1 38.20
Las Vegas,
Nev. 19.24 yes .3 -.6* -.6* 0 1972 -.8 a a a 30.051
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Table Ic Continued
I Change in 9c White Students Major Change in % White Students
Students Court -7 -5 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 Plan +0 +1 +2 4-3 +4 + 5 +6 +7 Signif. Pre- Post- Total
School District Reassigned Ordered Years Years Years Years Years Years Year Date Years Year Years Years Years Years Years Years Level Slope Slope Deseg.
Evansville,
Ind. 15.77 yes -.1* -2.2 -.3 -.1 1.2* -.3* 1972 -.7 a a a 29.57
Muncie,
Ind. 15.10 .3 -.9 -2.6 1.9 1972 -.3 a a a 15.10
Stamford,
Conn. 13.20 -2.6 -1.3* -.8 -1.8* 1.8 1970 -1.5 -.9 -1.5 N.S. -1.5 -1.2 21.42
Niagara Falls.
N.Y. 11.76 * -.4* -.6 1970 -1.3 -.5 -.7 N.S. -.5 -.6 30.28
Sacramento,
Calif. 11.10 yes * -1.3 1966 -.2 1.2 -.3* -1.0 -1.1 -1.1 -1.0 a a a 19.98
Oklahoma City,
Okla. 10.82 yes -2.2 -1.1 1968 -1.6 -4.9 -1.2* -.4 -1.6 N.S. -1.7 -1.8 11.50
Saginaw.
Mich. 9.60 -2.6 -.5 -.6 -2.3 1972 -2.2 a a a 9.60
Grand Rapids,
Mich. 9.40 1968 -3.1 -.8 -.3 -1.8 -2.2* a a a 10.16
Springfield,
Mass 9.10 -1.8 -1.8 .9* -3.7* 1968 -1.3 -1.9 -2.7 -2.2 -2.0* N.S. -1.4 -2.3 23.05
Ann Arbor,
Mich. 9.00 -.5 1965 -.1 -.1 -.9 -2.3 -.6 -.8 -1.1 -.2* a a a 15.48
Lexington,
Ky. 8.91 1967 .2 0 -.4* -.3 -.4 a a a 9.66
Baltimore,
Md. 7.92 -6.2 -1.5 -4.0 -1.0 -1.1 -.9 1971 -1.1 -1.1 N.S. -2.4 -1.1 7.921
5
5
Table U Continued
I Change in % White Students Major Change in % White Students
Students Court -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 Plan +0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 Signif. Pre- Post- Total
School District Reassigned Ordered Years Years Years Years Years Years Year Date Years Year Years Years Years Years Years Years Level Slope Slope Deseg.
Tulsa,
Okla. 7.83 yes -.1 -.2 -.4 -4.8 -.1 -.6* 1971 -.5* -1.9* N.S. -1.2 -1.9 14.36
Peoria,
111. 7.83 1968 -.8 -.9* -1.0* -1.1* -1.4* a a a 15.86
Cambridge,
Mass. 7.30 -.6 0 -.1 -1.8 0 -1.2 -.9 1972 -.9 2.0 N.S. -.7 1.9 7.3
Lansing,
Mich. 7.18 -.2 -.6 -1.1 -2.2* 1969 -.7 -1.8* -1.4 -2.1* N.S -1.0 -1.7 22.54
Racine,
Wise. 6.80 -1.1* -.4* 1967 -.5 -.4 -.7* -.8 -.1 -.9 N.S -.8 -.6 12.30
Takoma,
Wash, 6.50 -.7 -.7 -.3 1968 -1.4* -.6* -.9 -.9* -.1 N.S. -.6 -.7 9.44
San Bernadino,
Calif. 5.10 -.9* -.1 -.7 1970 -.8 -1.3 -.5 N.S. -.9 -1.0 7.10
Minneapolis,
Minn. 4.90 -.6 -.4 -1.5 -1.0* -13 -1.0* 1971 -1.5 -1.3 N.S. -1.0 -1.3 11.16
Waterbury,
Conn. 4.80 -2.4 -1.3 1970 -.9 -1.7 -.5 N.S. -1.9 -1.5 4.80
Rochester,
N.Y. 4.30 -2.4 -2.5 -1.6 -3.0 -2.8 -2.4* 1971 -3.3 -3.1 N.S. -2.4 -3.1 5.16
Seattle,
Wash. 4.14 -1.0 -1.1* -1.5 -.6 -.8* -.9 -1.6 1971 -1.5 -1.1 N.S. -1.0 -1.1 10.25
Dayton,
Ohio 3.20 -.6 1969 -1.1 -1.4* -2.0 -2.0 a a a 3.961
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Table 1c Continued
I Change in <7r White Students Major Change in % While Students
Students Court -7 -6 ^5 ^4 ~ -2 ~ Plan +0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 Signif. Pre- Post- Total
School District Reassigned Ordered Years Yeats Years Years Years Years Year Date Years Year Years Years Years Years Years Years Level Slope Slope Deseg.
Buffalo.
N.Y. 3.20 1967 -2.5 -4.0' -1.3* -1.3* -1.2 -2.2 a a a 5.79
Warren.
Ohio 2.80 -.5 1969 -.7 -.3 -.5 -.9 a a a 2.80
St. Paul,
Minn. 2.57 1965 * * -1.0 -.5 .7 -.5 a a a 6.77
So. Bend,
Ind. 2.50 • -1.3 -1.0 1970 0 -1.2 -.9 (Less decline than expected) N.S.,.05 -1.2 -1.0 3.80
Rockford.
111. 2.40 .7 1969 .9 -1.3 -.6 -1.1 a a a 2.40
Flint,
Mich. 2.39 -3.5 -1.5* -2.0 1971 -2.9 -1.7 N.S. -2.3 -1.7 3.69
Syracuse,
N.Y. 2.20 -2.6 -1.4 -1.7* 1967 -1.9 -1.8* -1.7 -2.0 -1.7 -2.0* N.S. -1.9 -1.8 3.65
Colorado Springs,
Colo. 2.10 .4* -.3 1971 -.1 -.2 a a a 2.30
Indianapolis,
Ind. 2.02 yes -1.3 -1.0 -.2 -1.4 -1.7 1970 -1.1 -1.9* -1.7* N.S. -1.0 -1.8 3.06
New York,
N.Y. 1.76 -2.0 -1.9 -1.8 -1.6 -2.2 1964 -2.6 -2.9* -2.0* -3.0* -2.9* -}.}* -2.3* -1.4 -1.3,.02,N.S. -1.9 -2.5 7.67
Pittsburgh,
Pa. 1.44 -.3 -.5* 1968 -1.7 -.5* -.5* -.4 -.8 -.8* N.S.,.02 -.4 -.6 3.18
Toledo,
Ohio 1.20 -4.3 1969 -.5* .2 -1.0* -.2 a a a 1.371
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Table 1c Continued
I Change in % While Students Major Change in % White Students
Students Court ~ ^6 ^5 ^4 ^3 ^2 ~ Plan +0 fl +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 4-7 Signif. Pre- Post- Total
School District Reassigned Ordered Years Years Years Years Years Years Year Date Years Year Years Years Years Years Years Years Level Slope Slope Deseg.
Waterloo,
Iowa 1.91 -.6* -.4 1971 -.6 -.4 a a a 2.25
Gary,
Ind. 1.30 1967 -2.2 -1.6 -1.3 -2.4 -1.5* a a a 1.64
Milwaukee,
Wisc. 1.10 * -.3 -2.4 -.3 -2.5 1972 -1.9 a a a 2.02
Louisville,
Ky. .83 -.9 -1.2 -1.0 -.5 1972 -2.2 a a a .83
Des Moines,
Iowa .82 * 0* 1969 -.1 -.4 -.3 -.6 a a a 1.10
Los Angeles,
Calif. 66 .2* -1.5 -1.8* 1971 -1.6 -1.5 a a a 1.56
E. St. Louis,
Ill. .29 1967 -3.7 -2.5* -4.2 -4.3* -4.4 a a a .73
Kansas City,
Mo. .26 -2.4 -1.9 -2.7* -1.6 1969 -1.8 -1.6 -1.9 -2.3* N.S. -2.2 -1.9 .44
Detroit,
Mich. .25 -4.5 -1.8 -1.9 -1.9 1967 -1.3 -1.9 -2.8 -2.0* -1.2* N.S. -2.6 -2.1 .26
San Diego,
Calif. .19 -1.2 -2.0 1967 -5.6 .1 -.5 -.2 -.4 -1.3 N.S.,.01 -1.6 -.4 .19
Chicago,
Ill. .17 -1.4 -1.4 -4.9 1968 -3.7 -1.6* -1.5* -2.0 -1.8* N.S. -2.4 -1.7 .46
Philadelphia,
Pa. .02 -2.0 -3.0 -1.0 -3.3 -1.4 -.9 -1.1 1972 -.1 a a a .021
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Table 1c Continued
I Change in % White Students Major Change in % White Students
Students Court -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 Plan +0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 Signif. Pre- Post- Total
School District Reassigned Ordered Years Years Years Years Years Years Year Date Years Year Years Years Years Years Years Years Level Slope Slope Deseg.
Hartford,
Conn. .01 -3.8 -3.7 -2.5 1968 -3.6 -4.7 -3.7 -1.9 -2.3 N.S. -3.3 -3.8 .01
Control Group:
Akron,
Ohio 0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 — -1.0 -.7 -.9 -.5 -1.1 a a 0
Albany,
N.Y. ' 0 -3.1 -1.8 -2.2 -1.1 -2.1 -1.1 a a 0
Albuquerque,
N. Mex. 0 — -1.3 -.3 -.5 -.4 a a 0
Boston,
Mass. 0 -1.4 -.3 -1.5 — -3.9 -2.5 -1.9 -2.6 -1.9 .05,.01 -1.0 -2.2 0
Camden,
N.J. 0 — -4.4 -2.7 -2.3 -2.8 -1.8 a a a 0
Charleston,
W. Va. 0 — .1 -.2 0 -.1 .1 a a a 0
Cleveland,
Ohio 0 — .2 -1.2 -1.0 .1 -.3 a a a 0
E. Orange,
N. J. 0 — -4.7 -3.9 -3.2 -3.4 -2.6 a a a 0
Erie.
Pa 0 — -.3 -.7 -.6 -.2 -.9 a a a 0
Hamilton,
Ohio 0 — -.2 -.2 .3 -.2 -.2 a a a 01
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Table Ic Continued
I Change in % While Students Major Change in % White Students
Students Court ~~7 ^6 ^5 ^4 ~ ~ ~ Plan +0 +1 +2 + 3 +4 +5 +6 +7 Signif. Pre- Post- Total
School District Reassigned Ordered Years Years Years Years Years Years Year Date Years Year Years Years Years Years Years Years Level Slope Slope Deseg.
Jersey City,
N. J. 0 — -3.9 -2.1 -2.9 -1.0 -2.0 a a a 0
Kansas City,
Kan. 0 — -3.3 -1.6 -.9 -2.0 -1.7 a a a 0
Lima,
Ohio 0 — -1.3 -1.5 -.5 -1.4 .6 a a a 0
Omaha,
Neb. 0 — -1.3 -.6 -.1 -.5 -.6 a a a 0
Newark.
N. J. 0 -3.0 -2.2 — -2.7 -2.9 -.9 -2.0 N.S. -2.6 -1.5 0
Santa Monica,
Calif 0 — .1 -.6 -2.1 -.6 -.9 a a a 0
Trenton,
N. J. 0 — -4.1 -2.2 -1.9 -1.8 -.9 a a a 0
Utica,
N. Y. 0 — -1.3 -.6 -.7 -1.4 -.5 a a a 0
Washington,
D. C. 0 -2.3 -1.9 -1.8 -1.4 -1.5 — -2.1 -.6 -.5 -.6 -.4 N.S. -1.8 -.5 0
Portland,
Ore. 0 -.6 -.3 -.2 — -2.5 -.9 -.6 -.9 -1.1 .02..01 -.4 -.9 0
Passaic,
N. J. 0 — -7.8 -2.6 -3.7 -3.4 -2.4 a a a 0
Paterson,
N. J. 0 — -3.8 -3.1 -3.9 -2.3 -1.5 a a a 01
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Table Ic Continued
I Change in % White Students Major Change in % White Students
Students Court -7 -^6 ~5 ^4 ^3 ^2 ~ Plan +0 +1 + 2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 Signif. Pre- Post- Total
School District Reassigned Ordered Years Years Years Years Years Years Year Date Years Year Years Years Years Years Years Years Level Slope Slope Deseg.
Phoenix.
Ariz. 0 — -1.4 -1.1 0 -1.2 0 a a a 0
Wilmington,
Dela. 0 -3.0 -2.3 -3.4 — -3.9 -7.1 -3.9 -1.3 -1.8 N.S. -2.8 -3.3 0
Youngstown,
Ohio 0 — -.1 -2.0 -1.4 .4 -1.6 a a a 0
Springfield,
Ill. 0 — -.5 -1.1 -.5 -.4 -1.0 a a a 0
a Unable to compute.
Source: Christine H. Rossell, "The Political and Social Impact of School Desegregation
Policy: A Preliminary Report." Paper delivered at the 1975 meeting of the American
Political Science Association in San Francisco, Sept. 2-5, 1975; Table 10.161
phenomenon; but it ignores the relative proportion of whites and the
simultaneous trend in the absolute number of black students. Changes
in the number of white and black students are significantly and posi-
tively associated across urban school districts, and black enrollments
in some central-city systems are beginning to decline. Consequently,
Rossell employs the percentage change in the proportion of white stu-
dents as her definition of "white flight." Notice that this definition
considers both the white and black student trends. Rossell argues
further that it is the white proportion that has political significance and
which may trigger "tipping points" should any exist in the community.
Coleman and Rossell also differ in their conception of desegregation
and how to measure it. Coleman, as we have seen, regards any reduc-
tion in his global, system-wide index of racial segregation in the
schools as evidence of desegregation. He did not seek the origin of
such index reductions. Indeed, his many statements to the press as-
sumed the larger reductions to be achieved by governmental actions
and usually court orders. The New York Times and others, it will be
recalled, noted this to be an inaccurate assumption in many cases. So
Rossell has a direct measure of governmental action for desegregation:
the percentage of students who were reassigned to schools in order to
further racial desegregation.
After all, it is direct governmental action for desegregation, often
requiring special transportation, that Coleman has been so assiduously
campaigning against in his many press interviews, television ap-
pearances, and Federal court affidavits. But where he never measured
such action directly, Rossell did. This difference in procedure leaves
Coleman's analysis open to a major artifact that had been noted by the
August 4 review panel at the Urban Institute: namely, that much of
the lowering of his segregation index in particular cities was not the
result of "desegregation" efforts at all but simply a temporary result
of neighborhood transition. Some of what Coleman labeled "white
flight" caused by school desegregation was actually temporary
desegregation caused by residential "white flight."
A Fourth Analysis
We have, then, three studies that have utilized basically the same
HEW data base on the same problem. Two of them report no relation-
ship between educational desegregation and "white flight"; one reports
a significant relationship—though one not nearly as large as
represented in the mass media. A number of factors have been cited
as possible explanations for this conflict in results between Farley and
Rossell, on the one hand, and Coleman, on the other.162
The present authors recently completed a fourth analysis to lend,
hopefully, some clarification to this complicated analytic puzzle. Our
point is a simple one that was alluded to earlier. Much of Coleman's
effect may be a function of the particular subsets of large urban
systems chosen for analysis and emphasis. The inexplicable exclusion
and inclusion of particular cities into the critical final subset of the
"largest" urban school districts, then, may well enhance the effect at
issue.
We tested this additional explanation for the contradiction between
the three studies for two interrelated reasons. First, Coleman's choice
of the "largest" urban school districts seems somewhat arbitrary on its
face. Second, the scatter diagram in figure 1 suggests that the particu-
lar subsets of cities he chose to analyse did in fact maximize the proba-
bility of his obtaining an association between the loss of white students
and desegregation. Let us explore these two points further.
Recall that Coleman did not list the urban districts in his sample in
his first paper. Only 3 months and hundreds of headlines later was the
list of the 20 "largest" urban school districts revealed. Washington was
immediately dropped for its lack of white students,
2
3 leaving only 19
in this crucial subset of urban districts.
But these are not the largest 19 urban school districts in the United
States. Omitted and never mentioned in any of the four versions of
Coleman's paper are Miami-Dade, Jacksonville-Duval, and Ft. Lau-
derdale-Broward, all county-wide urban systems in Florida. On what-
ever grounds they were excluded, it did not involve the fact that they
are metropolitan districts in Florida; Tampa-Hillsborough is also a
metropolitan district in Florida, yet it was included in spite of being
smaller than the three missing districts. Like Tampa, Miami and
Jacksonville experienced widespread court-ordered desegregation
without a significant decline in their white enrollment. Ft. Lauderdale
actually experienced a 39.2 percent increase in white students from
1968 to 1972 while engaged in an extensive desegregation program.
Thus, the unexplained exclusion of these three huge districts from
Coleman's analysis may have contributed to his finding an effect of
desegregation upon "white flight" where Farley's more inclusive sam-
ple did not.
Further complications were created when, for his second analysis,
Coleman constructed his subset of "largest" urban districts to include
2
3 We would not question the decision to drop Washington because of its tiny percent-
age of white pupils, but we wonder why a comparable cutoff was not also employed for
districts with tiny percentages of black students. Coleman analyzed Garden Grove,
Anaheim, and San Jose, all in California, though they each had less than 2 percent black
school enrollments. This is apparently another example of Coleman's exclusive concen-
tration on white Americans.163
Denver and San Francisco. These two additions, raising the number of
cases from 19 to 21, were made because they "were two of the few
northern cities to undergo extensive desegregation during the period
1968 - 73***."
2
4 Albuquerque, whose system is larger than that of San
Francisco, was excluded by invoking a new criterion: It "is not among the
first 50 in population."
2
5 No mention is made, however, of Nashville-
Davidson, a system larger than San Francisco in an area ranking 30th in
population, which had more court-ordered desegregation during these years
than either Denver or San Francisco.
Nor is a rationale provided for why the line was drawn after San
Francisco. This cutoff is particularly perplexing considering the fact
that the next urban school system in size is that of Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg, North Carolina. This is the district involved in the critical Swann
opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court that Coleman attacked as too
sweeping in his Boston television appearance. Under court orders, this
metropolitan district achieved a larger drop in Coleman's segregation
index than any in his big-city sample save Tampa.
A less arbitrary cutoff could have been achieved by following Far-
ley's procedure of choosing all urban school districts which had over
a certain number of students in a given year. Employing Coleman's
own rankings by 1972 enrollment, a cutoff of all urban districts with
more than 75,000 students would not only have included Miami,
Jacksonville, Ft. Lauderdale, Denver, Nashville, Albuquerque, and San
Francisco but also Charlotte, Newark (New Jersey), Cincinnati, and
Seattle. All of these additional cities are among the Nation's 50 largest
cities except Albuquerque, Ft. Lauderdale, and Charlotte.
To test the effects of these various selections of urban school dis-
tricts, we employed Coleman's time period (1968-73), his definitions
of "white flight" and "desegregation," even his data as provided in ap-
pendix 3 of the fourth version of his paper.
2
6 We also employed the
two principal control variables that Coleman used in both his initial
and later analyses—the black student proportion and the natural
logarithm of the total size of each school system. However, in order
to avoid the error introduced by residential transition, we used Farley's
over-time method of comparing 1968 data with those of 1973 rather
than Coleman's year-by-year procedure.
2
4 Coleman Four, footnote 22, p. 56.
2
5 Ibid., footnote 22, p. 56.
2
6 Ibid., pp. 99-121. We utilized the data for all school levels combined. Later
Coleman discovered that major errors had been made in his analyses of elementary
school enrollments (Coleman Five), but these errors do not affect our present results.
For the four cities omitted from Coleman's analyses and appendix 3 (Miami, Ft. Lau-
derdale, Jacksonville, and Nashville), enrollment data are from the same HEW source
utilized by Coleman; and their desegregation estimates are taken from Farley's index for164
Figure 1 presents our basic data in simplest form. The unmarked
points on the graph are the original 19 of Coleman's big-city analysis;
the two circled points denote Denver and San Francisco that were
later added by Coleman for his final big-city sample of 21; the four
points in triangles denote Miami, Jacksonville, Ft. Lauderdale, and
Nashville that should have been included in the sample of the
country's "largest" urban school districts; and the five points in boxes
denote Albuquerque, Charlotte, Newark, Cincinnati, and Seattle that
would be included if a standard cutoff of 75,000 students in 1972 were
applied.
Figure 1 indicates the relationship between the amount of desegrega-
tion from 1968 to 1973 across the abscissa and the percentage change
in white enrollment over these same years down the ordinate. The
graph is further subdivided at the medians into four quadrants: high
desegregation and low loss of white students; high desegregation and
high loss; low desegregation and low loss; and low desegregation and
high loss. The relationship at issue requires a strong tendency for these
30 cities to lie in a lower-left to upper-right diagonal; that is, they
should fall predominantly in the high desegregation-high loss and the
low desegregation-low loss quadrants.
The first thing to notice about figure 1 is that the heralded positive
association does not exist. Only a minority of the 30 cities fall in the
two predicted quadrants (r = —.30). This replicates Farley's results.
The second thing to notice is how important the two extreme points
in the lower left are for Coleman's argument. Not surprisingly, these
points denote Memphis and Atlanta. Throughout our discussion we
have emphasized how critical these two cities are in Coleman's
statistics; figure 1 shows how unique they are among the Nation's 30
largest urban school systems. Next notice that Denver and especially
San Francisco are in the high desegregation and high loss quadrant; re-
call these are the two districts added as an afterthought for Coleman's
second analysis.
Now check where the points are that denote the nine cities that
should have been included in the big-city sample. Six of the nine are
located in the high desegregation and low loss quadrant, including all
four of the districts larger than that of San Francisco. The remaining
three, Cincinnati, Newark, and Seattle, are located in the low
desegregation and high loss quadrant. In short, the two additions
elementary desegregation, 1967-72, which for other districts closely approximate those
of Coleman's index for all grade levels, 1968-73.165
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Coleman made to his subset of big cities for his second analysis con-
tributed to his obtaining a positive association between these two vari-
ables; the nine he left out would have severely reduced the association.
Figure 2 considers the same 30 urban districts, but relates the 1968
black proportion of the enrollment to the changes in white enrollment
from 1968 to 1973. Note the strong association that now emerges:
Those districts that had relatively high proportions of black students
in 1968 tended to lose the largest proportions of white students over
the next 5 years (r = +.57). Clearly, as Coleman has stated, such a
strong predictor must be controlled before a fair test can be made of
the effect of desegregation.
Just as figure 2 shows spatially, the Pearson correlation coefficients
in table 1 reveal that the key variable is the 1968 black pupil propor-
tion. Its first-order coefficients (column A) in all five samples of cities
are virtually identical with the multiple coefficients obtained with all
three predictors (column D) as well as its partial coefficients obtained
when holding the other two predictors constant (column E). In short,
neither the desegregation nor the system size variables are predicting
the percentage changes in white enrollments over this 5-year span.
Controlling for the proportion black and system size variables in the
partial correlations using desegregation as the predictor does decrease
its negative relationship with white student loss, but the coefficients
remain trivial (columns B and F). Moreover, there are small but in-
teresting changes in these five partial coefficients for desegregation
among the various subsets of cities (column F). Just as figure 1 in-
dicated, there is a slight improvement in the prediction when Denver
and San Francisco are added to the original 19 cities (rows A and B);
from +.059 to +.087). Then there is a drop in the coefficient for the
27 districts whose cities all rank nationally among the top 50 in popu-
lation (row C; from +.087 to +.023). Likewise, there are drops in the
coefficient when the four districts all larger than San Francisco are
added to Coleman's 21 (row D; from +.023 to -.108) and for the full
30 districts (row h; from -.108 to -.123). Indeed, the final two coeffi-
cients show a modest negative relationship between desegregation and
white loss, though they do not approach statistical significance (p =
.27).
This third failure to replicate Coleman's "white flight" results, con-
sistent with the findings of both Farley and Rossell, demonstrates the
critical importance to Coleman's study of the rather special and ar-
bitrary subset of "largest" urban school districts which he chose to
analyze and emphasize.
But the plot thickens further as we push our analysis beyond that
of Coleman's. He largely confined his analysis and interpretation to167
white Americans; yet, obviously, the policy issue even more crucially
involves black Americans. Table 2, then, repeats the analysis of table
1 for the percentage gains in black student enrollment. This analysis
employs the same three independent variables and the same five sub-
sets of large urban districts.
We should first clarify one potentially confusing difference between
tables 1 and 2. In table 1, following Coleman, we were using white
losses in enrollment; now in table 2 we are looking at black gains in
enrollment. This change in focus is caused by the larger demographic
shifts described earlier; 27 out of these 30 districts lost whites between
1968 and 1973, while 25 of the 30 gained blacks. Nevertheless, these
two dependent variables, white losses and black gains, are negatively
correlated (for the full 30 cities, r = -.34, p = .05). In other words, white and
black enrollments across these large urban districts are positively associated,
and thus tended to rise or fall together during this 5-year period.
A comparison of table 2's results with those of table 1 highlights
these related racial trends. The system's proportion of black students
in 1968 remains throughout both tables and all subsets of districts the
principal predictor; the higher the proportion, the greater the white
losses and the smaller the black gains. Apart from directly racial
reasons for these relationships, the fact that both variables react the
same way to cities with high proportion black enrollments suggests that
this variable is also a surrogate for other factors. Thus, large cities with
a high proportion of blacks often have highly unfavorable tax bases
and financial problems (consider New York City's present plight); they
are also often losing employment and have particularly old housing
stocks.
But of greater interest to our present concerns is the contrasting
operation of the desegregation variable in the two tables. In table 1,
we have noted virtually no effect of desegregation upon white losses,
though there was some slight variation according to which subset of
big-city systems was utilized. Yet in table 2, across all five subsets of
districts, desegregation has a modest but consistent positive association
with black gains (column B). Part of this relationship is due to the in-
direct effect that cities with low proportions of blacks have had more
desegregation; thus, the coefficients are substantially reduced when
proportion black and system size are controlled for (column F).
These analyses of white and black student enrollments lead to a con-
clusion that starkly contrasts from that of Coleman's. When viewed in
the perspective of a 5-year trend, desegregation had no discernible ef-
fect on the overriding general trend of white enrollment losses in the
Nation's truly "largest" urban school districts. It is particularly impor-
tant for policymakers to observe that districts which are metropolitan1
6
8
TABLE 2
Prediction of Black Enrollment Changes (1968-73)
for Various Subsets of Large School Districts
First-Order Correlations Partial Correlations
A. Prop, of B. Desegregation C. Natural Log D. 3 Variable E. Prop. Black F. Desegregation
Blacks, 1968-73 System Size, Multiple with Size and with Size and
1968 1972 Correlation Desegregation Prop. Black
Constant Constant
A. Original 19 -.583 +.247 .000 .605 -.565 +.198
Districts
B. Original Districts -.490 +.193 +.056 .515 -.467 +.145
Plus Denver and
San Francisco
C. 27 Districts Whose -.486 +.256 +.162 .527 -.428 +.145
Cities Rank in 50
Largest
D. 21 Districts of B. -.491 +.237 +.060 .517 -.451 +.132
Plus Miami, Jackson-
ville, Nashville, and
Ft. Lauderdale
E. Full 30 Districts -.505 +.283 +.126 .550 -.455 +.175
Data Sources: Same as for Table 1.169
in scope (Miami, Ft. Lauderdale, Jacksonville, Tampa, Nashville, and
Charlotte) are especially immune from the phenomenon (figure 1).
But desegregation may have a small effect in enlarging black enroll-
ments by, perhaps, providing hope to black communities that public
education for their children will improve. This possible black increase
could come about in a variety of ways—an increase in the inflow of
black parents attracted to the district, a decrease in the outflow, or a
cut in the dropout rate of black children. In any event, this suggestion
of an effect of desegregation on black enrollment appears both small
and tentative. Our larger point is simply that a rounded scientific and
policy perspective on interracial processes requires careful attention to
black as well as white Americans. Both Coleman's analysis and policy
arguments focus almost exclusively on whites.
Weaknesses in Coleman's Last Analysis
Recall that the first crude analysis which began the episode was
quietly abandoned in July, while the second analysis produced results
that conflicted with those of other investigators. Hence a third analysis
was introduced. Although it involved the crudest design of all three,
it has been emphasized by Coleman in public statements since last Au-
gust and has been characterized as a "rough test."
Performed on various subsets of what Coleman continued to call the
"largest" central-city school districts, this third analysis developed esti-
mated losses of white students for the years 1969-73 by projecting for-
ward the actual losses during the single year 1968-69. Next Coleman
grouped the districts into two sets for comparison: those that had a
reduction of .10 or more on his school segregation index during the
period 1968-73, and those that did not.
The first problem with this "rough test" is the small and selected
sample. Just 3 of the 10 desegregating districts (the original 8 plus
Denver and San Francisco) provide most of the "effect," and not sur-
prisingly all 3 of these cities are in the Deep South. When Memphis,
Atlanta, and New Orleans are removed from the analysis, the remain-
ing 7 desegregating districts present a different picture (18 percent loss
instead of a predicted 11 percent).
This raises the second problem of the lack of controls. Coleman
emphasizes that this new analysis is "more stringent" because the
1968-69 base-line projections cause each city to act as its own control.
But this ignores the fact that desegregation is now being defined in a
crude, dichotomous fashion and that the lack of control now involves170
differences between these two types of cities.
But the most serious problem with this third analysis is its reliance
upon only one base-line year to establish its projections. One year is
simply too unreliable an estimate upon which to base a whole analysis
for public consumption.
A Proposed Resolution
Since all four analyses basically employ the same HEW data base,
there should be an underlying resolution of the discrepant findings. We
believe there is such a resolution, and it consists of the following six
generalizations that one or more of the four studies support and none
contradict.
(1) There has been an enormous, long-term trend of whites leaving the
central cities for the suburbs and blacks coming into the largest central
cities. This trend began after World War I in many areas, gained mo-
mentum after World War II throughout the Nation, and represents a
"triumph of national housing policy."
2
7 It therefore antedated school
desegregation by decades.
(2) There is agreement among the studies that there is little or no ef-
fect of desegregation on the "'white flight" of students in medium- and
smaller-sized cities. The few apparent exceptions to this generalization
often involved special factors unrelated to desegregation.
(3) There is also agreement that there is little or no effect of
desegregation on the "white flight" of students in metropolitan-wide dis-
tricts.
(4) Desegregation required by Federal court orders has not had dif-
ferent effects on "white flight" from other desegregation of equal mag-
nitude.
(5) The loss of white and black students from large urban school
systems is significantly related to the proportion of black students in the
systems. Two qualifications must be inserted for this generalization.
First, there is considerable variance across cities in this relationship.
Farley found it held for whites in his 50 southern cities but not in his
75 northern cities. But in general, as revealed in tables 1 and 2, the
relationship holds for both races. Second, the fact that both white and
black enrollments related in the same way with proportion black sug-
gests that, in addition to racial factors, this variable also acts for a
range of variables that separate cities with high black percentages from
those with low percentages—receding tax bases, older housing, higher
unemployment rates, etc.
2
7 Orfield, op. dr, pp. 18-20.171
(6) Extensive school desegregation in the largest, nonmetropolitan
school districts, particularly in the South, may hasten the "white flight"
of students in the first year of the process; but at least part of this effect
may be compensated for in later years. Coleman showed only a 1-year
effect, part of which reflected neighborhood transition. Rossell also
showed this effect in the first year for rapidly desegregating urban dis-
tricts in the North. But she showed, too, that by the second and third
years these same districts have an average rate of reduction in their
white proportions below both their own predesegregation rate and
those of other districts. This phenomenon helps to explain the dif-
ference in findings between those analyses that investigate changes
over a span of years, such as Farley's and ours, and Coleman's year-
by-year design. Some white families may well hasten their already-
formed plans to move to the suburbs with the onset of school
desegregation, especially if there is negative political leadership as in
Memphis and Boston. But a longer period of observation suggests that
this first-year loss is recovered through a lower-than-normal loss in
later years.
Social Science and Public Policy
Studying Coleman's position has not been easy. The information
necessary to evaluate Coleman's much-publicized research has been
consistently difficult to obtain. Throughout the furor there has been a
confusion between his limited research and his sweeping views against
court-ordered desegregation. And when these views were questioned,
the critics were repeatedly made the objects of ad hominem abuse. We
do not wish to answer in kind. We believe that the whole episode goes
far beyond the immediate personalities and even the racial issues in-
volved in that it raises painful questions of how social science should
relate responsibly to public policy and the ethics involved in this rela-
tionship. This extensive campaign to alter public policy by such a
prominent social scientist highlights the thorniest aspects of this
problem that must be faced.
From April until August, the social science community was not pro-
vided the analysis upon which Coleman's widely-publicized opinions
were reportedly based. The details of the first analysis that began the
campaign were never released, for the second draft of the paper with
analytic details completely abandoned the first analysis and presented
an entirely new analysis with a radically different research design. In-
deed, a third entirely different analysis was not introduced until Sep-
tember. All told, there have been three contrasting analyses, and four
editions plus a 39-page erratum edition of the paper extending over a172
7-month period. The views did not change, but the research upon
which they were said to be based was constantly changing. Telephone
calls to the Urban Institute in June requesting methodological detail
were summarily rejected on the grounds that the analysis was "still in
progress." Yet this was after 2 months of nationwide publicity of pol-
icy recommendations that were said to flow from this "still-in-
progress" research.
What made the 4-month delay even more "unfortunate" was the
consistent confusion between Coleman's personal opinions and his
research findings. Most of the hundreds of articles and editorials that
have been written about the episode advanced Coleman's views as if
they were the results of a new and massive study of urban desegrega-
tion. Yet the connection between Coleman's views and Coleman's
research data is tenuous at best and quite conflicting.
Every social scientist, like any other citizen, has a right to express
his full political views on any subject without the support of research
results. Ethical problems arise, it seems to us, when the social
scientist's views are put forward not as political opinions at all but as
results of his own extensive scientific investigation, as "new insights
from recent research."
Further problems arise when strongly-worded, ad hominem attacks
enter the controversy. Some critics have employed such attacks upon
Coleman; and we have seen how Coleman has consistently employed
similar attacks upon virtually all of his critics regardless of the modera-
tion of their opposition. We regret such ad hominem remarks deeply.
They make "good copy" for the mass media, perhaps, but they
cheapen the debate, lower the public's respect for social science, and
divert public attention away from the real issues.
Coleman's personal attacks upon us and others all suggest that he
is thoroughly and unquestioningly certain that his views are correct.
Those who dare disagree with him must suffer from "motivated blind-
ness," must be part of "a kind of conspiracy of silence," must mistake
race riot fires for "an extraordinary display of the Northern Lights,"
or must be "a lot of old people who would rather pursue a common
path and attempt to ignore the fact that this [desegregation] may be
having unintended and undesired consequences." Agreeing with con-
ventional wisdom on the subject, he sees massive "white flight" in
major cities as a consequence of court-ordered desegregation to be so
completely obvious that his many critics must have forsaken their so-
cial science training for their unrealistic political hopes. We all believe
in our own ideas; but, when dealing publicly with issues of enormous
policy significance, we have a special obligation to at least entertain
the hypothesis that we may be wrong whatever "our fond hopes about
it."173
We firmly believe that social science can and should responsibly in-
fluence public policy on issues in which it can competently bring
research and theory to bear. Perhaps specialized groups of social
scientists, checked in part by peer review, can perform this task best.
Individual social scientists can also carry out this function responsibly
by basing their views on published and widely available material in
situations, such as courtrooms and legislative committee hearings,
where they subject themselves to formal cross-examination or at least
informed questioning. But intensive campaigns through the mass media
present a hazardous means of injecting social science input into the
political debates on policy.
Philip Meyer, of the Knight Newspapers, the Russell Sage Founda-
tion, and a few other individuals and organizations have directed atten-
tion in recent years to this dangerous lack of fit between the mass
media and social science. But unless structural changes are made in
both institutions and each learns to take the other more seriously, the
Nation will continue to witness examples of extremely inadequate re-
porting of social science findings relevant to public policy. This situa-
tion commits a disservice to the public as well as to the media and
social science. In time, the public might understandably conclude from
the seemingly "conflicting research results" and the stream of ad
hominem attacks that social scientists have nothing to contribute to
policy debates except their own highly politicized opinions.
* * *
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Thank you, Dr. Green.
Dr. Coleman, in view of the fact that Dr. Green has been comment-
ing on your comments, the Commission would be very happy at this
time to listen to your comments on Dr. Green's comments.
DR. COLEMAN. Well, Dr. Green has had a great deal to say about
a variety of things having to do with both my research and my posi-
tions. I am not sure exactly where to begin.
Let me cite something which he didn't address in his presentation
but something which he mentioned in his paper, in his very extensive
use of the Rossell study, which is defective, I think, in a variety of
ways. But let me read a portion of his paper having to do with the
Rossell study and I think directly relevant to our concern. It is on page
72.
DR. GREEN. They don't have that manuscript. I might add we have
a larger paper which will be published in the winter issue of the Har-
vard—does the Commission have that one?
DR. COLEMAN. Let me read from this paper. It says, "Coleman has
been too eager to cite data which fit his present conceptions without174
checking on their accuracy. Rossell checked out the error. The school
district, for reasons of its own, changed"—first let me indicate what
are my results that Dr. Green is attempting to refute. That has to do
with the loss that actually occurred in Boston in 1974 when school
desegregation took place.
As I pointed out elsewhere, in 1969 the school system had 2.9 per-
cent fewer white children than in 1968; in 1970, 1.0 percent fewer
white children than in 1969; in 1971, 4.2 percent fewer white children;
in 1972, 3.3 percent; in 1973, 6.6 percent, for a 5-year average before
desegregation of 4.5 percent.
Now in 1974 desegregation occurred. In 1974 the school system
had, according to my original statement, 16.1 percent fewer white chil-
dren than in 1973. In other words, 16.1 percent fewer in 1974 than
in 1973 compared to 4.5, an average of 4.5 for the preceding 5 years.
Dr. Green says the following:
Coleman had been too eager to cite data that fitted his preconcep-
tions without first checking their accuracy. Rossell soon pointed
out the error. The Boston School Committee changed its defini-
tion of white between 1973-74 and 1974-75 school years;
1973-74 included Spanish-surname pupils, but excluded them in
1974-75. Consequently, Rossell estimates that half the 16.1 percent loss
of white students Coleman attributed to desegregation was in fact due to
this shift in racial classification.*
I thought that was really very serious a question if in fact I had made
such a mistake so I, this morning, after I read Dr. Green's paper last
night, called the Boston School Committee. It turns out—I am not sure
where Dr. Rossell got her information—but it turns out that the figures
are exactly as I say. In other words, that there was not a comparable
decline in white population in 1974 when school desegregation oc-
curred to that which had occurred the years before, but it was 16.1
percent compared to an average in the preceding 5 years of 4.5 per-
cent.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. Did they tell you they changed the definition
of Spanish-surnamed pupils?
DR. COLEMAN. They told me that what they had done, in the fall of
1975, not 1973-74, but in the fall of 1975 they had divided Spanish-
surname students into two subgroups. But they had always included
Spanish-surname students in a separate group.
* Dr. Rossell, having been given the opportunity to respond to testimonial discrepan-
cies directly involving her or her research, has indicated that the 16.1 percent figure
is a misinterpretation of her statement. It has since been corrected by Drs. Green and
Pettigrew to show that the actual loss of whites between 1973 and 1974 was 14.4 per-
cent according to HKW-OCR data on which both Dr. Rossell and Dr. Coleman relied.
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For example, according to my original figures, or the current figures,
it ranged from 5.4 percent Spanish-surname in 1972 to 8.4 percent
Spanish-surname in 1975. So I would suggest that sometimes a call—
DR. GREEN. We both need the counter-check.
DR. COLEMAN. I would suggest the ball is in your court on that issue.
Let me make some other points.
First of all, I don't want to address all the issues. I couldn't address
all the issues that Dr. Green mentioned. But, rather, I would like to
suggest that there are two serious issues confronting us. One is an issue
of policy and the other is an issue of fact.
The issue of policy is the issue of what are the appropriate policies
with regard to school desegregation in the United States, both
desegregation having to do with constitutional protection and any
desegregation or affirmative integration the society wishes to carry out
beyond that. That is the first issue to which the fact issues are relevant
but are not determining. There are differences of opinion with regard
to this issue. The differences of opinion are based partly on a
philosophical position and partly on a factual position.
The second issue is the issue of is there or is there not an effect of
school desegregation on the loss of whites from central cities when it
occurs and, if so, what are the conditions under which this effect takes
place.
Now, Dr. Green addresses himself to both of these matters.
First let me say a little bit about the first of the two matters, the
question of what are appropriate policies. Dr. Green and I agree very
strongly that appropriate policies should be those which do not limit
themselves nor differentially address the central city in the suburban
areas. This is related to the policy which Dr. Green described as
freedom of choice, a policy that I was advocating.
Let me say that in 1968 I tried to get the Legal Defense Fund or
NAACP to carry out a suit, a suit I would like to see them carry out
now. For a variety of reasons which were probably good, they decided
not to do that at that time. But this suit would have been the kind of
policy which I, based partly on data and partly on philosophical posi-
tion, would advocate. That is a policy having to do with intradistrict
transfers. This may or may not be instituted through a court suit, or
it may or may not be instituted through legislation.
There is presently in Congress a bill introduced by Congressman
Richardson Preyer to require the States to make possible such intradis-
trict transfers, intradistrict transfers which are what I would describe
as an "integrating" transfer. That is, the student cannot transfer from
Letter from Dr. Christine H. Rossell to John A. Buggs, Staff Director, U.S. Commission
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a school to which he would otherwise be assigned to a school which
is of a higher proportion of his own race.
So it could not be a transfer which would lead away from integration
but, rather, toward integration. But it would provide two kinds of
things which I think are critical. One, it would not destabilize the situa-
tion, which is what with current policies, according to my analysis, is
happening when central-city school desegregation is carried out.
Secondly, it would provide opportunities for persons, particularly
blacks, who are prevented by reasons of residential discrimination
from residing in a particular homogeneous enclave to attend the
schools in that enclave.
DR. GREEN. When you refer to intradistrict transfer, are you refer-
ring to transferring black students into suburban communities and sub-
urban white students into central cities as well?
DR. COLEMAN. NO. I am talking about voluntary transfer. I am not
talking about compulsory—
DR. GREEN. Strictly on a voluntary basis?
DR. COLEMAN. Yes.
Now, I wanted to get straight first of all the issue of policy position.
I wanted to get that straight before turning to some of the factual mat-
ters.
Now, I would like to say a little bit about the factual matters. I think
Mr. Green has shown that it is possible to find places in which school
desegregation, including court-ordered desegregation, does not bring
about a loss of whites. I think it is important to know that. I think he
has shown also that it is possible to carry out analyses and not find
the loss of whites which in fact does occur, or which I believe does
occur, when school desegregation occurs under certain conditions.
Now, he mentions a number of studies. The one that I would like
to address because it is the only one that I feel is directly relel-
vant—this is the study by Reynolds Farley* which is a well-conducted
study and does disagree with mine. It uses the same data but that in
a somewhat different way. It is subject to a number of the problems
which Dr. Green indicates my research is subject to; that is, it is sub-
ject to the problem of "ecological fallacy," and the other problems
which are brought about by not tracing the actual persons who move
from a district or fail to move into a district.
Professor Farley does obtain different results than I do. He and I
have corresponded on this. Neither of us are clear as to why he ob-
* Reynolds Farley is associate director of the Population Studies Center of the
University of Michigan. Commenting in a letter to the Commission in March 1976,
Professor Farley indicated that there is no variance between his views as represented
in his study and the manner in which they are portrayed in this publication. However,177
tains different results. But it is a matter of some concern. He does
carry out somewhat a different kind of analysis.
He doesn't include the last year, 1973, which we do, because his
data do not go quite that far. It may well be the case that it is partly
because of the fact that he does not use the kind of analysis which
for us was the most powerful analysis, the one which included the ef-
fect of what we call between-district segregation—that is, the effect of
the existence of predominantly white suburbs upon loss that occurs at
the time of desegregation.
He has not looked at that. And this is made especially important by
the fact that in his analysis, because of a different classification of ci-
ties, he did include some Florida cities which we didn't include. Those
Florida cities don't show loss of whites upon school desegregation. I
think it is important to note that. We have only one Florida City in
our analysis, and it is simply because it is the only Florida city which
is classified by the U.S. Office of Education as a central district.
There are districts like Miami, Dade County, which are not classified
by the U.S. Office of Education that way. But in fact, what we desired
to do, both before and after the suggestion of Dr. Pettigrew, was to
use a classification which would be unchallengeable; and that is, we
used not our own criteria, but the criteria which are employed by the
U.S. Office of Education, even when those criteria, it seemed to us,
were a little bit puzzling.
But it is clear that, whether one looks at Tampa or Dade County,
there has not been a loss of white students in Florida desegregation.
And I think that should point to some important aspects of what hap-
pens when desegregation occurs. One is that they were metropolitan-
wide desegregation. Another is, as I said, that they were systems which
had a small proportion of blacks.
But with regard to the difference between Professor Farley's results
and my own, it may be because of the fact that he did not include
the more powerful analysis we carried out and did include a number
of Florida cities which were excluded by our criteria.
Now, I am somewhat offended by the apparent implication of Drs.
Pettigrew and Green that in the selection of cities or in the selection
of variables that we carried out the kind of motivated search for those
he has continued to analyze trends in racial segregation in public schools and its rela-
tionship to changes in white enrollment and, in September 1976, concluded that there
may well be a relationship between white flight and school desegregation. He stated in
an interview reported in the New York Times on September 3, 1976, that "I disagree
with Coleman in how long the effects last, but otherwise our data shows similar trends."
He will be updating his study in a report to be published in the fall of 1976 using 1973
and 1974 data. Letter from Reynolds Farley to John A. Buggs, Staff Director, U.S. Com-
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which would provide us with strongest effects. As I have described
with regard to the selection of cities, that was not so. One could add
and subtract and juggle around; the set of cities, I think, would not
be very worthwhile. But we attempted to carry out an analysis in
which there was an unimpeachable criterion by carrying out the analy-
sis described in our equation 3.
The analysis is sufficiently powerful, I believe, that no matter what
set of cities we would have included we would have found much the
same results. That is indicated also by the fact that if you look in the
equation-3 analysis, if you look at the effects we obtained for the
smaller school districts, we find the same kind of effects; slightly
smaller, but not that much smaller; the same kinds of effects and oc-
curring under the same kinds of conditions.
It is only when one fails to include these other factors, that is, the
proportion black in a city when it desegregates, and the existence of
white suburbs for white families to move to—it is only when one fails
to do that that large cities and small cities appear considerably dif-
ferent. So I am somewhat offended by the notion that we carried out
a motivated selection of cities or that we carried out a motivated selec-
tion of variables.
Mr. Jackson's analysis is cited a number of times. We used one de-
pendent variable in that case having to do with what might be
described as contact between blacks and whites in the school, and
used another dependent variable in our later analysis. The variable
which Dr. Green indicates we did not choose because of the fact that
it, according to him, did not show strong effect, is in fact the variable
that in our more extensive analysis we did use.
Also, he calls into question the dependent variable which we used
because it was not the dependent variable that Dr. Rossell used. Again,
there is the suggestion that there may be something motivated about
that.
The dependent variable we used is the dependent variable that Dr.
Farley used. If Dr. Farley's stndy can be used to refute ours, then it
seems to me a peculiar circumstance that if that question is of such
profound concern with regard to our study, it should be with regard
to Professor Farley's. I think it is with regard to neither study.
I think also that Farley and I have used a more nearly correct inde-
pendent variable as a measure of desegregation than Dr. Rossell uses.
Essentially, the issue here is whether one looks at what the system says
it did, which is what Dr. Rossell does, or what actually happened.
For example, in 1971 in Baltimore, Dr. Rossell classified the
desegregation that occurred in Baltimore as medium-level desegrega-
tion, or indicated that there was medium-level desegregation in Bal-
timore in 1971. However, if one looks at the actual index of segrega-179
tion in 1971 as compared to 1970, the index was .70 in 1970. It was
.70 in 1971.*
So there was no desegregation that took place whatever the system
said it did. So I would regard what Professor Farley has done and what
I have done as the appropriate and correct independent variable for
the issue in question.
I might mention something about racial intermarriage because I
think it is an interesting point. My point with regard to racial intermar-
riage is not that it is going to provide the quantity of integration in
our society that occurs with racial balance in the schools. Rather, my
point with regard to racial intermarriage is that integration in the
schools and integration in society has depended for a long time upon
well-intentioned white liberals, many of whom live in white suburbs
(and increasingly live in white suburbs), and have very little contact
with blacks, especially given the kind of demographic trends partly due
and and partly not due to desegregation, which are creating increasing
residential segregation in our society.
I think it is extremely important to have a reasonably large set of
interested parties, interested parties in the sense that their interests are
very fundamental, at the very level of the home, parties interested in
the very integration of society. So I think we need to address ourselves
to the question of how can we obtain strong and stable integration in
society and the strategies through which this will occur, I am not say-
ing racial intermarriage is going to be an immediate and overwhelming
thing. What I am saying is it should be encouraged precisely for that
reason, precisely because of the fact that it creates a set of interested
parties whose orientation to this issue is not so fragile as that of a set
of white liberals who happen to live in the suburbs.
I really don't want to say anything else because there will either be
too little to say or too much to say.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Thank you very much, Dr. Coleman.
Commissioner Ruiz, do you have any questions?
COMMISSIONER RUIZ. Yes. I notice Dr. Coleman gave freedom of
choice and made reference to it as a factor in relieving racial tension.
My comment is freedom of choice is not a rule of law. It is more akin
to a jungle procedure, past accomplishments in this world of ours by
the freedom of choice doctrine, the fastest gun, and even genocide,
really doesn't make it a pretty word for me.
*Dr. Rossell responded that the administrative action taken in Baltimore actually increased
integration in the targeted schools even if it did not have a city-wide effect. She credits the city
with 7.92 percent as the total reassigned to the magnet schools. The assignment, attributable to
administrative policy, she views as an important attempt to deal with segregation as it resulted in
Baltimore being classified as a "medium desegregation" city (5 - 20 percent reassigned). Letter
from Dr. Christine H. Rossell to John A. Buggs, Staff Director, U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, Mar. 12, 1976 (on file at the Commission).180
On this freedom of choice, it has brought economic disruption; large
monopolistic corporate structures took advantage by choice of other,
less powerful economic groups. So we had to pass antitrust laws to
give the consumer a break against freedom of choice by large corpora-
tions. Freedom of choice, I think, has its dangers.
But I would like to elicit a reaction or an opinion, and in order to
better present the question which is disturbing me, Dr.
Coleman—before I ask the question, first let me inform you what I
have perceived from listening to both of you here. I have perceived
a diagnostic approach in this area of the human relations which in
reality concerns the nature of man. This diagnostic approach analysis
which I have been hearing has been dealing in variables.
I hear this word tossed around all the time, variables, which gives
me the impression that this is more a subject of art, that it is not a
science, depending more upon who is doing the analysis and who is
presenting the concept for our record here, which leads me also to be-
lieve that our analysis of cause and effect in this area of busing may
not be susceptible to any scientific rationale whatsoever.
The question is: Doesn't logic tell us that in this area of racial ten-
sion, we will have to simply condition our society to what may not be
palatable to certain persons as part of the price of a civilized democra-
cy? Just like we have to pay taxes, we have to respect each other's
property, we have to curb basic, animalistic, human propensities to
provide for safety and orderliness. What is better for most in our plu-
ralistic society should be the rule that we should ultimately adopt.
I would like to very much address this issue within the context of
this question in order to find out whether we can come out with some
consensus. And that is, doesn't logic tell us that in this area of racial
tension, we will have to simply condition our society to what may be
best for all of us?
DR. COLEMAN. I would certainly agree with that. I think there may
be differences of opinion as to what may be best for all of us.
I ihink it is quite necessary in certain matters having to do with con-
stitutional protection. This is what the courts are for and this is what
the courts properly do. It is quite necessary for rules of logic to be
used to condition society independent of public opinion, insulated
from popular support or absence of support, to require the population
to live up to the Constitution.
I think what is at issue here is not that. What is at issue here is what
are the proper means and what are the effective means of affirmative
integration in society, Not constitutional protection—
COMMISSIONER RUIZ. IS your alternative instead of busing, intermar-
riage?181
DR. COLEMAN. NO. My alternative instead of compulsory racial
balance is the alternative I have said. What I have described is the in-
tegrating transfer. Let me comment on that a moment since you did
mention it.
Whites, and especially upper-income whites, already have freedom
of choice by freedom of residence. The proposal that I am suggesting
and the bill that is in Congress now is one to give blacks and lower-
income whites exactly the same kind of freedom. That is, the freedom
of choice, the freedom to attend whatever school you desire in a
metropolitan area independently of where you live.
COMMISSIONER RUIZ. Then you are in favor of freedom of choice.
Did I get that correctly?
DR. COLEMAN. What do you mean by freedom of choice?
COMMISSIONER RUIZ. TO do what you like to do. Not a rule of law.
DR. COLEMAN. NO, you have to specify that more clearly.
COMMISSIONER RUIZ. Well, Hitler had freedom of choice. People in
Germany had freedom of choice. In the early West, people had
freedom of choice, where the fastest gun exercised that freedom. Now
I don't know what you mean by freedom of choice.
DR. COLEMAN. Would you like for me to specify it again?
COMMISSIONER RUIZ. Yes. You said, as I understood, that persons in
the upper white class can do anything they want to with respect
because they have that choice, send their children where they will. Do
you want a similar right given to the underprivileged people?
DR. COLEMAN. Right.
COMMISSIONER RUIZ. HOW would you get that right, by changing the
economy?
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. YOU are interested in what incentives would
he provide? I assume that's the question.
COMMISSIONER RUIZ. I don't know.
DR. COLEMAN. Let me respond to precisely what the policy is. The
policy is a policy which would allow any child in a metropolitan area
to transfer to any school which did not have a higher proportion of
his race in the metropolitan area with transportation paid by public
funds. This would allow persons who have been discriminated against
because of income, or more usually because of race, from residing in
a particular area or particular school district or particular attendance
zone to attend school in that zone. Do you understand?
COMMISSIONER RUIZ. Yes, I understood you.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Commissioner Horn.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. Mr. Coleman, are you satisfied with the data
that you had available to analyze the problem that you posed?182
DR. COLEMAN. We have the following kind of situation. We are in
the process of carrying out a variety of policies, or a set of policies,
in a situation in which we have only a few cases. We have only 20
of the largest cities in the United States; and, as a consequence, we
cannot wait until the policies have been carried out with regard to all
of those cities before attempting to infer what might be the con-
sequences of those policies.
As a social scientist, I would prefer to have data after the fact with
regard to a much larger number of these districts. I would prefer to
have data after Detroit had undergone very large-scale desegregation;
Cleveland, which is in the process of litigation; Baltimore, which is in
the process of litigation; and a number of other cities which have not
undergone desegregation so we could have a stronger fix on that.
However, I do feel we have had enough experience now with regard
to these cities to make some fairly strong statistical evidence. So I am
confident that the results that we have come to do show as well as can
be done at present what the likely consequences of certain kinds of
policies might be.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. What data, though, would you suggest? This
is a long-term process that we really need to get at this problem and
the consequences of segregation and desegregation. What would you
outline, briefly? I realize that you could take all afternoon to answer
that question, but in summary.
DR. COLEMAN. I think one thing that has been extremely unfortunate
is that the country was faced with an opportunity, particularly right be-
fore 1970—and it is still faced with an opportunity—to obtain
knowledge about the consequences of the policies that are in effect in
the area of school desegregation. However, there has not been at the
Federal level—despite the existence of the National Institute of Educa-
tion, despite the existence of the U.S. Office of Education, despite the
existence of its parent body, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, which are administering such policies—there has not been
any systematic and continuous and comparable gathering of data in-
itiated at the Federal level on the variety of consequences of school
desegregation.
I would like to see a focus on at least three consequences: one, the
consequence on achievement of both blacks and whites in the schools.
Second is the consequence on interracial attitudes and attitudes about
oneself; and third is the consequence on population stability, demo-
graphic stability, because it is demographic stability in the long run
which will give us either residentially segregated or integrated society.
However, that just hasn't been done, and it has been left to a variety
of partly poorly- and partly well-conceived studies done at the local
level for us to attempt to infer something about those consequences.183
Fortunately, the Office for Civil Rights of HEW has gathered data
under law on the racial composition of schools throughout the country
since 1968. It is those data which have allowed both Farley and me
and will allow others to carry out the kind of research we have carried
out.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. I might just comment, Dr. Coleman, as per-
haps you know, this Commission invested—what, Mr. Buggs, $150,000
perhaps?—in the design with the RAND Corporation, published in
September 1974, on a design for a national longitudinal study on
school desegregation. This project is something that I and others have
advocated for two and a half years on this Commission and we can't
seem to get anybody interested in pursuing it.
But this study would do what many of the critics have objected to
in all the research, which is provide a longitudinal study on individuals,
covering just the points you are making. Not only achievement, but
improvement or whatever, on interracial attitudes, population, etc.
I think it is a tragedy that given the human and constitutional issues
involved this Government can't find $5 to $15 million, which is what
I think it would take, to examine what is going on in this country, and
that this study has been put on ice partly because of attitudes in the
white liberal community, etc. I would hope that project could be
resuscitated some time.
Now, I would like to know, to what extent social class was a variable
in any of your research?
DR. COLEMAN. In the research I have just been carrying out, social
class was not a variable at all because in the data gathered by the Of-
fice for Civil Rights the only classification of student bodies of schools
was classification by race.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. This concerns me because on white flight I
think you might look at the problem of class flight from the center city
to the suburb, even realizing the racially discriminatory practices in the
suburbs when it is black middle class moving there. What concerns me
is that we haven't properly isolated these factors in many of these stu-
dies. I want the degree to which you think this should be a considera-
tion.
DR. COLEMAN. I think it should be a consideration because I think
one of the unfortunate things about the population mobility that is oc-
curring, and this is quite apart from whether it is due to or not due
to desegregation, the increasing segregation between central city and
suburbs that both Dr. Green and I agree is occurring is not only racial
segregation, but also the whites moving out are whites who are more
educationally advantaged, more upper middle class, more middle class.
And the few blacks who are able because of some break in discrimina-
tion to move to the suburbs are the same thing.184
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. DO you know of any data on the black mid-
dle-class flight to the suburbs? Are there any studies along that line?
DR. COLEMAN. I think there are some studies beginning to be done
on that, but I don't know. I think it is probably, according to my data,
that flight is more pronounced in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan
area than in any other city. But it may well be being studied right now.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. I am interested in the cause and effect. The
claim was originally made in the newspapers that it was court-ordered
desegregation that caused this white flight. I think the studies and com-
mentary I have heard here shows that you had an exodus to the sub-
urbs even in cities where there were very few black residents.
I wonder if a lot of this so-called flight, which I would view as class
flight, is partly due not so much to the changing composition of the
inner-city school, but rather to the availability of low-cost housing that
is really the only option people of low income—which, proportionate-
ly, blacks are higher than whites, although absolutely there are more
poor whites—are able to secure? Do you have any feeling or research
on that?
DR. COLEMAN. I would certainly feel that that is probably the case,
that the existence of housing at particular levels of expenditure is a
very strong factor in influencing population trends.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. I have one or two more, Mr. Chairman.
On interdistrict transfer, you have mentioned the so-called freedom
of choice idea which has a number of connotations to people in the
civil rights community, most of them unpleasant, most of them in the
belief that where it was tried in the South, it didn't work.
DR. COLEMAN. First, let me say I didn't describe this as freedom of
choice at all. It was Dr. Green that described it as this. I would
describe it as an integrating transfer.
DR. GREEN. YOU were quoted this weekend. I realize sometimes
quotes may not be accurate, but I have seen in at least two major
newspapers, the Detroit Free Press and New York Times, the term
"choice" used. It was used in the context of parents being able to
select school as well as residential sites for their children. This is why
we in turn use the term freedom of choice.
DR. COLEMAN. I didn't use the term freedom of choice. I did use the
term choice. I am not against choice.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. Let me just say, doesn't this assume that to
achieve your policy outcome, which would be a better proportion of
black and white students in these schools and allowing this freedom
of movement by providing certain incentives such as the provision of
publicly-paid transportation, etc., that a certain degree of good will
must exist in these communities? Is such a policy outcome likely in the185
absence of that good will? It seems you have a philosophical,
psychological problem.
DR. COLEMAN. I think it requires some good will in the sense of not
moving into the streets or something like that. But I don't believe it
requires perfect good will in the sense that, according to the proposal
that I have and according to the bill now in Congress, this would be
a requirement which is imposed upon the receiving school district
without veto power. The receiving school district could not refuse to
accept children who came from out of the attendance zone or out of
the district, up to a particular percentage, some percentage which was
below that which would require it to go on split shifts. But a percent-
age which would be reasonably high.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. AS I understand it, you basically favor a
metropolitan solution. You do not favor a forced metropolitan solu-
tion.
DR. COLEMAN. That puts it very well. I favor very much a
metropolitan solution because these data, and I think other data—and
Dr. Green and I agree upon this—that central-city solutions are not
going to create population stability, that solutions must be
metropolitan solutions. I would favor because of certain philosophical
positions those metropolitan solutions which do not involve a compul-
sory racial balance in the metropolitan area but which do involve a
greater range of choice.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. If I might, Mr. Chairman, insert in the record
an interesting exchange between Dr. Coleman and two individuals that
appeared in the October issue of Phi Delta Kappa's journal. The first
is an article by Biloine Whiting Young and Grace Billings Bress enti-
tled "Coleman's Retreat and the Politics of Good Intentions," then Dr.
Coleman's response, "Social Research and Advocacy. A Response to
Young and Bress."
I think these are interesting articles on the early distortions made by
some of the advocates of the so-called Coleman Report, Version 1, in
the sixties. And a statement made by one author, "Under the Johnson
Administration the Coleman Report was trumpeted to the point of
distortion by both HEW and the Civil Rights Commission to make it
as powerful a weapon as it could be in the desegregation effort."
That comes from the articles by Gerald Grant.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Without objection, those articles will be in-
serted in the record at this point.
[The material described is on file at the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights.]
COMMISSIONER FREEMAN. AS you know, Doctor, I am a lawyer, not
a social scientist. So my discipline has been along the lines of the rule186
of law and basic constitutional, legal issues. So when this first surfaced,
this paper on the school desegregation and loss of whites, my question
first was: so what? That is not relevant to any issue or any discussion
when you are talking about enforcement of the law. However, it has
been a campaign, and the issue of desegregation and whether or not
this country is going to enforce a law has now become one with which
we must deal.
So I would like—particularly because when we talk about a black
central city and white suburbia, we are talking about conditions in
which State and Federal officials have failed to enforce the law. We
don't need any new laws with respect to that. The State and Federal
officials have failed to enforce the law to prohibit racial segregation,
the laws to prohibit racial discrimination in employment and housing.
I would like to know if you have any comments with respect to the
protection of the laws because whether a person achieves or not is not
a constitutional issue. But whether that person has equal opportunity
is.
DR. COLEMAN. I agree with you very much, Commissioner Freeman,
that social scientists' data on white flight or achievement or whatever
are not relevant to issues which have to do with the law, which have
to do with constitutional protection under the 14th amendment. I
agree with that very much.
My only difference with some persons—I am not sure whether it is
a difference with you or not—but my only difference with some per-
sons is the amount of school desegregation that is required by the law
as eradication of the results of de jure segregation. In other words, I
see, and I think the Court sees, as well, two aspects of school
desegregation. One is de jure segregation, which was most pronounced
under the dual systems of the South but which has also been found
in the North by specific actions of school districts, and the other is
what has been termed de facto segregation.
In order to overcome the former, court solutions are necessary
Those court solutions should, i believe, be blind to data of the sort we
have been discussing. With regard to the latter, affirmative integration
beyond that which is required to live up to the law is, I believe, desira-
ble. I don't believe the courts are the correct instruments to carry that
out. I believe there are other instruments which are the correct instru-
ments to carry it out because we are dealing now with affirmative in-
tegration rather than protection under the law.
The difference that I have with some persons is what fraction of the
segregation that exists now is segregation which lies under this first
category, de jure segregation, and what fraction is segregation which
lies under the second category which requires affirmative integration
in order to carry it out.187
COMMISSIONER FREEMAN. I don't recognize any difference between
so-called de facto and de jure. What we are really talking about is the
failure of State and Federal officials to enforce the laws.
DR. COLEMAN. If you don't recognize the difference—
COMMISSIONER FREEMAN. The courts are the only ones who have
really been doing anything. It is true that they may not be the best
ones. If the executive branch would have enforced Title VI with
respect to schools, site selection, housing, etc., then the white folks
who want to run to the suburbs would not have had anywhere to run
because black people and poor people would have been out there too.
DR. GREEN. If you look at segregated school districts throughout the
country as planned action, then the difference between de facto and
de jure segregation becomes minimal. I think that has been well
discussed in legal circles.
The question I would like to ask is this: If the courts are not the
proper instruments of change in this regard, what specific kinds of
strategies would you suggest? Let's assume—
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. I have a time problem here. I know that some
people have planes to catch. We are to have the privilege of listening
to two reactors. I rather feel that we should move to listening to them
at this time unless any member of the Commission has any further
question. I would like to get into that last dialogue myself. But I recog-
nize our time constraints. There are only two reactors. A third, Dr.
Presser, was unable to come. I would like Dr. Wolf and Dr. Epps, if
they would, to just join us on the platform.
I know there are some plane problems. But if they can come up now
and join Dr. Green and Dr. Coleman in a dialogue. Then the Commis-
sioners will have additional questions.
I will follow the order on the program here. The first person's name
on the program is Dr. Wolf, who is director of the Indiana Center for
Evaluation, Indiana University. I will also introduce at the same time
Dr. Epps, who is professor of urban education at the University of
Chicago. We are very happy to have both of you here. You have
listened to the dialogue that has been taking place here. Please come
into it at any point that you so desire.
Dr. Wolf?
DR. WOLF. Well, I had somewhat misunderstood the purpose of this
panel. I was under the assumption that we would be questioning Dr.
Coleman and Dr. Green about their papers. It appears that that will
not be the case. So I have several points that I would like to make.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. GO at it any way you want.
DR. WOLF. Once that became apparent to me, I have several points
I would like to make. I would be glad to hear what Dr. Coleman or
Dr. Green have to comment on it.188
The first point is, again, people talked earlier about logical argu-
ments, logic versus perhaps scientific data. There is one logical
question that I have or one puzzlement that I have. It seems that when
we are talking about desegregation the ultimate objective, it seems to
me, is to establish some type of environment where cross-racial in-
teractions occur. There is a presumption, I think, that those interac-
tions will be beneficial to all of the people involved in that process,
that they will be beneficial both in a cognizant sense, an achievement
sense, and an attitude sense.
What I think emerges out of Dr. Coleman's work, that the white
flight phenomenon that he describes, he says, or implies in his work,
will perhaps subvert the major intention of desegregation. If that is, if
whites are fleeing the schools that are supposedly in the process of
being desegregated, then the racial contact, the interactions that
presumably would have occurred, will not occur.
It seems to me, though, that there is a logical problem with that
because it is very possible, I think, from a logical perspective to
imagine that white people fleeing the inner-city districts, fleeing
because of the emergence of desegregation, may not have been in
schools that were biracial to begin with, or excessively biracial, and
that they had very little contact with black students anyway. So merely
because white flight is occurring does not necessarily mean that
desegregation as it is continued to be carried out wouldn't increase the
contacts between the races. In fact, it appears to me logically that the
incidence of interactions could even increase even though there is
white flight.
So I, perhaps, if there is time—
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. May I say it is 3:30. The agenda calls for the
summary and synthesis at 5:00 o'clock. Outside of the fact that maybe
one or two people have got problems with planes, we have plenty of
time to pursue these questions.
If you are going to address that to Dr. Coleman at this particular
point, there is one point I would like to inject right there because,
when people normally talk about white flight, I assume they are talking
about families picking up and moving from the central city into the
suburbs. I know, Dr. Coleman, that a great deal of your emphasis is
on the first-year impact. My query is whether really the number of per-
sons indicated have the opportunity during that first year to pick up
and move.
I am also wondering whether or not the analysis of the drop in the
number of white students has taken into consideration during that first
year what in effect has been a boycott of schools during that first year
on the part of some white students. As we held public hearings in189
Boston and took evidence there, we came to the conclusion that that
was a major factor in what was going on in Boston during Phase 1.
I know you don't go beyond the first year. Did that get into the
study at all?
DR. COLEMAN. Yes. Let me comment on that. It did.
We attempted to examine the possibility that you imply may occur,
that people come back into the schools the second year, or the possi-
bility that there is continued acceleration of the white flight, and the
third possibility, that the loss of whites goes back to its original rate.
We did not find whites coming back in. We did not find a continued
acceleration. We did find, although this is our most tentative result, a
reversion to their original patterns.
However, if you look in some cities, for example, in Boston this
year, the proportion of whites who are lost between 1974 and 1975,
between Phase 1 and Phase 2, is twice the proportion that was lost be-
fore Phase 1. It is 8 percent instead of 4 percent, which is what the
predesegregation pattern was. That is over and above the 16 percent
loss in 1974.
In Dallas there is relatively mild desegregation in 1971 under court
order, and following that desegregation in 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974
what had been approximately 2 percent loss per year of white students
continued at about 8 percent loss. In other words, in Dallas it didn't
go back down. But in fact what happened was it continued at the same
high level that occurred in the year of desegregation.
But in general, as far as we could tell, in most cities it goes back
to the original rate.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. GO ahead.
DR. WOLF. I was thinking, sort of picking up on Dr. Green's com-
ment earlier on the ecological fallacy and the use of aggregate data
to ascribe individual actions. It seems to me that if you are looking
at school district data and you have no data on individual schools, that
was my point, that it is very difficult to know whether or not the
whites who are fleeing the city are in fact whites who were in biracial
schools and, therefore, the contact between black and whites would be
diminishing, or merely whites who were in all-white schools and were
fleeing in anticipation of what would occur with a desegregation plan.
DR. COLEMAN. I think you are exactly right. All of the studies which
have been done suffer from this defect. Incidentally, I might make a
methodological comment with regard to this. That is that if the Office
for Civil Rights had been a little bit wiser in their original data collec-
tion, they would have required identification of schools so that one
could trace a particular school through the 6-year period. But it is not
possible to do so except by a lot of hard work which I think several,
I and some others, perhaps Professor Farley, are attempting to do now.190
DR. WOLF. I wanted to use that as an example of the next point I
would like to make. We have heard a lot of conversations today, a lot
of, particularly in the last two presentations, differences in particular
analyses that Dr. Coleman engaged in and several of the other
researchers. We found out that there were certainly different findings.
We can understand those different findings in terms of different
methodologies, etc. We seem to be engaged in some question of each
other's particular methodological approach.
What I would like to question now is the whole approach of using
statistical surveys, to overrely on statistical surveys in determining so-
cial policy, because I think we have a good example here that there
are certainly different ways to proceed, different variables to study,
and some critical methodological problems that in a sense raise very
fundamental questions about the results of this kind of research.
I think there has been over the last several years an increasing
amount of skepticism, at least on the part of some methodologies, an
educational inquiry for this overreliance on statistical data which has
a tendency to be oversimplistic, reductionist; it sort of denies the es-
sence of the complex city involved in an issue like desegregation.
I think we saw an example in Dr. Jackson's research where he
looked at some additional independent variables. You see that the
results are dramatically altered.
I think if you utilize perhaps some additional independent variables
you will find the results to be changed again. I just think it should re-
mind all of us who are involved in some way in any kind of social pol-
icy and who are in the business of trying to form social policy on the
basis of evidence we can generate as social scientists to be much more
careful about the oversimplifications of these kinds of approaches that
we use and rely on as though they were truth.
I am reminded that perhaps a commission of this sort should, and
I am sure you do and you probably have intentions to do, but to get
a wide variety of people into itself, people who have more direct ex-
periences in desegregation—people who are at the front lines, so to
speak, and who could talk from their own personal experiences. I think
that would be as equally informative to the development of coherent
social policy as statistical data would. I would like to pick up on that
again in my next point.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Are there comments on that at this point?
DR. WOLF. I certainly wouldn't mind.
DR. GREEN. I agree with the last point regarding using a wide range
of witnesses with a range of experiences related to desegregation. One
reason that I was concerned about the initial pronouncements regard-
ing the relationship between white flight and the extension of com-191
ments related to white attitudes as it relates to busing and the impact
on the achievement of minority kids, I have served as an expert wit-
ness in more than nine desegregation cases and participated very much
in assisting in the formulation of a set of strategies to bring about
desegregation in my own community of Lansing, Michigan. We have
had busing of black youngsters into formerly white areas and white
youngsters into formerly black areas. We have found to a great extent
parents might resist busing during the formulation of a plan. But if
meetings are held indicating that protection to all youngsters will be
put into effect, the kind of resistance that is often predicted, it was
almost minimal in our community. We have data to support that par-
ticular point of view.
I agree fully with the other point too, regarding of utilization of
research and, especially, correlational data is especially critical and
susceptible to error in making a assumptions about what happens
between variable 1, variable 2, .1, .2. We must be very cautious. This
is a point we have attempted to make in our critique of the Coleman
approach. The correlation does not indicate causation. Numerous fac-
tors in urban America, pollution, blight, simple racial prejudice are all
factors probably that are highly related to white flight. Until one can
systematically control a range of factors, one cannot conclude at all
that white flight, the flight of whites from urban centers is in any way
related to urban desegregation. SCS again is a very critical factor.
DR. COLEMAN. I would have to disagree with most of those points.
If we did hold in abeyance our opinions on these matters until all the
facts were in, we wouldn't carry out any policies. We have to carry
out policies. We are carrying out policies every day. Those policies
should be well informed.
There is a phenomenon, we all agree there is a phenomenon of a
very sharp loss in many large cities of whites from the central city
leading to a situation in which we have more, rather than less, re-
sidential segregation in the metropolitan area.
Now, the question is, and this is a question on which there are dif-
ferences, the question is what are the factors that are the cause of that.
But as we carry out policies—and I am not talking now about protec-
tion under the 14th amendment because that is or should be indepen-
dent of evidence of this sort—but as we carry out policies of affirma-
tive school integration beyond protection under the 14th amendment
then we should ask ourselves the question, are we exacerbating the
very problem we are attempting to solve? And we have to use statisti-
cal means to answer that question.
DR. GREEN. But until that data has been carefully collected, until all
segments of possible data have been collected, policy statements and192
pronouncements, it is an inappropriate way to shape and modify pol-
icy. That is our key.
From what we have been able to observe and obtain from Professor
Coleman, this data does not clearly, conclusively at all demonstrate a
relationship between white flight, court-ordered desegregation, white
flight and voluntary desegregation. This data does not support that at
all. There is also a body of data in conflict with Professor Coleman.
So if nothing else comes out of the analysis and reanalysis of the
Coleman approach, it simply says this: His results at best are tenuous
and you never advocate policy, significant policy, policy that impacts
on school children throughout the country on data that is inconclusive
and tenuous. That is my point.
DR. COLEMAN. I know in the newspaper that you have not been hesi-
tant to do similar things, that is, to advocate particular policy based
on evidence which you regard, although I do not, and although we dis-
agree on the direction of the evidence, but you regard the evidence
as tenuous. But I think you haven't been hesitant to make such policy
pronouncements.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Okay. From what you are saying I gather you
would have a great deal more confidence in the conclusions that were
reached as a result of the intensive and well-directed studies from city
to city.
DR. WOLF. I think that that kind of information would be much
more informative because I think that, in putting together those kinds
of case studies, one would have the opportunity to explore many more
of the complex factors that obviously bear on this issue then the
research does at the moment. I think that I would certainly advocate
those kinds of studies.
Might I add in making my next point, because it is very much re-
lated to that, that there seems to be a tendency to attack emerging
social policy. There is nothing wrong with that sort of criticism.
Since those policies, like desegregation and the policies that relate
to desegregation, are complex, it is not uncommon for problems to
emerge. And even preliminary studies to reflect certain conditions
like the white flight phenomenon, it appears though to me that it
might be more constructive, or certainly as constructive, to look for
incidence of success as well as incidence of failure.
I think there are a multitude of those incidents available to us and
your Commission. It may be worthwhile to have people come before
this group and talk to them about the ways in which they have been
able to deal satisfactorily with these sorts of problems. I am not sug-
gesting that we back away from taking a critical look at things. I am
merely suggesting that we can also critically examine instances of suc-
cess, as well. I think it would be worth your effort to do that.193
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. AS you know we did hold 5 days of public
hearings on the situation in Boston. And we listened to quite a number
of success stories insofar as the integration of some of the schools in
Boston were concerned, and we did listen to evidence on the other
side. But it gives you an entirely different perspective if you do dig for
and obtain positive as well as negative evidence.
Dr. Epps, do you want to come into the discussion at this point?
DR. EPPS. Yes, well, first of all, let me just point out that social
science is not the only area that is having difficulty when researchers
attempt to influence policymaking. The atomic energy researchers, for
example, are having a devil of a time trying to convince the country,
on the one hand, that it ought to develop atomic reactors, while
another group equally well trained and well versed argues that it will
be an ecological disaster. Another area is drug research where there
are hundreds of studies which indicate, on the one hand, that
marijuana is harmless and, on the other hand, that it is going to
destroy the world.
I say this simply because I think we ought to put this into perspec-
tive. Social science and some of the other sciences simply do not have
at this time the kind of data or research tools that make it possible
to come up with clear-cut evidence or data that would allow us to
make statements that are true beyond a reasonable doubt, to use At-
torney Freeman's legalistic terms.
With that in mind, I think you [Attorney Freeman] were absolutely
right when you said this kind of data is really irrelevant in legal cases.
That is what we should all keep clearly before us. If you are asking
if this study, or any other study that I know about, is producing
evidence that can be said to have conclusions that are true beyond
reasonable doubt, I don't think such data exists.
Getting to the specific study involved, I think Dr. Green and Dr.
Pettigrew are correct when they say that the study does fail to demon-
strate that the white flight is directly attributable to court-ordered
desegregation. When I first read about Dr. Coleman's study, I was sur-
prised at his conclusions because I'd already read Mr. Farley's study.
And very clearly, his research found that you could not say that there
was a very strong connection between segregation and white flight.
But when I did have a chance to read Dr. Coleman's research, I
said, well, he has some conclusions that are different from Farley's, but
the research results do not lend themselves to the kind of strong state-
ments being made. Certainly as I look at the list of conclusions, I could
agree wtih some of them, I could disagree with others. But out of it
all I came out with the feeling that Coleman's research is saying to me,
at least as I read it, that a metropolitan solution is absolutely necessary
because no other solution will work. And I think he agrees with that.194
On the other hand, when he raises a question about whether
desegregation as a result of court-ordered plans is appropriate, I simply
have to ask, as others have before me, is there any other alternative?
As you look at the record, has anything else worked? I think we have
to say that nothing yet has produced any kind of discernible result
other than a court-ordered desegregation plan or some other legal ac-
tion.
The conclusion I reach from that then is that, if we are saying in
this society that we are going to desegregate schools, then we have to
have some kind of legal action to get that done. It seems as if the only
way this kind of legal action can be effective is to include metropolitan
plans. The one somewhat sobering note throughout all of this is that
in those districts where desegregation seems to have taken place
without any appreciable white flight, it has taken place in districts such
as Miami, Jacksonville, and so on, where there is a metropolitan
system, and I should point out, I think Dr. Green already knows this,
that these systems were metropolitan governments before desegrega-
tion took place. That raises some questions which I hope the legal peo-
ple will be looking into. Is it going to be necessary for us to have
metropolitan governmental units in order to get metropolitan
desegregation? If that is what it would take, then I think that is what
we ought to be advocating.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. On that point, do you know what the feeling
of the black leadership in center cities is in answer to that question?
DR. EPPS. I can't speak for all of them. Some of them would be very
much frightened by the proposition of having to be elected on a
metropolitan-wide basis. Others would welcome it. They would say
that, 'I am qualified. I will stake my record against anybody else's and
take my chances.' Just dropping names, if that would help you, Tom
Bradley and Ed Brooke.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. We could mention others, but I find it in-
teresting, in 1971 when I started questioning black leaders appearing
before this Commission, most of them from the center city were reluc-
tant to go into a metropolitan government, feeling that "Now that we
have achieved political power in a center city area, Whitey wants to
take it away from us by diluting us in a larger metropolitan area."
All I am saying is: That is a good, interesting solution and "good
government" people have favored it for 50 years. But there are politi-
cal realities where the black leadership themselves are not particularly
interested as I listen to them.
DR. EPPS. That may be true, but I still say it is worth looking into.
DR. COLEMAN. One of the reasons that I feel that this bill which is
before Congress right now is an important bill is because the courts195
have been prevented by their own legal precedent, they have been
prevented from anything beyond central-city solutions. This may not
always be the case, but until now they have been. The only way in
which metropolitan solutions under present legal precedent can be
achieved is either through State legislatures or through the Congress.
That's why I feel that this current bill which would allow these in-
tegrated transfers across a school district line has some, has a great
deal to offer with regard to metropolitan solutions.
COMMISSIONER FREEMAN. DO I understand you have a bill you are
pushing through Congress?
DR. COLEMAN. NO, ma'am. I was commenting on a bill which has
been introduced by Congressman Richardson Preyer. It is a modifica-
tion of a bill written before his death by Alexander Bickel of the Yale
Law School which was designed to provide some means by which
school integration could be carried out, a means which was short of
compulsory racial balance—
COMMISSIONER FREEMAN. IS this voluntary integration?
DR. COLEMAN. It is not voluntary on the part of—
COMMISSIONER FREEMAN. This is what it is supposed to be?
DR. COLEMAN. It is not—
DR. GREEN. Voluntary on the part of the parents.
DR. COLEMAN. Yes, it is not voluntary on the part of receiving
schools.
DR. GREEN. The onus and responsibility is on the parents to take the
initiative to bring about a form or level of desegregation.
COMMISSIONER FREEMAN. That is another name for freedom of cho-
ice?
DR. GREEN. I would think so because I think, again, it would be safe
to infer that not many white parents would be opting to leave Grosse
Pointe and have their kids bussed into the east side of Detroit.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. I think the record ought to show that in terms
of what is available to the courts, the decision by the Supreme Court
in connection with the Wilmington, Delaware, case throws a little dif-
ferent light on that and offers some encouragement.
I know a distinction between de jure and de facto has been running
through this discussion. But we do recognize that the court decisions
up to the present time have rested on a finding that there have been
acts on the part of public officials that have denied constitutional
rights to children and young people. The courts have normally given
school committees or school boards an opportunity to do something
about it. Then when they haven't done anything about it, the courts
have stepped in with their plans.196
Is there agreement on the fact that, when a district court on the
basis of the evidence before it finds that there have been acts on the
part of public officials that deny constitutional rights to children and
young people, then that court has no alternative other than to put into
effect a plan which will correct that unconstitutional situation and
restore those rights to children and young people, whether it involves
transportation of pupils or any other method that the court feels must
be utilized in order to implement the 14th amendment? Are we in
agreement on that?
DR. COLEMAN. We are certainly in agreement on that, Commissioner
Flemming. What we are disagreeing on is the degree of remedy
required of the court.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Well, here the U.S. district court is con-
fronted with the factual situation that I have described. Some people
might question the judgment they exercise in a particular case. But we
don't question, do we, the fact that they have got to come through
with a plan to implement the constitutional rights of children and
young people. Some plans will work better than other plans maybe,
but, nevertheless, the courts have got to come through with a plan. Do
we agree that the Congress should not inhibit in any way, shape, or
manner their ability to develop such a plan and use such remedies as
the evidence in that particular case indicates should be used?
DR. COLEMAN. I have no disagreement at all with that.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. The Court, as we mentioned this morning,
has obviously limited the absolute nature of that so-called constitu-
tional right to a desegregated education. They did it in the Swann case.
They put in factors of health and safety. It is not an absolute right
under the Court's own mandates because they have put, as corollaries,
certain other criteria that they did not feel it was unreasonable to im-
pose on the desegregation plan.
I think some of our problems here when you talk about population
distribution in urban areas run exactly into that difficulty. What you
Ialk about with Washington, D.C., obviously you look at that, every
single child is in a constitutionally prohibited situation, if you follow
the absolute theory here.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Let me say this: I recognize that the Court in
the Swann case identified what I would call common sense standards
that any U.S. district court judge will take into consideration in deter-
mining the kind of plan that has to be implemented.
But you will recall that Dean McKay in his presentation indicated
that he thought that the Congress, if it developed the right kind of a
record, could establish some standards that would guide the courts in
the development of a plan. But he also agreed that if any U.S. district197
court judge decided that one or more of those standards stood in the
way of implementing the constitutional rights of the children or young
people, then that U.S. district court judge would have the right to pass
over that standard in order to reach a decision in that case on the
basis of the facts of that case which, in his judgment, would implement
the constitutional right for the children or young people in that par-
ticular area.
The Congress has recognized this even in their antibusing legislation
when they have put in a phrase to the effect that courts are always
in a position where they can take cognizance of and implement the
constitutional rights of persons involved in a case.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. I think before Dr. Coleman leaves at 4:00
o'clock, it is important to get back to another case of social science
research that many have said was influential in part of the decision of
Brown v. Topeka. That is Gunnar Myrdal's study, with a group of
sociologists and others, on The American Dilemma.
It seems the Court was influenced not only by that study, but also
by a series of court cases starting in a Texas law school and others,
that led to the conclusion you could not get an adequate education if
it were separate but equal because you didn't have the alumni associa-
tion, you didn't have the library, you didn't have the staff facilities,
etc. These were inherently unequal.
I think one of the problems, given application of resources, does the
conclusion necessarily follow in all parts of the country today, and my
impression is, we don't know. We don't have the studies we need to
know. If you have in Washington, D.C., a situation you can't solve on
other than a metropolitan basis, and we have had a whole generation
of children going to school here, we don't know what the effects are.
All I am saying is that the Court made certain assumptions partly
on social science and partly on logic in the 1954 decision. These were
not absolute conditions. They led to a conclusion that I think was quite
justified at the time. But I think what we were searching for here is
what is going on now and what is the proper policy to give children
a decent education. That is what we are talking about, a decent educa-
tion. I think too often it is lost in a lot of legal sophistry.
DR. EPPS. Before we get off onto something else, I think we are still
here talking about legal problems; we are talking at this conference,
as I understand it, about those legal issues. Quality education is, for
me at least, a separate issue. I would love to spend some hours talking
about that.
COMMISSIONER SALTZMAN. If I may, I would like to address Dr.
Coleman on that issue. I mean no innuendoes, Doctor, I am just not
sure of the phrase you used to speak of what we have called the free
choice, voluntary choice, what was that phrase? Integrated what?198
DR. COLEMAN. Integrating transfer.
COMMISSIONER SALTZMAN. NOW, isn't it true that the Supreme Court
has ruled that the burden of affirmative efforts to desegregate schools
is not with the parents but with the school board? Wouldn't you agree?
DR. COLEMAN. The Court has not yet allowed, except in the
Wilmington case, which is not yet perfectly clear, the Court has not
yet allowed a right which this would provide. And that is the right of
a child who doesn't live in a district to attend school in that district.
I think that is a right that a child should have. It is a right which
blacks have been precluded from having because of not being able to
live in certain districts because of being discriminated against through
housing discrimination. So I think it is a right which ought to exist for
every person in the United States.
COMMISSIONER SALTZMAN. Dr. Wolf's initial remarks about the
whites who are fleeing from the city lead me to think of a newspaper
article I just read last week, I think in the New York Times, evaluating
attitudes in Pontiac, Michigan, of the white community with respect to
desegregation of the Pontiac schools. They found in a survey they
made, and I am not sure how scientific it is, that the attitudinal
changes following desegregation were significant. The desegregation of
schools produced attitudinal changes favoring desegregated education.
That it is not the reverse. You do not change attitudes with moralistic
preachments.
I am led to recall Dr. Weaver's point of view this morning, his
behavioral point of view. So in relationship to what you have said, Dr.
Coleman, if we are to await the white majority's change of heart with
respect to its attitudes, we may never achieve it unless we bring,
through the constitutional process, certain structural changes.
DR. COLEMAN. I have never said what you attribute to me. What I
have said is that I believe that compulsory racial balance within a cen-
tral-city school district is both wrong social policy and destabilizing of
the population. Compulsory racial balance in the metropolitan area
may or may not be good social policy. In many large cities, I think
it would be unwise social policy as well.
DR. GREEN. The integrating transfer is compulsory upon the receiv-
ing system. One, if we accept the notion that it is compulsory upon
the receiving system and also accept your assumption that integration
between black and white youngsters is important in that regard, why
place the onus and responsibility and burden upon people who tradi-
tionally are lacking in power to bring about that desired effect? Why
not put the onus and responsibility legally upon public school officials?
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. If I might follow up Commissioner Saltzman's
comment: In Boston we certainly listened to testimony that indicated199
that the institutional change, the structural change we are talking
about definitely brought about an attitudinal change on the part of
principals, faculty, community leaders, and, above all, on the part of
students in those schools.
I see Dr. Green is leaving. I assume he has to catch a plane, also.
And Dr. Coleman. We appreciate the presence of both of them. We
appreciate the fact that we had the opportunity of listening to a
genuine dialogue on some very basic issues.
DR. COLEMAN. Thank you very much, Commissioner Flemming. I
think it has been a fruitful afternoon.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Thank you very much.
Now, do members of the Commission desire to address any further
questions or comments to Dr. Wolf and Dr. Epps? We will go down
the line.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. Dr. Wolf, I am concerned about the case
study approach. I agree with you regarding the need for "success" sto-
ries and I said it the day I came on this Commission. Chairman
Flemming said it the day he came on this Commission. We need more
success stories. One of my concerns is that there has been too much
self-flagellation, too much dwelling on the "racist society attitude" and
not enough showing people how to go from point A to point B.
So I would agree with you on the need for case studies and that ap-
proach. This Commission has done a number of them. One of the
problems, though, which I feel the case study approach has, and I
would like your reaction, is that it is journalistic in the sense that it
is common sense. You pick and choose based on your own selective
value judgments— the researcher, Commission, whoever is doing the
study.
One of my feelings is that we need something better than that and
that survey research, whether you are talking about a Gallup or Harris
poll or what not, has better tools than simply going out and doing what
your instincts lead you to do and that we could scientifically, if you
would, go out and get on a random sample basis a cross-section of ex-
periences, and that this is what the RAND report sought to do, talking
to school principals, community leaders, children in the school, and so
forth. I would merely ask: Isn't that a better approach?
DR. WOLF. Let me see if I can respond to that in a variety of ways.
First, the point that I tried to make at the outset was not that this kind
of statistical data is wrong and we should not continue to pursue these
kinds of studies. I merely said we have a tendency to overrely on that
kind of data. It is very obvious that there are problems related to that
methodology. I think the one example in Dr. Coleman's study of col-
lecting data on school district enrollment, then making inferences that200
imply policies as they relate to certain schools, creates a problem. So
it is the overreliance on that kind of data that bothers me.
Now, I think that in Dr. Green's paper he talked about the ecologi-
cal fallacy. I think there is a more devastating fallacy that runs through
all social science. That is the fallacy of objectivity. I don't believe
because we subject variables to quantification and statistical manipula-
tion that that makes the process objective. We still decide on what we
are going to study, what the questions are, and we still select ap-
propriate statistics we think would be the most telling.
So I really do not believe at all that quantitative statistical kinds of
analyses are any more objective than case study methodologies. When
you get right down to it, it is a function of the integrity of the
researcher. That is the critical dimension to all research, not the par-
ticular method they employ because you can engage in many
safeguards in the process of doing case study field methodology that
will enable you to guard against improper inferences. And I think that
that sort of approach would be more telling, more useful.
There is a problem with the over-reliance on easily measurable vari-
ables. We have a tendency in all research that relates to education to
select things that lend themselves most to measurement quantification.
We get into a lot of problems with it. I think there are many glaring
examples at the national level of that sort of problem.
Perhaps one of the best examples is the evaluation of Head Start.
I have engaged in a study now and I have gone and I have talked to
many of the people involved in the original steering committee, the
people who put the Head Start program together, and we have found
in talking to these people at great length that the language that they
used to create that program had nothing to do with the measures ulti-
mately used to measure its effectiveness. I think we can get into the
same kind of problem with desegregation.
The ultimate objective, if it is to create equality in education, if it
is to nurture and support interaction across race, I think we would ulti-
mately, to do justice to this vital question, need to develop procedures
that will enable us to get at those issues. Quite often we gravitate to
the things that lend themselves most to statistical surveys. I don't be-
lieve that kind of data is the most revealing.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. Dr. Wolf, it seems to me—and I would agree
with you on the value-biased-oriented nature of social science and so-
cial scientists are presumably trying to guard against that—but to get
to the "ought's," you have to first know what are the "is's." It seems
we don't know all the "is's" right now.
We have a scattering of studies, some of which are mentioned in Dr.
Green's paper. Someone examines 20 school districts in 1 year or 13201
school districts over 2 years, a junior high school here compared to
one there. It is a complete hodgepodge.
One of my first questions to Dr. Coleman was on the adequacy of
the data that he had to solve his problem. What I was trying to elicit
was what data would you really like to have to answer the question,
because my concern as I have read his studies over the months has
been that you are dealing with gross aggregate data that I think leads
you into a lot of possible mis- interpretation. I think it leads the critics
into a lot of misinterpretation.
My hope is that reasonable people can sit down and say, "Look, first
we need to know what is going on in a wide range of schools— those
that are defined as desegregated to those defined as segregated, in dif-
ferent economic areas, different racial mixtures." Then we need to
know where desegregation is occurring and has that successfully oc-
curred. And I believe you can get some of that through case studies.
But, again, that is such a selective process I would rather see us ap-
proach the school just as Gallup or Harris approach public opinion, in
the sense of drawing a random sample of schools in certain categories
and then analyzing those in depth and tracking the students over time
as they move within a school, between schools, between areas. It is ex-
pensive and it costs a lot. But right now public policy in this country
is being made on a hodgepodge of impressions and emotions and not
really based on any solid analysis.
DR. EPPS. Even if you had that kind of data you would still not be
immune to the kinds of problems we are faced with today.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. At least you would have the data. Then you
could argue about the value of assumptions from that data.
DR. EPPS. But remember, your data are no better than the questions
you ask.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. That can be solved. Gallup and Harris get
at it. Sure, they made a mistake in 1948 but they haven't repeated it.
DR. EPPS. The questions they ask are very superficial.
DR. WOLF. Yes. Those policies seem to be attractive and popular,
but they are fraught with problems from a measurement perspective.
I received a questionnaire from the National Rifle Foundation, an
opinion poll. I don't know why it came to me, but I suspect perhaps
others received it as well. There was no way in the world that I could
have responded to the questions in any other way than they wanted
me to.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. That is the typical congressional question-
naire we all know about that they send their constituents. But you
know social science can and does do better than that.
DR. EPPS. But even so, I think they would be the first to admit that
they were far from perfect.202
COMMISSIONER SALTZMAN. Are you saying if I may ask that, irrespec-
tive of whatever sociological studies we undertake, that we are dealing
with perhaps a moral imperative, a constitutional responsibility, even
more than what derives from sociological studies, and this ought to be
the basis for policymaking in the area, how we achieve the constitu-
tional requirement of desegregation.
DR. WOLF. It is not just a function of the data which you collect.
It is the function of the way in which you display that data and the
way in which you form policy with that data. The problems Dr. Green
found in Dr. Coleman's work, not so much in his work as in the way
he presented that evidence to the press before it had been adequately
criticized by other social scientists, I think that is a critical problem.
I believe there is a value to that kind of data. But only when you
have a human being who can sit down and help you understand the
nature and facilities of that data does that data become as valuable as
it can be. Merely to do studies and publish studies and to make policy
decisions on the basis of those studies and then find methodological
criticisms that go on for 2 years after a fundamental decision has been
made seems to me to be a very serious limitation to our methodology.
I would like the kinds of things that went on here today to occur in
all instances when social policy needs to be formulated.
Dr. Epps, you have a comment you would like to make.
DR. EPPS. First, we have to keep in mind, I think, that we are talking
about trends. Dr. Coleman talks about projections. He should be very
careful to point out that these trends don't apply to any particular city.
Secondly, that these trends change. If you know the history of popula-
tion prediction, I would say we are dealing in an area that is just as
shaky.
Whatever predictions we make on the basis of 1966, 1968, 1973,
may not hold for 1983. It may be a completely different social and
political situation. The recession itself, for example, we are going
through now may have a profound impact on housing patterns. There
is soft evidence that people may be coming back to the city already,
irrespective of what is going on in the schools.
This makes me want to tell everybody, be very careful about the
conclusions you draw from this kind of research.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Thank you very much.
Mr. Keppel, we are just deiighted to have you with us. I know un-
doubtedly a large percentage of the persons who are in the audience
right now know and respect the kind of leadership you have provided
us for a great many years.
Dr. Keppel was one of our witnesses in connection with the Boston
hearing. As I recall it, he was on the stand a very short period of time203
but he hit the nail right on the head within a very short period of time
and helped us a great deal. That came near the end of 5 days of public
hearing, as I recall.
So we are delighted to have you with us again. We look forward to
your comments.
MR. KEPPEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think your staff went through a most astonishing process in finding
somebody who was supposed to summarize and synthesize. One usually
looks for somebody with personal or professional detachment. I had
something to do with Secretary Weaver when he was at HUD. He is
an old colleague and close personal friend. Bob McKay and I are col-
leagues right now. Mr. Green and I worked on Prince Edward County
schools and I even appointed James Coleman to make that report that
started all this.
[Laughter.]
As a matter of fact, I have even traveled to Boston, Detroit, and
Chicago. But I came back fast from Chicago. Therefore, I am not
detached and I am perfectly sure, Mr. Chairman, that you knew very
well that I am not.
What I was trying to do was to listen. The meeting is impossible to
summarize. In any case, it is impertinent to summarize to a commis-
sion of this distinction and an audience of this distinction what they
have been hearing and reading. I am not going to try.
Now that I am back in the hallowed halls of bureaucracy, I will go
back to my old habits, which is the way we always make progress in
Washington—let me try to "reorganize."
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. That is in order, always.
MR. KEPPEL. Let me think from the point of view of the members
of the Commission as to what its agenda might be without pretending
to any knowledge about what conclusions might be reached.
I take it, not exactly from what was directly said today but from
what lay behind whatever anyone was saying, that the hardest job is
to get the perspective right in the public mind; the extent to which
there is an understanding (and I don't pretend that it be a social scien-
tific understanding) of the kind of history that Secretary Weaver was
speaking to this morning.
He reports social forces that have been at work, some of them for
100 years, some since the Second World War, some even more recent,
which are deep, fundamental forces. Compared to them the small per-
centage figures shown in some of the studies being argued today about
white flight are tiny. The need for perspective seems to me to be the
most difficult problem we have. It is a perspective, as the Chairman
has made clear, which involves social class.204
A second aspect, a more recent aspect, of what seems to me as per-
spective, is a point Mr. McKay made this morning. I will try to repeat
it. He pointed to the fact that when the executive, the legislative and
judicial branches were going in the same direction, at roughly the same
time, one had not only something "happening" in the sense of public
education, but one also had something happening in public attitude
and public response. When these three either went at different speeds
or in different directions (and I think Mr. McKay suggested maybe
both of those took place at one time or another) one faces a complete-
ly different situation.
The first case (where they were going together) was illustrated at
the beginning of Mr. Coleman's paper, where I recall there was that
most dramatic figure of change in the Southeast. There seemed to be
a difference during the period in which the executive, the legislative,
and judiciary went forward together. An aspect: Busing is, as Mr.
McKay put it, a legal conclusion. But it is also a symbolic issue. I sub-
mit this (the question of perspective on busing) is the first agenda item
for the Commission.
The second is an estimate by the Commission of where we actually
are in the United States. The Vice Chairman has been putting
questions to try to get a reasonably accurate picture of which way are
we moving. To put it rather bluntly, given the fact that the executive,
legislative, and judicial would appear to be going in somewhat different
directions from each other, is the net effect that the Nation is moving
backward into the sixties? This is a judgment that the Commission and
people of the United States have to make.
It is perfectly clear there is considerable disagreement on the facts
as they are collected now, or the ersatz facts as perhaps one could
argue they are sometimes. Consider the percentage changes in propor-
tion of the white population out from the cities, which has been a sub-
ject of enormous public dispute: How important is that shift over time
and in comparison to the past? I am forced to ask myself that question
compared to the larger question of carrying out moral, as well as the
legal, considerations.
Mr. Chairman, I would judge more than half of what we have been
talking about has been the question of how much we trust the studies.
Social scientists seem to be developing—which they didn't always have
in the sixties—a kind of commendable modesty and civility with each
other. They are asking themselves the question: How much should one
depend on what they tell us?
I am forced to comment that I feel deeply sympathetic with the
Commission. You have clearly before you the extraordinarily difficult
problem of balancing off the legal argument—which is clear
enough—against that of reliance on sociological data.205
I am sure that in Boston—though not stated here, but surely un-
derneath what was stated here—the clear issue was how much aching,
heartbreaking reaction, physical reaction, can you ask of a communi-
ty?
The Commission is faced with proposals it might make for changes
in the law. I assume one of the tasks of the Commission is also to in-
fluence professional understanding. It was hinted but never quite stated
here that a number of things had to come together for desegregation
to work well. This means a relationship between the methods by which
the courts make decisions on specific cases, the executive branch
makes decisions on specific cases, and the legislative branch makes
policy.
Now, I heard nothing said today as to whether there is any informal
machinery—other than of the Commission— between these branches.
I have served as a master in a court, and I am well aware of the fact
that the court operates to a great degree by itself. What may be
missing, at which the Commission might look is the possibility of the
informal (under our separation of government I guess it would have
to be that way) system of communication between the three branches
of government. I have heard no reference to this today.
The Vice Chairman raised the question of effective remedies. But I
judge that is not your topic today. That is, you are not dealing with
the question of what remedy obtained the best results for pupils. Might
I assume that is coming up some other time?
Finally, we have trouble, troubled societies, very troubled with the
effects of what they are doing, or the noneffects. We have lawyers, as
I understand it, concerned that they are moving into an area where,
while they know the constitutional interpretation, they cannot predict
the social reactions. We have an executive branch banged around
between the two.
I want to close, Mr. Chairman, where I closed the last time I
testified before you—and this is personal, not an effort to summarize.
I want to say that from what I have sensed and underneath what I
heard said about the shifts of attitudes, both by Mr. Weaver and Mr.
McKay, that the only likely way in which deep-lying attitudes are going
to be changed—on which there was evidence saying they had been
changed in some cases—was when the executive branch fully sup-
ported the judicial with all the powers of the state.
Curiously, that point never came up in a single one of the discus-
sions today. But is that not ultimately where fundamental national
opinions are formed?
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. YOU did raise that one in Boston. You
probably recall this was one of our major points in our findings and
recommendations.206
MR. KEPPEL. It may be that the way to have the largest effect on
the public opinion is that very act, to put matters into perspective.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. YOU have been very helpful.
I will ask if there are any questions, comments, my colleagues might
like to make in light of Dr. Keppel's comments.
COMMISSIONER SALTZMAN. I appreciate the significance of leadership.
Perhaps on a par with that is the significance of the kinds of structural
changes which bring attitudinal changes. As I have personally gone
along in the work of the Commission I have come more and more to
recognize the significance; structural changes bring about fundamental
attitudinal changes rather than the reverse.
MR. KEPPEL. I think I would agree. I am not sure what you mean
by structural changes. Would this mean metropolitanization as one ex-
ample?
COMMISSIONER SALTZMAN. And desegregation of schools and ex-
perience with the buses rather than talking about the buses.
MR. KEPPEL. Mr. Weaver used the phrase, if I remember cor-
rectly—I don't understand the language of the social sciences—but I
think he said he wanted to talk about "behavior."
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. I was intrigued by your idea of getting some
group that could bridge the gap in an informal way between the
legislative and judicial and executive branches. That is one device
which, while it might not be perfect, might bring people together to
get at the problem solving and get away from the rhetoric. I think
there are a few such proposals in Congress. In raising this question I
am not making any commitment to them because I haven't read them.
I have just heard about them. But I am thinking about a Hoover- type
commission made up of perhaps 15 or 20 American men and women
with impeccable credentials from both parties, perhaps a few retired
judges as well as some current and former Members of the Congress,
private citizens, members of the executive branch, who could super-
vise—you have heard me preach on this before—the implementation
of a national longitudinal study and could really take a fresh look at
what is going on in this country and try to come forth with some
recommendations to the American people as well as the governmental
structure to solve some of these problems. How would you react to
that?
MR. KEPPEL. I would react favorably. I think I am trying to go one
step further. A lot of this depends on the timing in particular cases of
actions which are both executive and judicial; more rarely legislative,
but occasionally so.
It is bringing together the action of those two, a continuing process
of some sort which, for all I know, may well be going on informally207
right now, but I just don't know of it. I am struck with the loneliness,
Mr. Chairman, of the people involved in this.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. I wouldn't object to that kind of an approach
to deal with some of the basic issues that confront us in this area. But
I sense you're saying something different. You stress the informal, and
it would have to be informal because of our separation of powers. Yet
there is not anything—there isn't that kind of a dialogue going on at
the present time between people in the executive branch and the
legislative branch and the judiciary.
MR. KEPPEL. When I was Commissioner of Education I always got
the impression that I couldn't, shouldn't, and in any case didn't call
up the office of the Federal district judge. That isn't to say we never
had gossip sessions going on. But I don't think the gossip system is a
very effective way of doing things.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. That is an interesting job description.
But what you are feeling for, I think, is very, very important.
Of course, the thing that keeps emerging from all of these discus-
sions, as far as I am concerned, is the fact that some of the so-called
studies and some of the articles, editorials, and so on are just leading
people down a blind alley, just like we found in Boston.
People who talk about the fact that they can bring about some
change in Federal laws that would make it possible to avoid confront-
ing what the judges say we have to confront are rendering a great dis-
service.
We are not going to take away in the final analysis from the courts
the authority to implement provisions in the Constitution.
I agree with Dean McKay.
If we move in the direction of some of these proposed constitutional
amendments in this and one or two other areas I could mention, it
would mean that, for the first time, we would be amending the Con-
stitution of the United States in order to water down or deprive per-
sons of rights instead of amending the Constitution in order to
strengthen or add to the rights that the people have. I don't think there
is enough emphasis on that aspect of some current efforts to amend
the Constitution.
Over the next 8 or 9 months we are going to do our best to get on
the top of the table some of the forward movement in this area. Some
of us feel that a hearing like the Boston hearing helps.
I also, as Commissioner Saltzman said, believe we cannot overlook
the fact that we are dealing with basic constitutional and moral issues.
VICE CHAIRMAN HORN. In conclusion, I would like placed in the
record this brief summary prepared by the RAND Corporation which
I have referred to on a number of occasions.
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. Without objection, it will be done.208
[The material referred to is on file at the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights.]
CHAIRMAN FLEMMING. DO any other members of the Commission
have any other comments?
If not, we express to Dr. Wolf and Dr. Epps, again, our appreciation
for their being here. And, again, Mr. Keppel, thanks so much.840023 (09-83) 1365
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